Wednesday 17 February 2016

Verdun 2: French positions and preparations

The cause of justice for Alsace and Lorraine
was at the forefront for La France
Falkenhayn's plan to break through the narrow central part of the Verdun salient is a serious error when viewed through the retrospectoscope, but his reasoning at the time was sound, even if it flew in the face of conventional military strategy. Rather than throw his maximum forces at the 'shoulders' of the salient, creating the classic pincer movement, he believed that with a smaller, albeit significant, force he could impose major damage on the French and take the garrison town itself within five days. The aim was to overwhelm French defences from the north and north east following massive artillery bombardments, and then force their way into the garrison town. They were prepared to tolerate high initial losses provided the French casualties were much higher. He also read correctly the deep French emotional attachment to Verdun as a symbol of nation and defiance. 






Verdun was a key part of General Sere de Rivieres' system of defences built to guard the new French border following the war of 1870 (a predecessor of the post WW1 Maginot Line). It was decided to fortify the surrounding hills with forts, batteries and redoubts. It had more recently been enhanced by the Brialmont system of the Belgian forts such as Liege, and had the retractable heavy guns on the turrets of its main forts. The town itself was walled, entrenched and fortified; then there was an inner ring of redoubts outside the city walls (Belleville, St  Michel, Belrupt and de Regret). Beyond these there was a strong ring  of 27 forts and batteries extending for some thirty miles and on either side of the Meuse (see map).

Revanche translates as 'revenge' but the French psyche, following the humiliation of the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, ran beyond into a deep sense of the need for justice and putting right the wrongs done to Alsace and Lorraine, annexed since then.The French desire for revanche was everywhere, but also powerful was the French tradition of elan rather than defence, particularly amongst the senior military - and above all in Joffre. By autumn 1915 he had denuded the forts of most of their big guns, and was planning and pushing hard for the joint major offensive in the Somme in 1916. Against his dominance in planning for this, Colonel Driant's protests (see previous post, 5th February) can be likened to Churchill's wilderness years warning about German rearmament in the 1930s. It was unwelcome and derided at the time, but turned to prescience in the light of subsequent events.

The French held salient in February 1916 had been improved somewhat by the exertions of 1915, and was a flattened crescent facing north, curving gently round from Avocourt in the west, past Malancourt, then Brabant(on the right bank of the river) round to Flabas  and Ornes and then Eix to the east of Verdun. Although unknown to Falkenhayn, the French defence in the central area remained weak, but ironically it helped them to have to focus on resistance at this single thrust, rather than at various points around the salient. Castelnau's timely reinforcements had stiffened the central defences just enough to prevent a rout in the coming days. He brought larger artillery and fortified trenches to the right bank - the poilus called them 'Castelnau's network'.

Despite the secrecy and subtleties of the German build up before their assault, people had a sense of what was coming. The Crown Prince's original attack date, 12th February, had to be postponed because of bad weather. A trickle of information from captured or deserting Germans confirmed what was building. Many of the small villages in the salient were swiftly abandoned, and the town itself evacuated a large number of civilians. Communications to and from the salient were difficult. The nearby main railway lines ran north to south and were under control of the Germans. The one other line running westwards to Paris  ran close to German artillery at the edge of the salient and could not be used. This left a single road from Bar le Duc just over 30 miles to the south. The centrality of this route in the dramas of Verdun was to earn it the accolade of la voie sacree. At this early stage, the first of the troop reinforcements marching north from Bar le Duc met large numbers of Verdun refugees heading south away from the imminent carnage.  







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