One Hundred Days - 4: The Battle for the Saint-Quentin Canal

A famous moment. On the canal bank by
the captured Riqueval Bridge, soldiers of
49th Division relax, having been
relieved by 32nd Division.

Ludendorff was back in command, to some extent recovered from his physical and mental breakdown in July. He saw a position that was desperate but not yet terminal. His forces still held firmly to key defensive positions around Ypres: on the high ground east of Rheims; in the Meuse valley and, most importantly, at the Siegfried zone in Picardie. If he could keep this line until winter he would have time to reinforce, thus strengthening Germany’s negotiating position.

From top to bottom of the Western Front the armies were lined up against each other for the denouement of this grotesque war*. Ludendorff concentrated his limited reserves in Lorraine – his communications nerve centre. The previous post outlined how the French and Americans had moved to threaten this with the opening of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. If Germany were to lose either Longuyon in Lorraine or the security of the Siegfried zone defensive, then Ludendorff’s hopes for the winter would be ruined. 

Allied supremo Foch appreciated this, but was now in the enviable position of being able to continue with devastating assaults on multiple points of the entire front to tie down and weaken the German resistance.

Notwithstanding Foch’s tactical policy, the central attack on the Siegfried zone in front of Saint-Quentin was the most critical of this phase. The responsibility fell to Rawlinson’s 4^th army, which covered the front from Cambrai to Saint-Quentin. There was considerable anxiety in London about potential for high casualties from a full frontal assault on the most strongly defended section of the Western Front. Once again, Haig’s resolve that his forces could, and would, succeed prevailed. Rawlinson would receive flank support from Byng’s 3^rd army on the north, and from Debeney’s 1^st French army to his south. For his own part, Rawlinson wanted his army’s Australian Corps to spearhead the attack. Like Haig, he was confident of success, but on this occasion Monash, the Australian commander was hesitant. Just as Rawlinson's British Corps had been in action since March with little relief, so had the Australians, and they had been leaders in many of the crunch confrontations. Mounting casualties and tiredness were having their effects. Then Monash was greatly cheered by the assignment of two USA Divisions (27^th and 30^th), each comprising 15,000 fresh troops, under his command. He now agreed to Rawlinson’s request to devise an attack to break through the Hindenburg line and open up the Germans’ whole defensive zone**.

The Siegfried zone was formidable. Not only were the entrenchments, fortifications and machine gun nests several miles deep, they were given added sophistication by a network of water barriers. These comprised the Sensée and Scheldt rivers and several canals, the most forbidding of which was the Saint-Quentin section of the Canal du Nord – Rawlinson’s target. The main German trenches were on the eastern bank, but advance posts on the west bank were skilfully positioned to deter effective artillery support for the attackers. The map shows, however, that for a 3.5 miles stretch from Vendhuile to Bellicourt the canl ran through a tunnel. The tunnel had multiple shafts connecting to the trenches above, so that large numbers of men could rest and shelter there during bombardments. As it emerged from the tunnel, the canal’s cutting was very deep, becoming shallower as it proceeded south to Bellenglise, where it was incomplete, and dry. In effect, these forward areas comprised the Hindenburg line, whereas the several miles of defences behind, that extended on a line from Beaurevoir to Fonsomme, comprised the Siegfried ‘zone’.

The towns of Cambrai and Saint-Quentin, already the focus of much attention in the war, were critical to the success of the Alies’ plans. Twenty miles apart on a north-south line they formed the bulwarks of Germany’s defences in Picardie. Cambrai was the railhead for all supplies to the area, and Saint-Quentin held the key to the Siegfried zone.

Monash planned to make his attack across the ground above the tunnel. Despite the strength of its defensive positions, it would allow him to deploy his tanks. He nominated the fresh American troops of the 27^th and 30^th Divisions to make the first wave breakthrough (see Map), and then his Australian Corps would ‘leapfrog’ them and break into the Siegfried zone and the north west of Saint-Quentin. Two British Corps, totalling six Divisions, would provide the follow up support. Rawlinson made one significant (and prescient) change to Monash’s plan. At the suggestion of its Commander, Sir Walter Braithwaite, he moved IX Corps*** into the front line to the right of the 30^th Division. Its role was to cross the canal south of its emergence from the tunnel. Success here would enable fire to be brought upon those defending against Monash’s tanks and infantry. The steep slopes of the cutting were fifty feet deep, and the Germans felt them to be impregnable, let alone the challenges of getting men and equipment across the canal – itself 50-60 feet wide and several feet deep. Monash thought the idea mad (possibly influenced by a widespread Australian distaste for Braithwaite, who had been Hamilton’s Staff officer throughout Gallipoli back in 1915). So, probably, did the infantry of the 49^th (Midland) Division, given the job of making the hazardous crossing.

