The Treaty of Versailles 4: Germany Signs

Orpen's famous painting of the signing ceremony in
the Hall of Mirrors, Versaillles

Germany, of course, was not a participant in the Paris Peace Conference. Like the Austrian and Ottoman governments the delegates had to await their summons to Paris to receive the terms of the treaty. Six months elapsed between the Armistice and their arrival in Paris. During that time, despite the turbulence and threat of revolution, a German socialist republic government had functioned with the grudging support of the army, and a cautious optimism had appeared. After all, their leaders told them, they had not been defeated in the field; not been invaded, and the authoritative President Wilson was calling for a ‘just peace’. Further encouragement came in March, when neutral Netherlands refused to extradite Kaiser Wilhelm to face war criminal charges.

Having been faced down over the Kaiser, the European leaders were more determined to make the Germans pay in terms of penalties, reparations and lost territory. Lloyd George (and to some extent British public opinion) was softening a little, but in France the opposite was the case. Italy was unyielding in demanding full reparations and the lure of extensive territories that induced them to sign the Treaty of London in 1915 (see Post 7/7/2015). Wilson’s attempts to mediate using his principles and points led to arguments and a general rise in tension. Punishment, payment and reparation all had to be resolved and agreed.

The full conference comprised delegates from 32 countries and met only eight times, always to ratify decisions taken by the Supreme Council. Not surprisingly this caused some unhappiness, particularly when that Council was soon reduced from ten to four members (See Post 18/6/2019). In contrast, the Council of four met over 150 times, before Orlando’s walk out reduced it to the Council of Three. All of this took place in an intense period from March to early May, when the competing demands summarised in the previous post had to be slotted in alongside consideration of main clauses of the settlement with Germany.

By the end of March, the Supreme Council had ditched, first, the Japanese, and then the Foreign Ministers. They may have hoped that excluding the aggressive and obstinate Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino would lower the temperature, and lead to some compromises in the Italian demands. But

Vittorio Orlando.
Urbane Italian PM.

Orlando remained under the grip of Sonnino (and even more strident Italian public opinion). Italy viewed the Treaty of London as a sacred promise against their commitment, and subsequent losses, in the war. Wilson had made it clear early on that he regarded it as of little standing alongside his principle of self determination. Lloyd George and Clemenceau were annoyed and embarrassed by their predecessors’ loose undertakings that promised Italy much of Austria, especially its Adriatic coast; large areas of Albania; a slice of Turkey (sic), numbers of Greek Islands including the Dodecanese; part of North Africa and even part of Jerusalem. As the weeks passed the relationship between Wilson and Clemenceau also deteriorated, and they were frequently at odds. The former was furious that Wilson, in his view, prioritised the League of Nations over dealing with Germany. He had also upset his own military leader Marshall Foch by excluding him from the French delegation to the Conference. Foch was fulminating on the sidelines, calling for measures to enforce the Armistice terms (in his opinion Germany was not complying) and for an occupation of the Rhineland.

The two big questions to be addressed were border changes and the agreement of financial penalties, damages and reparations. To facilitate these, Germany would first have to accept the blame for the pre-war machinations that led to war (this would appear as the infamous Article 31 of the treaty – the guilt clause). She would also have to accept massive reductions in military and industrial strength, in the interests of future peace. Clemenceau argued hardest for major border changes in the west, between France and Germany. The return of Alsace and Lorraine was a given, but France also wanted Germany to stay to the east of the Rhine, and so all the industrial areas of the Rhineland and Saar basin were included. There was a strong case for all the German coal production there to be allocated to France (and Belgium) as replacement for the mines in the war zone destroyed by the Germans during their retreat. To Germany’s east, a new Poland required concession of land in Prussia and Silesia. To provide for Wilson’s promise of sea access would mean leaving East Prussia as a coastal enclave within Poland. Again, France was most strongly in favour of harsh measures. Clemenceau backed Polish negotiator Dmowski’s submission for a ‘greater’ Poland (see Post 22/6/2019). He wanted a strong Poland at Germany’s eastern border to compensate for the loss of his erstwhile ally Russia. As with Germany’s west there were important industrial and agricultural considerations, and everywhere there was the thorny issue of ethnic and national minorities, exposed by shifting borders.

Assessing how much Germany should pay – and who should receive how much payment – was an even greater nightmare. Germany was bankrupt; her people were close to starvation, and much of her industrial capacity was about to be removed. There was a limit to what could be paid, regardless of how much should be. On the other hand, the allies were also bankrupt, or close to it with war debts, and if Germany did not pay, how could they ask their own taxpayers to do so? Britain had spent by far the most of the European allies, but France had lost the most, and had the enormous task of rebuilding a large chunk of the country (as did Belgium on a smaller scale). The inevitable compromise requirements would satisfy no-one.

