The Arab Revolt 2: Lawrence of Arabia

Col. Thomas Edward Lawrence
1888-1935

Allenby’s position after the triumphant seizure of Jerusalem (see Post 3/12/2017) required a period of consolidation before he could move to the next phase. His aim was to move northwards on both sides of the River Jordan towards Damascus. With the help on his right flank of the Arabs, and their muse TE Lawrence, the taking of Damascus would isolate Turkish forces further south, thereby knocking the weakening Turks out of the war in the middle east.

Northern Palestine was still occupied by reasonable strong forces. To the east of the Jordan the key target remained the capture, or at least disablement, of the Hejaz railway. For this, the Arab forces of Sherif Feisal and TE Lawrence were essential partners.

Lawrence’s extraordinary two years of marauding partnership with the Arab forces came from his great affinity with the region and its culture, but in many ways he was an unlikely character for such a military drama. Re-reading his account in Seven Pillars of Wisdom fifty years on (I struggled through it for O level) I found him more in the war poet box than the military memoir. To anyone like me, to whom ‘desert’ conjures up only monotonous miles of sand dunes, his rich descriptions of desert life and topography are a revelation. He was a writer with a great memory; or a great sense of imagination, or keeper of a highly detailed diary – or possibly all three*. Lawrence’s liaison work with the Arabs became increasingly important to Allenby, and he spent much time shuttling between supporting Feisal and Cairo, Aqaba and Allenby’s field HQ. He understood that the Balfour Declaration of late 1917 meant that Britain would not keep all of its promises to Sherif Hussein in Mecca, and he had to live with that falsehood through the rest of the campaign.

Allenby spent the first months of 1918 strengthening his positions and improving supply lines. The route to Damascus was across difficult terrain, and included several important (and therefore well defended) junctions. He wanted to move north along the coast also, in order to enable supplies from accessible ports for his men as they advanced on Damascus and beyond. His preparations were rudely interrupted by Operation Michael on the Western Front in late March (see Post 21/3/2018). He was obliged to send all the troops he could afford (and others that he could not) to support the beleaguered 3^rd and 5^th Armies in Picardie. This coincided with the transfer of the German General Liman von Sanders (of Gallipoli fame) to replace Falkenhayn as the senior German Adviser to the Turkish Armies. He resolved to hold what he had in Palestine, although he was not helped by the indecision of the Turkish leader Kemal, who also wished to divert troops to the new opportunities appearing in the Caucasus (See previous post). Nevertheless, these two developments were checks to Allenby’s progress, and increased his reliance on support from Feisal and Lawrence’s Arab forces. They advanced from their base at Aqaba (See Post 23/7/17) and focused their disruptive attacks on and around Ma'an, a key railway town some 130 miles south of Amman and 250 miles south of Damascus. Allenby spent several weeks replenishing his force, borrowing and begging troops from wherever he could. Mainly men came from the British and French Imperial Divisions serving in Africa or Salonika. Indian and ANZAC troops comprised the majority, with additional Senegalese, Moroccan and Algerian troops making up a cosmopolitan ‘Egyptian Expeditionary Force’. Allenby dispatched a group, made up of the 60 Division, the ANZAC Mounted Division and the Camel Corps (!) to cross the Jordan and link up with Feisal, now harrying the railway to the north of Ma'an. Another Gallipoli veteran – the Australian General Harry Chauvel, commanded the Group.

This strategy did not, at first, succeed. Although Chauvel made initial progress from the Jordan’s east bank, this created a salient that was soon threatened by the arrival to its north of Turkish reserves. Allenby was forced to order his men to withdraw, and by 4^th May they were back on the west bank of the river. Although Feisal and Lawrence had reached the agreed position, they were struggling to advance further north. Allenby would have to wait until his centre and left flank were strong enough to push the whole Turkish line in Palestine further north, in order to protect Chauvel’s left flank. Allenby endured a difficult three months as he waited for more men and supplies to arrive. His battle was very much a sideshow to the unfolding dramas on the Western Front at this time. The impact of von Sanders’ organisational skills allowed for numerous testing counter-attacks on the weaker parts of Allenby’s line, but he able to hold firm.

