One Hundred Days - 3: The Americans at St. Mihiel and the Argonne

Pershing - hubris at St. Mihiel,
nemesis in the Argonne.

The Allies were now making significant progress towards victory on the Western Front. Although in the war since April 1917, the Americans were about to make their first independent foray in this theatre. Previous posts have noted their contributions as part of the British defence in Operation Michael and, notably, in a stirring attack at Belleau Wood near Chateau Thierry in the second Battle of the Marne. Now, however, a US army – 500,000 strong – led by its own Commander and providing its own supplies and communications was about to make its mark at the southeastern section of the front.

General Pershing was a strong man, imbued with the hubris that often attaches to such roles. Plucked from a very different environment chasing revolutionaries in Mexico (see Post 9/3/2017) he had, since his arrival in France, argued for the creation of an independently led army, rather than a supplier of reinforcements to the British and French armies. Curiously, he still believed that the superior character and condition of his men would prevail, where British and French armies had been dragged into costly attritional fighting. Shades of Joffre in 1914. Admittedly Pershing’s men were well trained and in excellent physical condition, making them less vulnerable to the influenza that was sweeping through more tired and weakened ranks on both sides. But they had zero experience of the atrocious realities of modern warfare. Nevertheless, Pershing regarded lightly and condescendingly the lessons so painfully learnt over the past four years. Not surprisingly, Haig and Pétain opposed his views and Foch, as supremo who was able to give Pershing orders, had to manage the tensions. The large numbers of American troops arriving in Europe on a weekly basis strengthened Pershing’s case, of course, and Foch was minded to support him. There was also a certain logic to allocating the north section of the Western Front to Britain (with Belgian support at the coastal end); to the French controlling the largest, central sector in front of Paris and Verdun; and for the Americans to take the lead in the shortest section, to the south east and to the east of Verdun. Their chance came with the attack on the St. Mihiel salient.

The area around St Mihiel comprised the longest standing salient on the entire Western Front. It pre-dated Ypres, and was formed during the giant enveloping German movements of autumn 1914, which had only been halted by the desperate battles comprising the ‘miracle’ of the Marne. The map shows a sharply protruding triangle with its apex on the river Meuse at St. Mihiel. It stretched 15 miles to the north to Fresnes and 25miles to Pont-à-Mousson on the river Moselle to the east. Thus forty miles of line to defend rather than 25miles across the base of the triangle. The Germans had stayed in the salient because it enabled them to threaten key French railway routes – notably Paris to Avricourt – thereby isolating Verdun*, and its terrain made it relatively easy to defend. The French had made costly and unsuccessful attempts to recapture the salient through 1915, but since then it had been a comparatively uneventful area.

Foch now wanted to take it back, not only to relieve the pressures on his own rail links, but also to breakthrough to the Woeuvre plain and the Germans’ own railway supply routes to the upper Oise and Aisne areas. Coming south round Luxembourg these comprised one of the two vital arteries from the German heartland maintaining the German armies in France**. These two networks met at the major junction at Longuyon. If Foch’s forces could get here, the entire southern communication routes of Germany could be isolated.

The defending German army was the 5^th, commanded by General Max von Gallwitz. He had seven Divisions to defend his forty miles line, but numbers were depleted by influenza and long term casualties and he had only 50,000 men, with a few Austro-Hungarians as a weak reserve. Pershing’s first army comprised nearly ten times that number, although he deployed two divisions of 15,000 men each for the first attack. At great speed he proceeded to move his men around the salient during early September.

Gallwitz could read the writing on the wall. Even before the main American build up he had pressed Ludendorff for permission to withdraw and shorten his lines. As the gravity of Germany’s position worsened, Ludendorff recognised the inevitability and gave orders to pull back on September 12^th. Too late. At 1am on 12^th an enormous American bombardment fell on 11miles of the southern aspect of the salient. At 5am troops went over the top, and were followed soon by tanks. The Americans were pushing at an open door and the Germans – already preparing to leave – fell back as quickly as they could. Within four hours the Americans had control of the railways running through the area, and within 24 hours they had taken Vigneilles at the base of the salient. Some further advance were made, but the battle of the St. Mihiel salient was over in three days. The Americans, in their first major action in the Western Front, had secured a crushing victory with less than 1000 casualties, and the taking of 16,000 prisoners. Their most advanced units were within range of the defensive Howitzers of Metz. Pershing felt vindicated, and wanted to pursue the Germans hotfoot down the Meuse valley towards Belgium, but he was to be denied.

Americans (with British Helmets) after the
great victory at St. Mihiel.

The British and French at Supreme HQ were less than generous in their appraisal of Pershing’s success, viewing it as a picnic rather than a true battle. More importantly, Foch was determined that Pershing should join the fight alongside the French 4^th Army, east of Rheims in an operation moving through the Argonne to the north and east. Foch now believed in a victory in 1918, but only if the Siegfried line at the heart of the Western Front could be captured. In truth, the ‘line’ was now more of a zone, a rectangular area of nearly 40 x 25 miles of formidable defensive fortifications. He preferred to push well to the west of the Meuse valley to break through the Argonne and towards the junction at Longuyon (see above), thereby cutting supply lines to the Siegfried areas.

Pershing was obliged to fall in with Foch’s plan. In an impressive feat of logistics he moved his army and its support and equipment some sixty miles to the west in less than two weeks, to line up on the right flank of General Gouraud (a hardened veteran who had left an arm at Gallipoli in 1915). Gouraud and Pershing’s assault began on 26^th September. There was to be no repeat of St. Mihiel. Allied casualties were heavy***. The Americans advanced only seven miles in three days of hard fighting in difficult territory, and were becoming bogged down in stalemated local actions. Pershing was now experiencing the harsh realities of the Western Front. On 29^th, in line with Foch’s strategy he called off his attack. Ironically, on that day, the British were making perhaps the most significant breakthrough of the 100 days – at the Canal du Nord at St. Quentin.

* A factor in Falkenhayn’s decision to attack Verdun in 1916 (See Post 2/5/2016)

** The other ran north of Luxembourg and round the Ardennes and through Liege to supply Belgium and Northern France.

*** Two future famous generals fought in these actions, MacArthur and Patton - the latter being badly injured in the Argonne as he led a tank advance.