Nevertheless, there was good progress through April, as spring arrived in Paris, lifting peoples’ spirits. Despite Orlando’s growing unhappiness with lack of progress on Italy’s demands, the other three felt sufficiently confident to invite the Germans to attend the conference and receive the terms in early May. Orlando really dug in his heels on the need for a decision in favour of Italy’s claim to Dalmatia (much of today’s Croatian coastline, including the ports of Trieste and Fiume). Occupation of the old Austro-Hungarian port of Fiume had become the emotional focus of Italian nationalism, inciting large public demonstrations across Italy.  On 24^th April, Orlando walked out of the Supreme Council discussion and returned, with Sonnino, to Rome. He would return thirteen days later, but the resulting press coverage was an embarrassment to the remaining three leaders at a most sensitive time.

Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau.
Led the first German delegation, but
not the second. Remind you of anyone?

Orlando had not re-appeared by the time of the next drama – the first appearance of the German delegation. On Sunday 4^th May, a meeting of the full Conference had rubber stamped the Big three’s terms for Germany. The summons for Germany was thereby confirmed for 7^th May, which just happened to be the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the Lusitania – one of the most egregious acts of the war. The Germans were to be allowed two weeks to comment and respond to the terms. The German delegation was led by Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, an old school diplomat now Foreign Minister in Ebert’s Socialist led coalition government (See Post 7/11/2018). He sat with his colleagues at the central table of the conference room while Clemenceau stiffly read out the main terms. Awkwardness and delays in translation meant that it was a little while before the shock and distress of the Germans became apparent.

Bockhorff-Rantzau stumbled through a prepared response before he and his colleagues withdrew in disarray. As the news filtered out, reactions in Germany were predictably of disbelief and outrage. Wilson in particular was vilified, and went from Germany’s great hope to despicable traitor overnight. There was political and civil unrest, but Ebert kept his nerve, and within two weeks produced a comprehensive set of objections and counter-proposals. The onus was now on the allies to respond. The first two weeks of June were filled with animated, often bitter, discussions within the allied governments. Wilson was conciliatory towards Germany, and was perhaps more alarmed by the hostile reception his League of Nations Charter was receiving in Washington. Clemenceau and his government  remained hawkish, the bitterness being over how hawkish. Lloyd George came under pressure to conciliate. Senior advisers including the economist John Maynard Keynes argued that a stable and peaceful Germany posed less danger than a starving revolutionary one. In the end only minor concessions were made, the main one being to grant plebiscites in some areas with large German minorities as in Silesia. In that period Orlando’s government in Rome fell because of public anger and disenchantment.

Scuppered at Scapa. A grisly
end to WW1 at sea

The Germans were given one week from 16^th June to agree to the revised terms, or to face invasion. More uproar followed in Germany. Ebert’s coalition fell apart. On June 21^st the German Fleet anchored in Scapa Flow, where it had been since surrendering to the British Fleet on 11^th November, scuttled itself rather than pass into the ownership of the British. Over 400,000 tons of shipping went to the depths of the Scottish sea. On 22^nd June, Ebert cobbled together another coalition that wearily agreed to the terms with the exception of the guilt clause. The Paris response was a flat repetition of its previous ultimatum.

And so it was, on the morning of 28^th June - exactly five years on from Sarajevo -  that people crowded into the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles Palace for the denouement. To the new German Foreign Ministers Johannes Bell and Hermann Mueller fell the doubtful honour of signing acceptance to one of history’s most famous documents. The full list of articles is included as an appendix, but the main clauses pertaining to Germany were:

• Acceptance of blame for causation of the war (Article 231)
• ·      Reparations for the losses and damage done of 20 Billion Gold marks, an interim figure (worth approx. £2 billion at the time) that would be worked on further by a commission (ultimately rose to £6.6billions)
• ·      Loss of territory in Germany and overseas:

                        - Alsace and Lorraine

                        - Saar Coalfields to France for 15 years

                        - Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium

                        - West Prussia and Posen to Poland

                        - east Silesia to Poland

                        - Memel (northern area of East Prussia) to Latvia

                        - all overseas colonies (mainly shared between Britain and France who thereby        temporarily increased their empires)

• ·      Demilitarised area 50 miles wide in the Rhineland bordering France
• ·      Allowed no submarines or air force, and a fleet with only a maximum of six capital ships.
• ·      The army to be restricted to 100,000 men.
• ·      Membership of the League of Nations not allowed
• ·      Any union (anschluss) with Austria forbidden

Bell and Mueller signed, and it was done. "Es ist volbracht".