One Hundred Days - 2: Arras, Bapaume and Peronne

Part of the British advance on Bapaume
August 1918

The war was into its fifth terrible year, but events were now moving swiftly. The fourth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination on 28^th June had seen Germany’s final assault still advancing and the Allies apparently close to exhaustion along most of the Western Front. By the anniversary of the outbreak of war, the Germans were decidedly on the back foot, and the coordinated strategy of Foch was coming into play. Those 37 days were as eventful in 1918 as they had been in 1914.

There was still much to worry about. After a lull during the worst of the crisis, public discontent and industrial unrest had returned in Britain and France. Germany’s material gains from the overrunning of Eastern Europe post Brest- Litovsk (see Post 22/1/2018) were proving elusive, even illusory, but the Allies were still worried by the twin threats of Bolshevism and German advances through Europe into Asia. British and French forces had established bridgeheads at Murmansk (in March) and Archangel (on 2^nd August) in Northern Russia. Encouraged by the achievements of the Czech Legion (See Post 31/5/2018) the Allies wished to bolster the remaining nationalist forces in Russia resisting incursions by Germany (supporting Finland) in the northern Baltic; and also to link up with the Czechs to strengthen ‘White Russian’ resistance to the Bolsheviks further south. It was an impossible task, and from the Volga to the Caucasus, and into northern Persia the positions were dangerously confused and unstable. Turkey was by now nearly as weakened as Russia, but with German support (much reduced from earlier years) threatened to take key areas of the Caucasus, including the oil fields of Azerbaijan (shades of WW2). British forces moving north from Baghdad (see post 7/12/2017) were dragged hundreds of miles to the Caspian Sea to help save Baku from capture (they succeeded).

With the Central Powers’ positions in the east so uncertain, Ludendorff saw that he had little option but to hold on as best he could to his Western Front positions.

After the success of Amiens (previous Post), Haig agreed with Foch that a shift of emphasis further north was preferable to maintaining the focus on Chaulnes. Byng’s 3^rd Army lined up to the north of Rawlinson’s 4^th (see Map), and was closer to the Siegfried Line – now a realistic objective. Haig instructed Byng to plan an advance that would take the Arras-Albert railway link, and finally make Arras safe from counter-attack. This would put him in a strong position to attack the Siegfried line and push further north towards critical German positions in northern France. It had similarities to the 1916 Somme plan, but this time it was part of a much wider coordinated strategy commanded by Foch.

On 21^st August, on a nine mile front between Moyenville and Beaucourt (that included part of the 1916 front - see Map), Byng launched his attack at 5am. It was another wet and misty dawn. Although well dug in, the Germans were focused on shoring up their withdrawal further south. They were surprised, and overwhelmed., and by the evening the British had advanced to their railway objective. The following day, Rawlinson’s army on their right flank came into the attack, creating a southern pincer for a definitive attack on Bapaume. This took place on 23^rd August, and succeeded by 28^th. In the meantime, several of the infamous villages of the 1916 campaign were cleared, including Mametz, the Thiepval ridge,  Martinpuich and Le Sars. As these hard fought but convincing victories unfolded, Foch broadened the attack. On the southern flank the French pushed forward again towards the Canal du Nord. On the northern flank on 26^th August Horne’s army pushed east from its Arras line. These multiple attacks stretched the German attempts to withdraw in an orderly fashion to their deep defensive positions on the Siegfried line.

On 30^th August, amid advances along most of the line from Arras to Noyon, the Australian 2^nd Division captured Mont Saint-Quentin. This hill, rising from the east bank of the Somme guarded the town of Péronne. Having crossed the marshy Somme during the night, they surprised and defeated – with no artillery backing – an elite German garrison. Péronne was duly taken by the Australians the following day. This was a great prize, and a remarkable exercise by the Australians, planned and commanded by their leader General John Monash.

John Monash. Like the
Canadian, Currie, a
no nonsense leader of
Empire troops 

Now Foch was turning the screw. Horne’s 1^st and Plumer’s 2^nd armies in Flanders attacked, recapturing Bailleul and Mount Kemmel (see Post 10/5/18). East of Paris, Mangin resumed his advance, pushing further north and east. Most tellingly, Currie’s Canadian Corps (part of Byng’s 3^rd Army) attacked the pivot of the Siegfried line - the Drocourt-Quéant switch – and captured six miles of the line between Etaing and Noreuil.

Cumulatively, these actions pushed Ludendorff to despair. He had no option but to marshal his defences behind a line of water cover – the river Oise; the Canal du Nord and the marshy river Sensée (to the west of Douai). The main Siegfried line section covering Cambrai and Saint-Quentin was still intact, but both ends were now vulnerable.

Final small scale attacks by the British along their new front prepared the ground for the attack on these two decisive centres. In less than a month, the British had moved their line from an approximate north – south connection Arras-Bapaume-Péronne to be threatening Cambrai and Saint-Quentin. In the process the German withdrawal may have cost less casualties than their Kaiserschlacht offensive, but they had lost 70,000 prisoners of war, and over 700 artillery pieces.

