Verdun 1: Falkenhayn's judgement

There is a mystique about Verdun, the historic town some 160 miles from Paris, to the east of the Argonne forest on the upper Meuse river, and in 1914 only 20 miles from the German border. Ian Ousby's superb book (see bibliography) describes in detail the French psyche in the eventful years between the humiliations of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the outbreak of war in August 1914. Although Napoleon III was exiled after that defeat, the aftershocks of the Revolution of 1789 persisted, and the country remained split between monarchists (led by senior military and the church) and republicans.

The Dreyfus affair (1894-1906) was a long running saga indicative of this, and split the country. However, felt by the whole of France was the longing for 'revanchement' - restoration of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine so tragically lost in 1870. 

Trapped in a salient by Prince Wilhelm’s forces 
since the Battle of the Marne in 1914, Verdun was a historic and symbolic example of French resistance. Since the year of 450 a.d. when Attila’s forces left it in ruins, it had been besieged ten times. In 1870 the garrison finally fell to the Germans on November 8^th after stubborn and heroic resistance. The German governor sent to administer had been Theodor von Bethmann-Hollweg, uncle of the current German Chancellor. 

January 1916 found the Allies in a strong position for men and materiel. Britain had as many men training in reserve back in England as there were at the fronts, and weapons production had improved dramatically during 1915. It was a similar story in France. The Russians were beginning to match materiel to their seemingly endless supply of troops. Faced with this, the Germans were almost forced to do something pre-emptive, and in this case (unlike early 1915 when the Kaiser ruled in favour of the East) it was Falkenhayn’s call, and he called Verdun on the Western Front. 

Erich von Falkenhayn.
His Christmas memo to
the Kaiser proposed the
Verdun campaign

 His reasons and logic for this (rather than potentially less costly initiatives to the east) were set out famously in his ‘Christmas Memorandum’ to the Kaiser. 

He reasoned that over time, Germany’s most formidable opponent was Britain. Unable to attack Britain except by submarines, or through Flanders, which would prove difficult or indecisive, the best strategy was to weaken fatally Britain’s main ally France. If the French army could be disabled, then the British army on the Western Front would be bereft. Falkenhayn sensed no great danger from the Russian or Italian fronts, but saw great advantages in taking a major stronghold of the French – either Belfort or Verdun. He settled on Verdun, and argued the following benefits of doing so:

•         It would be a huge strategic and moral blow against France
•         It would pre-empt a feared Allied offensive further north, probably on the Somme
•         Balkan neutrals veering to the Allies would re-think
•         Low morale at home would be raised by the propaganda benefits of such a victory
•         The prestige of the Royal Family would be enhanced (Crown Prince Wilhelm was in command).

Cynically (but correctly), Falkenhayn reasoned that he could force the French army to ‘bleed white’ because of its emotional commitment to the cause of saving Verdun. He believed Germany could control the battle so that France would be obliged to pour reinforcements into its defence, whereas the Germans would sustain light losses with (relatively) limited forces.  In this regard he went against the great Prussian military principles of Clausewitz and Moltke, dictating the need to strike with maximum available force to create a decisive breakthrough. Deliberately, he did not move significant forces from other parts of the western front, but left 90 Divisions largely inactive, to guard against Allied counterstrokes. Nevertheless he did move resources from the east, and during January the Crown Prince’s army was increased by three additional corps and massive artillery back up. Also brought under Prince Wilhelm’s command were the detachments situated in Alsace, Lorraine and the Woevre plain. Like Gorlice-Tarnow in 1915 (and he may have been secretly hoping for such a dramatic breakthrough), the build up was done with great stealth, mostly at night, and the French were slow to appreciate what was happening. They were misled in part by diversionary actions placed at various points of the front through January by the Germans. In part they were prevented from gaining intelligence by much improved German airpower, with the arrival at the front of the new armed Fokke aircraft that were much more effective in reducing Allied air reconnaissance.

Colonel Emile Driant.
Another of WW1's
great characters. 

Meanwhile, the French commanders on the ground were much concerned by the poor state of preparedness to defend a move against Verdun. Following the destruction of the Liege and Antwerp forts in August 1914 by modern heavy artillery, Joffre had come to the view that the defensive concept of the fort was irrelevant to the unfolding western front situation post the Marne. Heavy guns from the forts had been redeployed on other parts of the front, and the fortifications were lightly manned. General Herr, Commander of Verdun, was unsuccessful in pleading for reinforcement of the garrison, and his shortages became so serious that he was forced to weaken the defences of the right (east) bank, including the centrepiece Douaumont fort itself. Eventually in late 1915 he and Colonel Driant (a Chasseurs [light infantry] commander serving in the Verdun salient) by-passed their senior officers and raised their concerns directly with the Government. Driant was a military veteran - soon to be elevated to national hero status by the events of Verdun - who had dabbled in military politics and derring-do novels before becoming Deputy for Nancy in Parliament. He contacted directly his friend, Deschanel, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, in late 1915 warning of the vulnerability of Verdun to a major German attack. The War Minister, now General Gallieni, demanded reassurances from Joffre and the GHQ, receiving a testy and resentful reply protesting Joffre’s extreme displeasure at being by-passed. Nevertheless, Joffre did dispatch General Castelnau to Verdun to review defensive arrangements. He took General Henri Philippe Petain, one of the army’s best commanders, with him. From early February rapid improvements began - just about in time as it turned out.

The topography of this fortress town on the river Meuse is vividly described by Buchan:

 “The city lay on both sides of the river in a pocket of plain. West and north on the left bank rose at some distance low hills, of which the nearest and most conspicuous was the ridge of Charny bearing the outworks of de Riviere’s [post 1870 defensive line] system. On the right bank the heights of the Meuse rose steeply from the stream to some 500 feet above the water level of the valley. These heights from west to east were five to six miles broad, and broke sharply down to the clayey flats of the Woeuvre. They were not a range of hills but a plateau, showing in places a gentle rise to inconsiderable crests. The summit was largely cultivated, and diversified with great woods of beech, oak and chestnut. The ravines which descended to the Meuse and Woeuvre were deeply cut and filled with scrub. Little villages and farms were scattered over it, and several roads followed the natural hollows of the tableland. One, which was conspicuous in the coming battle, ran from Vacherauville on the Meuse, by Beaumont, to Ville and Chaumont in the Woeuvre; another followed the crest of the heights from Bras by Louvement to Herbebois and Ornes. The Metz railway tunnelled the range to Eix [to east of Verdun]; a little line crossed by the gorge of Vaux, and skirted the east side of the hills to Damvillers and the vale of the Loison; the main line to Sedan and the north followed the western side of the Meuse trench. The inner circle of forts kept the first crest of the rise; the outer circle was farther over on the tableland, corresponding to what was its line of greatest elevation”