Haig started the battle on 27^th September with a feint at the northern end, aimed at Cambrai. Byng’s 3^rd Army jumped off from the stalemated areas of the 1917 battle (See Post 20/11/2017). British and Canadian troops advanced on a thirteen mile front. As they advanced through Gouzeaucourt and Marcoing, they revisited the ground so fiercely contested in operation Michael around the Flesquieres salient. On the 28^th, Plumer’s 2^nd army stretched the feint to Flanders as they broke through north of Ploegsteert Wood (south of Messines) advancing and taking 10,000 prisoners. To Rawlinson’s south, Mangin also struck in Champagne. Meanwhile at the heart of the battle line, the 4^th army artillery had been pulverizing the German lines for 48 hours with new record breaking numbers of shell and gas canisters. The Americans launched their assault at 6am on 29^th, along the six miles from Vendhuile to Bellicourt; while the British opened their own attack on the next six miles down to Holnon.

Unlike the recent triumphs at Amiens and Bapaume, this operation did not go according to timetable. Whether because of inexperience of the Americans, or  because of the scale of the challenge (or a combination of the two) the 27^th Division's attack failed. Rawlinson brought in extra tanks in support, but these were badly mauled by improving German anti-tank guns. Fog again interfered with plans. In poor visibility, the American spearhead passed unaware a number of German outposts, resulting in heavy losses to their countrymen in the following waves. The 30^th Division fared better, and did break across the tunnel mound to capture Bellicourt, but with heavy losses, and the Australian leapfrog was not able to reach its objectives.

Sir Walton Pipon Braithwaite.
An egg. Zero at Gallipoli, hero at
Saint-Quentin

It was Rawlinson’s modification to the south that transformed disappointment to staggering success. Supported by a highly effective creeping barrage, the men of IX Corps under command of Braithwaite, moved forward. The 49^th Division went first, and other the helpful cover of fog they tackled the canal. The Royal Engineers provided floating piers and life belts, and on the eastern bank scaling ladders were used to climb up and into the trenches. The Staffordshire regiment famously seized the only remaining canal bridge at Riqueval before the Germans could blow it. With this secured, and support of a tank brigade – that had crossed the tunnel in the 30^th American sector and driven down the east bank – the 49^th established a strong bridgehead and moved on to reach all of their objectives. This included Bellenglise with its great supply and troop centre. Later in the day the 32^nd Division moved forward to relieve the 49^th, and to leapfrog them, and by nightfall the whole of the 32^nd was on the eastern side of the canal.

This stunning success unlocked the battle. The pressure on Monash’s advance was relieved. The following day progress east by the 1^st Division of IX Corps enabled the French 1^st army to advance and tighten the noose around Saint-Quentin. To the north Byng’s 3^rd army continued to encroach on the outskirts of Cambrai. The twin pillars of Cambrai and Saint-Quentin would hold for a further week, but their fate was sealed.

By 8^th October, the final act of the Great war was opening, with Allied advances along the whole 250 miles of the Western Front. As Buchan summarises it:

“The Belgians and Plumer were threatening Lille from the north. Cambrai was outflanked, Saint-Quentin had fallen, and the larger part of the main Siegfried line had gone….. Mangin had regained the west part of the Chemin des Dames, and Berthelot had reached the Aisne and cleared all the land between that river and the Vesle. Gouraud was through the first position in Champagne, and close on the Brunehilde line. Pershing, though his advance was naturally slower, was feeling for a blow at the most deadly spot of all.”

In the months since July, the Western Allies had taken more than a quarter of a million German prisoners and 25,000 machine guns. In other theatres away from the Western Front the news was even worse for Ludendorff and the Kaiser.

*The Germans, by now significantly depleted in troop numbers (frequently 7,000 or less men per Division rather than 10,000), were still arranged in three Army groups comprising nine separate armies. From north to south these were: IV (under von Armin), VI (von Quast); XVII (von Below), II (Carlowitz), VIII (von Hutier), VII (Eberhardt), I (Mudra), III (von Einem) and V (von Marwitz). The Allied line up against them was (from the north also): Belgian army (King Albert); British armies: 2^nd (Plumer), ‘new' 5^th (Birdwood), 1^st (Horne), 3^rd (Byng), and 4^th (Rawlinson); French armies: 1^st (Debeney), 10^th (Mangin), 5^th (Bertelot), and 4^th (Gouraud); and the American 1^st Army (Pershing). 

** Terminology can be confusing here. Following the German withdrawal to their new line in early 1917, the Allies referred to the entire line as the Hindenburg Line. The Siegfried line (now zone) was but one section of this line, albeit the strongest and most significant. Other sections also were named after German mythological figures eg Brunehilde

*** IX Corps had been badly damaged in the Battle of the Lys, moved south to recuperate, only to get caught up in the German offensive on the Aisne. It had seen tough times.