September was the defining month for Allenby (See Map). On 1^st of that month the Turks were holding a line eastward from the coast just north of Jaffa, to the south of Nablus, across to the east bank of Jordan, then down the east bank to the Red Sea, and then east to the Hejaz railway line north of Maan. But Allenby was now ready to make his move in strength, and with cavalry back up Between 19^th and 25^th a number of decisive actions pushed and pulled the Turkish line apart, and enabled the near extinct tactic of a cavalry breakout to flourish. On 19^th Indian and French Divisions attacked on the Plain of Sharon in the Battle of Megiddo; and a third (this time successful) Trans-Jordan attack moved north rapidly towards Samakh on the Sea of Galilee, and Nazareth – where they nearly captured a desperate, fleeing von Sanders.

Freed from Turkish pressure to his left, Chauvel was back on the east bank of the Jordan and racing north, past Amman to Irbid, which he reached on 26^th. This in turn enabled Feisal and Lawrence to move north swiftly as the Turks fell into disarray. Allenby ordered them to bypass Amman and head for Deraa (today Daraa), where they would link up with Chauvel for a final advance on Damascus.

Maj-Gen Edward Chaytor.
Not much like a farmer in
this photo.

Amman itself fell to an eastwards moving group of 11,000 men known as ‘Chaytor’s force’ – infantry, mounted infantry and field artillery, commanded by the redoubtable New Zealand farmer Major General Edward Chaytor. Chaytor garrisoned the city, and proceeded to intercept and capture thousands of Turks as they straggled back in retreat from points further south.

Von Sanders hope now was to establish a defensive line based on Damascus, but events were moving too fast for him. Along the coastal areas Allenby’s advance had taken Haifa and Beirut, opening new supply routes to the east and north as far as Aleppo. In the centre, some forward units of Chauvel’s cavalry were already north of Damascus; and on the right Lawrence had taken Deraa on 28^th, sealing off the last route by rail north to Damascus. Von Sanders had no choice but to abandon the city. On the early morning of 30^th September, in quick succession, a detachment of Australian cavalry, Lawrence’s Camel Corps and General Chauvel entered the city to seal a decisive defeat and strategic loss for Turkey. She had lost the great majority of three armies in less than one month.

Further advance towards Aleppo continued while the Arabs and British negotiated testily about the administration of Damascus. The British force in Mesopotamia now forged further north meeting little resistance, and by the end of October, the remains of the Turkish army was back in Anatolia. On 30^th October, Turkey signed an armistice with the allies in total surrender.

The entry into Damascus proved to be the final act in the drama for Lawrence. A sensitive man who disliked violence and militarism, he had adopted both in pursuit of what he saw as his overriding duty to help his country prevail. He knew from the outset that ‘perfidious Albion’ would undermine promises made to the Arabs regarding self-determination – that British (and French) self-interest would outweigh the opportunities created by freeing the middle east from centuries of Ottoman rule. Lawrence’s contribution to the defeat of the Turks was a significant one, although by the time Damascus was taken he had become embittered and depressed. After taking his leave of Feisal he approached Allenby at his HQ and asked to be released. He returned to England on 4^th October. He attended the Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919 as a member of the Foreign Office delegation and adviser to Winston Churchill. He had gone to lobby for Arab independence, only to find that the British and French had already agreed their positions. Further disillusioned, he joined the RAF, seeking some degree of anonymity, but never fully recovered. He died in a motorbike accident in Dorset in 1935 – the famous first scene in David Lean’s film, Lawrence of Arabia.

* For example, this description of a desert sunset: “There Joyce and I sat and watched a sunset, which grew from grey to pink and to red; and then to a crimson so intolerably deep that we held our breath in trepidation for some stroke of flame or thunder to break from its dizzy stillness”