Tuesday 26 June 2018

Kaiserschlacht 7 - The (3rd) Battle of the Aisne


Operation Blucher-Yorck June 1918. Despite the gains, the
Germans did not get as close to Paris as in September 1914

The large territorial gains made in the early stages of Operation Michael and Operation Georgette (see Posts 21/3/2018 and 8/5/2018) brought a mixed reaction in their home country. The Kaiser, his military leaders and many politicians looked at the maps and became overconfident, missing the significance of the later stalemates and attrition. Talk of a negotiated peace trailed away to be replaced by more strident demands for territory and reparations in outright victory that was surely coming. Richard von Kuhlmann, now a high profile foreign minister following his success at the Brest-Litovsk treaty (See Post 22/1/2018) was one of a minority who argued for holding fast to the new gains, but to consolidate the position in the east, and strengthen Germany’s hand for a negotiated peace. The German people were less convinced by the extravagant claims of impending victory. Not only were they hungry and war weary, they were sick of the huge casualty figures resulting from the ‘triumphs’. They were now being discomforted further by British RAF air raids, penetrating as far into Germany as Cologne.
However, Ludendorff was not prepared to make any concessions in his Kaiserchlacht. In the relative calm during May, he had managed to replace more than 70% of the half million casualties  from the offensive so far. Frustrated near Amiens and in Flanders, he still aimed to split the British and French armies as a prelude to victory.
Ludendorff now resolved to attack at the southern limit of the great salient created by Operation Michael. His plan was to drive through and weaken further Foch’s reserves by drawing them south from Flanders. He would then return to the Somme region in the centre to apply the coup de grace, separating the British and French. In that sense the Battle of the Aisne* was a diversionary action. Some diversion, some action.

Ludendorff’s selection of the Aisne was for reasons similar to his choice of the Lys for Georgette. It was sufficiently far from the central thrust to weaken Allied reserves there, and it threatened key Allied possessions. At the Lys it was communications and the Channel ports. At the Aisne it would be the main communication routes to Champagne (south of the Marne), and Paris itself. Operation Michael had created a large salient, like a nose, from the Hindenburg line into the heart of France, and his plan now was to create another salient – a large pimple on the nose – towards the river Marne; and then another, further west towards Compiegne (see map). In the final phase, he would consolidate these, and link with his existing salient at Montdidier (See Post 4/3/2018) thereby isolating Amiens and Paris. Having sucked all Allied reserves into these areas he would be enabled to resume his advances further north.
The Army Group under Crown Prince Wilhelm had forty Divisions between two armies to carry out this surprise move. The I Army was commanded by the veteran von Below, and the VII Army was under von Boene. The armies were to attack on a 30 miles front between Reims and the river Ailette (a tributary of the Oise) to the west. Their first objective would be the high plateau of the now infamous Chemin des Dames (See Post 13/5/2017).
Once again, the German concealed their preparations well, and would find themselves advancing against a weak section of the Front. This time it was the French that would bear the brunt of the attacks, although on the right of their defensive line stood the ill-fated British 9th Army Corps. It had been formed specifically for the Gallipoli campaign in 1915 before transferring to France at the end of that terrible saga. It had been commanded by General Hamilton Gordon since 1916, and had recently taken a severe mauling at the Battle of the Lys; being transferred south to this quiet (sic) sector to recuperate. Marshall Foch still believed the main German resumption would come against Arras or in Champagne, and had opted to leave the Chemin des Dames lightly defended by five divisions of the 6th French Army, under General Maistre (who had finally won it from the Germans in the Battle of Malmaison in October 1917 (see Post 10/12/2017)).

The German assault began with the now familiar gas and heavy artillery barrage through the night of 26-27th May. Soon after dawn an irresistible attack of storm troopers and infantry broke through the weak defences on the plateau, and before long they were on the Aisne. On the right, the British had more initial success in holding the Germans but by afternoon they were forced back across the Aisne at Berry au Bac.
Men of the Worcestershire Regiment
defending the Aisne south bank
Ludendorff’s day 1 success was, for the first time in Kaiserschlacht, beyond his objectives (see map). He was in a position to advance rapidly to the Marne, and if his flanks could broaden the sharp salient he was creating, he could sniff Paris. By the end of the next day, his forces were on the high ground north of Soissons, and infiltrating to the east of the town.
However, that same day saw the first significant involvement of the American army. Its 1st Division, acting with the French 1st Army, was part of a successful counter-attack and capture of Cantigny, near Montdidier. This pressurised the north-west of the German advance, and was an ominous sign, since 250,000 American troops were now arriving in France every month.
On 29th came the next German surge towards the Marne. Soissons fell, and by the evening of 30th von Boehne had control of a ten mile stretch of the Marne, around Chateau Thierry. However, on his flanks he could not advance beyond Soissons, nor could von Below take Reims.
Paul Maistre - somewhat
harshly sacked for caving
in at Les Chemin des Dames
Ludendorff was reaching the limits of his advance. He needed desperately to broaden the base of his salient, the tip of which was Chateau Thierry. The lure of Paris was too great for him to stop, but it meant he must commit all of his forty Divisions and most of his reserve – the very trap into which he had planned to force Foch. A series of actions, very costly for the Germans, created an uneasy stalemate by 3rd June, and a need for Ludendorff  to switch the focus of his attack. This came on 9th June, with a major attack to the west, led by von Hutier in the Montdidier-Noyons sector. He was seeking to reach Compiegne, from where he could attack Paris from a more northerly direction. Desperate attack encountered desperate defence (shades of Verdun), and von Hutier’s storm troopers had only limited success. Nevertheless, on 10th June the French were falling back towards Paris, before a defensive arrangement by General Mangin (now back in favour, see Post 13/5/2017) defined the furthest point of the German effort.
From now, counter-attack tactics by Mangin and increasing numbers of American reinforcements began to turn the tide on a battle front before Paris that now stretched for nearly 100 miles – recalling the great 1914 Marne battle.
Final German efforts to break through at Courcelles, on 13th June, and Reims, on 19th June, were repulsed with very heavy German losses. The German storm troop tactics had finally been blunted, then exhausted. A lull followed for nearly one month, but when hostilities resumed the Allies would be the ones on the front foot.

* codenamed by Ludendorff, as with other Kaisershlacht initiatives, as Operation Blucher-Yorck (after two Prussian generals of the Napoleonic wars)