One Hundred Days – 1: The Battle of Amiens

It seems strange to relate that the Battle of Amiens on 8^th August 1918 marked a mere one hundred days of WW1 remaining before the Armistice. Although it may be easy to identify this in hindsight, it was not immediately obvious. Popular opinion in August had expected a short violent war, over in months not years. By late 1916 and through 1917 public opinion despaired of any ending to the death and misery – unless it was in the different form of revolution and civil war in Russia. The spring of 1918 had seen the Kaiserschlacht bring Britain and France to the brink of defeat. Then the second battle of the Marne had recalled the ‘miracle’ of the first in 1914: but Mangin’s successes in pushing the Germans back to between the Aisne and the Oise was more of a relief than a harbinger of victory.

A word in favour of Douglas Haig at this point. He has been widely criticised, even vilified (including by this Blog), as the Chief Donkey commanding the lions in the trenches. In 1915 Haig had become Commander in Chief of the largest, most complex British Army ever assembled. No previous leader had had to approach the scale of Haig’s tasks; and indeed, he and his generals made many mistakes. By 1918 Haig’s army was larger still and even more complex. The multiple advances - artillery tactics; shells and fuses; machine guns; mining and tunnelling; communications; tanks, and above all (sic) aircraft – had to be planned and co-ordinated by Haig and his staff to create the 1918 military juggernaut that finally could overcome the German military machine. In spite of his failings and errors (and his toxic relationship with the British Prime Minister) Haig’s doggedness, persistence, and unswerving belief had brought him to the verge of the 100 days, where he was to prove one of the stars. If Mangin had shown the way at the Marne, Haig was about to direct the first significant British assault against the new German front.

Through his improving relationship with Generalissimo Foch, Haig had earned some flexibility from the former in the way he deployed his forces. He could opt to go in Flanders, on the Lys, or south of the river Somme. This time he chose the Somme. For his main attack, Rawlinson’s 4^th Army was lined up between Morlancourt (near Albert) and south of the Amiens main road to Roye (see map). On Rawlinson’s right was Debeney’s 1^st French army – also under Haig’s command. Success on this front would further isolate von Hutier’s occupation of the Montdidier salient (see Post 3/4/2018). A major objective was Chaulnes, an important German communications hub, midway between Amiens and Saint-Quentin. Rawlinson assembled his best infantry – the Canadians and Australians – for the attack. By subterfuge the Germans were misled into expecting the Canadians to be part of an attack in

Complete air dominance allowed detailed survey
of German positions before the attack

Flanders. In the misty daybreak of 8^th August, that recalled the first day of Operation Michael in March (See Post 23/3/2018), Haig and Rawlinson implemented Foch’s tactics to near perfection. There was no pre-bombardment. Instead, the artillery opened simultaneously with the rush of the British and Empire ‘storm trooper equivalents’. They were supported by 400 of the new faster Whippet tanks. Rawlinson had 21 Divisions, including three of cavalry, at his disposal against seven depleted German Divisions. The ground had been thoroughly reconnoitred from the air in preparation, and in many places along the front the Germans were taken completely by surprise and overrun. By the end of the day, 6-8 miles had been advanced through the central areas, whereas on both flanks the resistance had been stronger, and progress slower (see Map). The Cavalry Divisions had advanced up to 23 miles behind the front, and attacked the railway lines east of Chaulnes – a feat unheard of on the Western Front to date in the war.

Shades of Dad's Army. But Whippets
were faster and more mobile

On 9^th August modest further gains were made, and north of the Somme the British advanced beyond Chipilly and Morlancourt. On 10th, forces from the French 3^rd army, moving to the high ground at Lassigny, effectively completed a pincer movement with Rawlinson and Debeney to surround Montdidier. Von Hutier’s substantial garrison there of men and arms was forced to surrender.

An extraordinary three days of success at an earlier stage of the war would probably have degenerated into a bitter attritional struggle. Foch was so delighted that he did initially propose further attacks but, ironically, it was Haig the over-optimist who played back his own tactics to Foch, and argued for a halt. (Haig himself had been told in no uncertain terms by his Generals Currie (Canada) and Monash (Australia) that they needed time to regroup before another push). Foch soon approved a shift in the British line of emphasis, which would come from Byng, further north. In the meantime further gains by the French consolidated the higher ground to the south above the Oise.

For Germany, Amiens was a serious reverse. Ludendorff’s only options now were for staged withdrawals all along the front, and these were promptly begun. He wrote in his memoirs shortly after the war “August 8^th was the black day of the German army in the history of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through… August 8^th made things clear for both army Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy”. He was by now on the verge of complete physical and mental breakdown. In the course of two days of anguished conference at HQ in Spa on 13-14^th August he offered his resignation to the Kaiser. It was refused, but he was sent away for rest and recuperation.

By contrast on the following day, 15^th, mass was celebrated in Amiens Cathedral in thanksgiving for the delivery of the city from the German threat.

