Three years in - 3rd August 1917

The spark for the global conflagration was the assassination in Sarajevo on 28th June 1914. Sequentially, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28th July; August 1st Germany ordered general mobilisation and declared war on Russia; August 3rd Germany declared war on France; on August 4th Germany declared war on Belgium, and Britain did so on Germany. But not until 6th August did Austria-Hungary declare against Russia, and it was 12th August before Great Britain and France declared war on Austria-Hungary. It is not easy to pick a date to mark the 3rd anniversary of onset of the greatest conflict in history. So I've plumped for August 3rd - the date on which the two greatest armies in the world were irrevocably set against each other, and in the mid range of those other declarations.

The Prinzregent Luitpold. Cooped up in Wilhelms-
haven, her frustrated crew mutinied on 3/8/1917

As it happened no seismic events happened on that 3rd anniversary. There was a mutiny on board the German battleship Prinzregent Luitpold in Wilhelmshaven, where frustrated and war-weary sailors demanded an end to the war; and in the Bukovina, Rumania the Germans re-occupied some territory taken in the brief Rumanian assault of late 1916. But through July and August 1917 a range of events demonstrated how the old world order was continuing to change as the war ground on. The first year had seen desperate struggles that only confirmed the foolishness of experts' predictions of a short decisive war. The second year clarified matters so that by the end of 1916 it seemed only a matter of time before the British Naval blockade and the combined strengths of the Allies would eventually wear down the German people, or their military machine. By 3rd August 1917 all bets were off, in fact it looked like Germany as the more likely outright victor. Two major factors had brought about this turnaround - the Russian February Revolution, and the declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare on the high seas. The latter had triggered a third significant factor - the entry of USA to the war on the side of the Allies.

All this had changed the two major constants of the war to date. Firstly that Germany had no choice but to pursue war on two major fronts - the Eastern and the Western. The February Revolution in St. Petersburg caused a short term collapse in the discipline and organisation of the Russian Army. Above all, uncertainty regarding the outcomes affected the balance of the Allies strategy. The planned advance through the Caucasus into Persia to link with the British faltered. By August there was a supportive provisional Russian government headed by the young Kerenski, but the outlook remained bleak. The prospect of Germany being awarded almost a free hand to attack in the West was a chilling one. Secondly, the post Jutland status quo at sea, whereby the German High Seas Fleet remained bottled up in port, and the British Grand Fleet continued its blockade of German imports, was reversed by the dramatic early effects of the German unrestricted U-boat warfare declaration in January 1917. By April, the monthly losses in merchant shipping tonnage really did pose a threat to the viability of the British war effort, although by August 3rd it seemed that the worst might be past.  

The very welcome counter to these two reverses was the entry of the USA into the war. Initially this was more of a psychological boost than a military one. However, now that the shackles of a sham neutrality had been cast off, the full economic and material resources of the USA could be committed to the cause, and there was strong cause for optimism if the present dangers could be overcome.

Initially Woodrow Wilson focused on building capacity, by voting funding and selective conscription through Congress in order to enlist 1.5 million men within four months. He supported Britain's naval blockade by banning certain exports to neutral countries. One result of this was that in July and August 1917 alone, neutral China, Siam, Liberia and several South American countries followed the USA's lead in declaring war on Germany. 

Losers? By August 1917, what had been the most significant failures of the war to date?

• Austria's plans to annihilate Serbia - instead a humiliating defeat only put right by German intervention in 1915 that truly did the annihilation.
• the Schlieffen master plan to end the war in three months - reversed at the Battle of the Marne
• the Russian French agreement to crush Germany from east and west, crushed instead by the German victory over Russia at Tannenberg 1914
• Joffre's elan-fuelled offensives in Champagne and Artois through 1915
• Churchill's and Kitchener's strategic gamble at Gallipoli
• Falkenhayn's Verdun plan, which backfired and ended his time as German C-in-C
• Nivelle's shooting star career as French supremo, ending in mutiny of his own armies in May 1917
• Russia's aims for Galicia and Hungary, so bright in late 1914 but destroyed by the German advances into Russia following the Gorlice-Tarnow breakthrough in 1915
• Germany's first U boat blockade attempt, which was ended by the diplomatic own goal of the Lusitania sinking in 1915
• At sea, the 'definitive' Battle of Jutland met neither side's aim, but it was the German High Seas Fleet that remained bottled up in its ports until its surrender in 1918
• Roumania's ill judged entry to the war on the side of the Allies, which was crushed within months
• the German political leadership had lost control of the agenda to Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Bethmann-Hollweg, an ever present as Chancellor since 1909, resigned on 14th July 1917. He was followed a day later by his inept Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmerman, whose crass telegram had finally provoked Woodrow Wilson to war. Even Kaiser Wilhelm II was now no more than a political figurehead.
• Civilian populations almost everywhere suffered, but more so in occupied and blockaded countries
• Armies - losses in first three years stood at around 6 million

