Foch's Masterplan for Victory

Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch

Ludendorff was in deep trouble. His Kaiserschlacht, with its shifting emphasis of attack, had resulted in a large strategic cul de sac. The sizeable territorial gains – presented to the German public as prelude to complete victory – could not disguise the failure to make the decisive breakthrough. The Germans had been held off – just – in front of Amiens; in front of Ypres and Hazebrouck, and now at the Marne in front of Paris. Ludendorff was left with an enlarged salient and greatly lengthened lines of communication across scarred battleground. From the second battle of the Marne, where improved French defensive tactics were followed by Mangin’s counter thrust (see previous post), his generals were requesting orderly withdrawals to consolidate. Ludendorff’s crisis was that he could not face withdrawal. To do so would surrender the initiative, and admit, tacitly, that Kaiserschlacht had failed.

The news from other theatres was not comforting. The Austrians, Turks and Bulgarians were looking distinctly vulnerable, and the old Eastern Front was unstable. The plea of Kuhlmann, German Foreign Secretary (see previous Post) in early July for a negotiated peace brought an abreaction from the highly stressed Ludendorff. He telephoned the Kaiser from his headquarters in Spa, and angrily demanded that Kuhlmann be sacked. The Kaiser, feebly, complied.

Thus, Ludendorff’s last chance was for a positive result on the Western Front. But here, the balance of men and materiel was slipping away from Germany. Reinforcements from Britain and significant numbers of Americans were arriving to recover from Allied losses from Kaiserschlacht. The Germans (who had suffered at least as many casualties) could rely only on the old and the very young for their reserves.

Foch assumed his role as Allied Supremo and Generalissimo following the dark first day of Operation Michael on 21^st March (see Post 21/3/2018). Since that time his unavoidable priority had been the marshalling and co-ordination of Allied defences (including, to a lesser extent, in Italy) against the formidable German assaults. He had not started well. He was slow to recognise Haig’s desperate position in Flanders, and was deceived over the German stroke on the Aisne. But by now he was growing into his role. The arrival of Americans to boost his reserves increased his confidence and he set about improving the Allied defences. He increased further the depth of the front lines (in the style of von Armin at 3^rd Ypres (See Post 1/10/2017). He reorganised artillery tactics to focus on newly identified concentrations, and increased the capacity for rapid counter attacks against early breaches of the line.

Mangin’s counter-attack at the second battle of the Marne was the product of these improvements. The move was between Soissons and the tip o the German salient at Chateau Thierry. Mangin's 10^th Army was even supported by four Divisions of Haig’s BEF – a sure sign of increasing co-operation. Nevertheless, they had to overcome stiff German resistance to succeed. The result was a further great boost to Foch as his thoughts turned to an offensive campaign. In addition to more men, he was able to draw on almost unlimited arms and materiel; a new breed of faster moving tanks, and near complete air superiority (increasingly important)*.

There was a comparative lull between Mangin’s success in mid July and the decisive battle for Amiens on 8^th August. Ludendorff was unable to act for lack of manpower. His casualties were high but, worse, more men were being incapacitated by the first wave of the Spanish Flu epidemic (of which more later). Whereas Foch was biding his time. His master plan was for complete victory, and unlike Ludendorff he had time on his side. At this stage he did not believ that the war could be won until 1919, and he planned accordingly. Politicians and public alike were still anxious from the reverberations of the great German offensives, and he was not under immediate pressure to break through. However, at the supreme war council meeting in July, Foch authorised his deputy, Weygand, to announce that Mangin’s victory was to be the turning point in the move from defence to attack.

The crucial railway lines at the turning point July 1918

Foch’s plan was for a series of devastating but brief attacks at multiple points along the whole front. In any such action, attacks would stop when progress was halted, and the emphasis would move to new target. If this sounds similar to Ludendorff’s erratic strategy for Kaiserschlacht there were important differences. Such complexity of action was now possible because of improved co-ordination and communication – a real weapons system with infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft working together coherently. They had come a long way from the unwieldy relentless attritional campaigns of 1915 and 1916.

The initial thrusts of Foch’s plan were to secure vital areas of the front that were most endangered by German positions. Three vital rail routes from Paris towards the front had to be removed from range. They were at Avricourt, Amiens and the St. Mihiel salient (see Map). He also prioritised assaults  in Flanders to secure Bethune, Hazebrouck and the Channel ports. Surprise and mobility were the watchwords of his approach – indeed these had been exemplified even before Mangin’s counter attack at the Marne, when the Australian Corps under Sir John Monash, had brilliantly captured the village of Le Hamel to the north east of Villers Bretonneux on 4^th July.

With these frequent surprise assaults, Foch believed he could push the Germans back to the Hindenburg line by winter, before launching final attacks in Spring 1919. To their great credit, it was Haig and Mangin among others who gradually persuaded Foch that victory might be achieved in 1918.

*French aircraft production had outstripped the rest, and by 1918 France had the largest air force of all the combatants.