Foch's Masterplan for Victory

Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch

Ludendorff was in deep trouble. His Kaiserschlacht, with its shifting emphasis of attack, had resulted in a large strategic cul de sac. The sizeable territorial gains – presented to the German public as prelude to complete victory – could not disguise the failure to make the decisive breakthrough. The Germans had been held off – just – in front of Amiens; in front of Ypres and Hazebrouck, and now at the Marne in front of Paris. Ludendorff was left with an enlarged salient and greatly lengthened lines of communication across scarred battleground. From the second battle of the Marne, where improved French defensive tactics were followed by Mangin’s counter thrust (see previous post), his generals were requesting orderly withdrawals to consolidate. Ludendorff’s crisis was that he could not face withdrawal. To do so would surrender the initiative, and admit, tacitly, that Kaiserschlacht had failed.

The news from other theatres was not comforting. The Austrians, Turks and Bulgarians were looking distinctly vulnerable, and the old Eastern Front was unstable. The plea of Kuhlmann, German Foreign Secretary (see previous Post) in early July for a negotiated peace brought an abreaction from the highly stressed Ludendorff. He telephoned the Kaiser from his headquarters in Spa, and angrily demanded that Kuhlmann be sacked. The Kaiser, feebly, complied.

Thus, Ludendorff’s last chance was for a positive result on the Western Front. But here, the balance of men and materiel was slipping away from Germany. Reinforcements from Britain and significant numbers of Americans were arriving to recover from Allied losses from Kaiserschlacht. The Germans (who had suffered at least as many casualties) could rely only on the old and the very young for their reserves.

Foch assumed his role as Allied Supremo and Generalissimo following the dark first day of Operation Michael on 21^st March (see Post 21/3/2018). Since that time his unavoidable priority had been the marshalling and co-ordination of Allied defences (including, to a lesser extent, in Italy) against the formidable German assaults. He had not started well. He was slow to recognise Haig’s desperate position in Flanders, and was deceived over the German stroke on the Aisne. But by now he was growing into his role. The arrival of Americans to boost his reserves increased his confidence and he set about improving the Allied defences. He increased further the depth of the front lines (in the style of von Armin at 3^rd Ypres (See Post 1/10/2017). He reorganised artillery tactics to focus on newly identified concentrations, and increased the capacity for rapid counter attacks against early breaches of the line.

Mangin’s counter-attack at the second battle of the Marne was the product of these improvements. The move was between Soissons and the tip o the German salient at Chateau Thierry. Mangin's 10^th Army was even supported by four Divisions of Haig’s BEF – a sure sign of increasing co-operation. Nevertheless, they had to overcome stiff German resistance to succeed. The result was a further great boost to Foch as his thoughts turned to an offensive campaign. In addition to more men, he was able to draw on almost unlimited arms and materiel; a new breed of faster moving tanks, and near complete air superiority (increasingly important)*.

There was a comparative lull between Mangin’s success in mid July and the decisive battle for Amiens on 8^th August. Ludendorff was unable to act for lack of manpower. His casualties were high but, worse, more men were being incapacitated by the first wave of the Spanish Flu epidemic (of which more later). Whereas Foch was biding his time. His master plan was for complete victory, and unlike Ludendorff he had time on his side. At this stage he did not believ that the war could be won until 1919, and he planned accordingly. Politicians and public alike were still anxious from the reverberations of the great German offensives, and he was not under immediate pressure to break through. However, at the supreme war council meeting in July, Foch authorised his deputy, Weygand, to announce that Mangin’s victory was to be the turning point in the move from defence to attack.

The crucial railway lines at the turning point July 1918

Foch’s plan was for a series of devastating but brief attacks at multiple points along the whole front. In any such action, attacks would stop when progress was halted, and the emphasis would move to new target. If this sounds similar to Ludendorff’s erratic strategy for Kaiserschlacht there were important differences. Such complexity of action was now possible because of improved co-ordination and communication – a real weapons system with infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft working together coherently. They had come a long way from the unwieldy relentless attritional campaigns of 1915 and 1916.

The initial thrusts of Foch’s plan were to secure vital areas of the front that were most endangered by German positions. Three vital rail routes from Paris towards the front had to be removed from range. They were at Avricourt, Amiens and the St. Mihiel salient (see Map). He also prioritised assaults  in Flanders to secure Bethune, Hazebrouck and the Channel ports. Surprise and mobility were the watchwords of his approach – indeed these had been exemplified even before Mangin’s counter attack at the Marne, when the Australian Corps under Sir John Monash, had brilliantly captured the village of Le Hamel to the north east of Villers Bretonneux on 4^th July.

With these frequent surprise assaults, Foch believed he could push the Germans back to the Hindenburg line by winter, before launching final attacks in Spring 1919. To their great credit, it was Haig and Mangin among others who gradually persuaded Foch that victory might be achieved in 1918.

*French aircraft production had outstripped the rest, and by 1918 France had the largest air force of all the combatants.