One Hundred Days – 1: The Battle of Amiens

It seems strange to relate that the Battle of Amiens on 8^th August 1918 marked a mere one hundred days of WW1 remaining before the Armistice. Although it may be easy to identify this in hindsight, it was not immediately obvious. Popular opinion in August had expected a short violent war, over in months not years. By late 1916 and through 1917 public opinion despaired of any ending to the death and misery – unless it was in the different form of revolution and civil war in Russia. The spring of 1918 had seen the Kaiserschlacht bring Britain and France to the brink of defeat. Then the second battle of the Marne had recalled the ‘miracle’ of the first in 1914: but Mangin’s successes in pushing the Germans back to between the Aisne and the Oise was more of a relief than a harbinger of victory.

A word in favour of Douglas Haig at this point. He has been widely criticised, even vilified (including by this Blog), as the Chief Donkey commanding the lions in the trenches. In 1915 Haig had become Commander in Chief of the largest, most complex British Army ever assembled. No previous leader had had to approach the scale of Haig’s tasks; and indeed, he and his generals made many mistakes. By 1918 Haig’s army was larger still and even more complex. The multiple advances - artillery tactics; shells and fuses; machine guns; mining and tunnelling; communications; tanks, and above all (sic) aircraft – had to be planned and co-ordinated by Haig and his staff to create the 1918 military juggernaut that finally could overcome the German military machine. In spite of his failings and errors (and his toxic relationship with the British Prime Minister) Haig’s doggedness, persistence, and unswerving belief had brought him to the verge of the 100 days, where he was to prove one of the stars. If Mangin had shown the way at the Marne, Haig was about to direct the first significant British assault against the new German front.

Through his improving relationship with Generalissimo Foch, Haig had earned some flexibility from the former in the way he deployed his forces. He could opt to go in Flanders, on the Lys, or south of the river Somme. This time he chose the Somme. For his main attack, Rawlinson’s 4^th Army was lined up between Morlancourt (near Albert) and south of the Amiens main road to Roye (see map). On Rawlinson’s right was Debeney’s 1^st French army – also under Haig’s command. Success on this front would further isolate von Hutier’s occupation of the Montdidier salient (see Post 3/4/2018). A major objective was Chaulnes, an important German communications hub, midway between Amiens and Saint-Quentin. Rawlinson assembled his best infantry – the Canadians and Australians – for the attack. By subterfuge the Germans were misled into expecting the Canadians to be part of an attack in

Complete air dominance allowed detailed survey
of German positions before the attack

Flanders. In the misty daybreak of 8^th August, that recalled the first day of Operation Michael in March (See Post 23/3/2018), Haig and Rawlinson implemented Foch’s tactics to near perfection. There was no pre-bombardment. Instead, the artillery opened simultaneously with the rush of the British and Empire ‘storm trooper equivalents’. They were supported by 400 of the new faster Whippet tanks. Rawlinson had 21 Divisions, including three of cavalry, at his disposal against seven depleted German Divisions. The ground had been thoroughly reconnoitred from the air in preparation, and in many places along the front the Germans were taken completely by surprise and overrun. By the end of the day, 6-8 miles had been advanced through the central areas, whereas on both flanks the resistance had been stronger, and progress slower (see Map). The Cavalry Divisions had advanced up to 23 miles behind the front, and attacked the railway lines east of Chaulnes – a feat unheard of on the Western Front to date in the war.

Shades of Dad's Army. But Whippets
were faster and more mobile

On 9^th August modest further gains were made, and north of the Somme the British advanced beyond Chipilly and Morlancourt. On 10th, forces from the French 3^rd army, moving to the high ground at Lassigny, effectively completed a pincer movement with Rawlinson and Debeney to surround Montdidier. Von Hutier’s substantial garrison there of men and arms was forced to surrender.

An extraordinary three days of success at an earlier stage of the war would probably have degenerated into a bitter attritional struggle. Foch was so delighted that he did initially propose further attacks but, ironically, it was Haig the over-optimist who played back his own tactics to Foch, and argued for a halt. (Haig himself had been told in no uncertain terms by his Generals Currie (Canada) and Monash (Australia) that they needed time to regroup before another push). Foch soon approved a shift in the British line of emphasis, which would come from Byng, further north. In the meantime further gains by the French consolidated the higher ground to the south above the Oise.

For Germany, Amiens was a serious reverse. Ludendorff’s only options now were for staged withdrawals all along the front, and these were promptly begun. He wrote in his memoirs shortly after the war “August 8^th was the black day of the German army in the history of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through… August 8^th made things clear for both army Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy”. He was by now on the verge of complete physical and mental breakdown. In the course of two days of anguished conference at HQ in Spa on 13-14^th August he offered his resignation to the Kaiser. It was refused, but he was sent away for rest and recuperation.

By contrast on the following day, 15^th, mass was celebrated in Amiens Cathedral in thanksgiving for the delivery of the city from the German threat.