One Hundred Days - 2: Arras, Bapaume and Peronne

Part of the British advance on Bapaume
August 1918

The war was into its fifth terrible year, but events were now moving swiftly. The fourth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination on 28^th June had seen Germany’s final assault still advancing and the Allies apparently close to exhaustion along most of the Western Front. By the anniversary of the outbreak of war, the Germans were decidedly on the back foot, and the coordinated strategy of Foch was coming into play. Those 37 days were as eventful in 1918 as they had been in 1914.

There was still much to worry about. After a lull during the worst of the crisis, public discontent and industrial unrest had returned in Britain and France. Germany’s material gains from the overrunning of Eastern Europe post Brest- Litovsk (see Post 22/1/2018) were proving elusive, even illusory, but the Allies were still worried by the twin threats of Bolshevism and German advances through Europe into Asia. British and French forces had established bridgeheads at Murmansk (in March) and Archangel (on 2^nd August) in Northern Russia. Encouraged by the achievements of the Czech Legion (See Post 31/5/2018) the Allies wished to bolster the remaining nationalist forces in Russia resisting incursions by Germany (supporting Finland) in the northern Baltic; and also to link up with the Czechs to strengthen ‘White Russian’ resistance to the Bolsheviks further south. It was an impossible task, and from the Volga to the Caucasus, and into northern Persia the positions were dangerously confused and unstable. Turkey was by now nearly as weakened as Russia, but with German support (much reduced from earlier years) threatened to take key areas of the Caucasus, including the oil fields of Azerbaijan (shades of WW2). British forces moving north from Baghdad (see post 7/12/2017) were dragged hundreds of miles to the Caspian Sea to help save Baku from capture (they succeeded).

With the Central Powers’ positions in the east so uncertain, Ludendorff saw that he had little option but to hold on as best he could to his Western Front positions.

After the success of Amiens (previous Post), Haig agreed with Foch that a shift of emphasis further north was preferable to maintaining the focus on Chaulnes. Byng’s 3^rd Army lined up to the north of Rawlinson’s 4^th (see Map), and was closer to the Siegfried Line – now a realistic objective. Haig instructed Byng to plan an advance that would take the Arras-Albert railway link, and finally make Arras safe from counter-attack. This would put him in a strong position to attack the Siegfried line and push further north towards critical German positions in northern France. It had similarities to the 1916 Somme plan, but this time it was part of a much wider coordinated strategy commanded by Foch.

On 21^st August, on a nine mile front between Moyenville and Beaucourt (that included part of the 1916 front - see Map), Byng launched his attack at 5am. It was another wet and misty dawn. Although well dug in, the Germans were focused on shoring up their withdrawal further south. They were surprised, and overwhelmed., and by the evening the British had advanced to their railway objective. The following day, Rawlinson’s army on their right flank came into the attack, creating a southern pincer for a definitive attack on Bapaume. This took place on 23^rd August, and succeeded by 28^th. In the meantime, several of the infamous villages of the 1916 campaign were cleared, including Mametz, the Thiepval ridge,  Martinpuich and Le Sars. As these hard fought but convincing victories unfolded, Foch broadened the attack. On the southern flank the French pushed forward again towards the Canal du Nord. On the northern flank on 26^th August Horne’s army pushed east from its Arras line. These multiple attacks stretched the German attempts to withdraw in an orderly fashion to their deep defensive positions on the Siegfried line.

On 30^th August, amid advances along most of the line from Arras to Noyon, the Australian 2^nd Division captured Mont Saint-Quentin. This hill, rising from the east bank of the Somme guarded the town of Péronne. Having crossed the marshy Somme during the night, they surprised and defeated – with no artillery backing – an elite German garrison. Péronne was duly taken by the Australians the following day. This was a great prize, and a remarkable exercise by the Australians, planned and commanded by their leader General John Monash.

John Monash. Like the
Canadian, Currie, a
no nonsense leader of
Empire troops 

Now Foch was turning the screw. Horne’s 1^st and Plumer’s 2^nd armies in Flanders attacked, recapturing Bailleul and Mount Kemmel (see Post 10/5/18). East of Paris, Mangin resumed his advance, pushing further north and east. Most tellingly, Currie’s Canadian Corps (part of Byng’s 3^rd Army) attacked the pivot of the Siegfried line - the Drocourt-Quéant switch – and captured six miles of the line between Etaing and Noreuil.

Cumulatively, these actions pushed Ludendorff to despair. He had no option but to marshal his defences behind a line of water cover – the river Oise; the Canal du Nord and the marshy river Sensée (to the west of Douai). The main Siegfried line section covering Cambrai and Saint-Quentin was still intact, but both ends were now vulnerable.

Final small scale attacks by the British along their new front prepared the ground for the attack on these two decisive centres. In less than a month, the British had moved their line from an approximate north – south connection Arras-Bapaume-Péronne to be threatening Cambrai and Saint-Quentin. In the process the German withdrawal may have cost less casualties than their Kaiserschlacht offensive, but they had lost 70,000 prisoners of war, and over 700 artillery pieces.