The Treaty of Versailles 5: The Fall Out

Following Germany's signature, the Treaty of Versailles had been endorsed by signatories from all thirty two nations except one. The exception was not Italy, who had been mollified pending further discussions, but China, whose delegates had returned home in disgust. In turn nearly all of those signatories’ governments, with widely varying enthusiasm, ratified the agreements. Germany’s assent perhaps only confirmed their realisation that they could have done nothing to stop the threatened invasion and occupation of Germany had they refused. There was much unfinished business, and not just with Italy. Further negotiations and treaties would be required for Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia (See Appendix), but the main players were keen to leave the stage.

Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau left for home that evening, and by the next day Wilson was crossing the Atlantic. His was to be one of the few ‘governments’ that would not ratify. With supreme irony, the creator of the League of Nations was unable to persuade his own Senate to agree to its charter, Republican opposition to it being marshalled by Henry Cabot Lodge. An exhausted Wilson arrived home to this crisis, and within weeks had left on a punishing national tour to raise support for his beloved League. Not quite half way through the tour he collapsed with a severe stroke. Hospitalised for weeks, he remained unable to govern meaningfully until the end of his term of office.  The USA never signed the League Charter and never joined the League. They signed a separate peace Treaty of Berlin with the Germans later in 1919.

Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau found their authority lessened rather than enhanced by the Treaty.

Embittered - Marshall Foch 1919  

A raging Foch, with his forces in eastern France made his famous statement on hearing news of the signing “this is not peace, but an armistice for twenty years”. This proved uncannily accurate, but Foch died a few years before he could say ‘I told you so’. Lloyd George’s economic adviser Keynes resigned in disgust, and by the end of 1919 had published his scathing (and influential) book The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Predictably, it was widely welcomed in Germany. The 20 billion goldmark figure in the Treaty was an interim and composite figure that summarised any number of complexities and staging. Of the eventual agreed figure of £6.6bn only around half was ever paid. France’s greatest economic compensation came from their occupation of the Saar and Ruhr coalfields.

The German overseas colonies were distributed, mainly between Britain and France – who also established their mandates in the Middle East, contributing to the conditions for the problems that have continued for over 100years.

The tragic destruction of Smyrna (Izmir) 1923 

 Perhaps the most tragic outcome came from Lloyd George’s unstinting support for the Venizelos Greek expansionism plans. A bitter four years was followed, culminating in the massacres and destruction of Smyrna (Izmir) in 1923, and the emergence of modern Turkey. Britain’s loss of prestige in the treaty that followed (see Appendix) would be a further blow to Lloyd George’s waning popularity.

The Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles produced a suitably dramatic and controversial closure to the First World War. Many mistake and misjudgements were made, but much was achieved. Considering the complexities and the scale of the issues, is it really fair to hold the Treaty responsible for an even worse Second World War and, by implication, all that has followed 1945? Marshall Foch thought so, but we don’t have to.

Final word to Margaret Macmillan:

The Peacemakers of 1919 made mistakes of course. By their offhand treatment of the non European world, they stirred up resentment for which the West is still paying today. They took pains over the borders in Europe, even if they did not draw them to everyone’s satisfaction, but in Africa they carried on the old practice of handing out territory to suit the imperial powers. In the Middle East, they threw together peoples, in Iraq most notably, who have still not managed to cohere into a civil society. If they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse. They tried, even cynical old Clemenceau, to build a better order. They could not foresee the future, and they certainly could not control it. That was up to their successors.

(p493 Paris 1919)