And what had prospered?

• the German military machine was undefeated. It had made huge initial gains, been forced by weight of opposition to establish strong defensive positions and concede some ground, but nowhere was it defending on German soil
• Turkey - everybody's favourite for an early crushing, either by allied forces or 'neutral' Balkan enemies. In fact the new secular Turkish leadership had worked effectively with Germany and gained notable successes, particularly against the British at Gallipoli and Kut. Nevertheless, three years in, its crumbling Ottoman Empire was under increasing pressure from all sides. 
• the Royal Navy, despite its outdated customs and leadership, had retained control of the high seas, and the blockade of Germany that slowly drained the lifeblood of the country. (It was below the surface that the U boat menace tipped the balance towards fatal merchant shipping losses.)
• the Italian army - commanded by Cadorna, who had managed his armies well in a ping-pong series of battles with Austria along the line of the Isonzo river. At this point he was holding his own, and looking like an attractive partner for the allies to join in knocking Austria out of the war. 
• USA neutrality, lasting for nearly three years of all out war, undoubtedly brought financial gains to the country through loans and armament sales. This would strengthen the position of the USA greatly in the post-war world. In contrast, all of the combatant nations were in severe economic difficulties by this time.

Who had been and gone? Of the dramatis personae, many of the original key players were dead or discarded

• Sir John French - first C-in-C of the BEF, sacked in 1915.
• Kitchener - War Minister 1914-16. A watery grave in June 1916.
• Churchill - First Lord of the Admiralty until the Gallipoli disaster. Back in the Government as munitions minster 1917
• Herbert Asquith (PM) and Edward Grey (Foreign Minister) - left office in 1916 with the fall of the British coalition government.
• Joffre, French C-in-C - eventually paid the price for the terrible attritional failures of 1915
• Moltke, Falkenhayn as German military supremos: Moltke for the Marne, Falkenhayn for Verdun.
• Grand Duke Nicholas  -  uncle of the Tsar. A career soldier, and a good one, unlike his nephew who sacked him and then took over from him. He was made scapegoat for the defeats of 1915 
• the Tsar, Nicholas II. A dead man walking. Deluded, incompetent, insensitive - by August 1917 he was under house arrest with months to live 
• Conrad von Hotzendorf, Austrian Chief of Staff since 1909. He was one of the few individuals who could reasonably be accused of causing WW1. Despite humiliations and a string of poor performances at the head of the Austrian army, he retained office until March 1917, when Charles I, Austria's new Emperor fired him. Too little, too late.

Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson,
carriers of the Allied hopes going into the fourth year of war

As the war entered its fourth year, Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George were perhaps the Allies most prominent statesmen. Haig was in command of the British Army, but with lukewarm support from his government. In France, Petain was C-in-C and Clemenceau was the most influential politician, though the latter had declined to join the latest short lived government of national unity. People in the west hoped (in vain) that some order and stability might come from Russia, keeping them as a potent ally. Kerenski's star was in the ascendancy, but would not be for long. In Germany, Ludendorff (with, to a lesser extent, the people's hero Hindenburg) was running the show. His military single mindedness meant further misery and suffering for the German civilian population, now desperate for the war to end.

In fact, all combatant nations - civilians, soldiers, sailors, politicians - were desperate for the war to end. But nobody yet had the answers.

Third Battle of Ypres - Part 1: 31st July 1917

The attack had to grind seven miles east-
wards from the salient to Passchendaele

The two most infamous British battles of WW1 were undoubtedly the Somme and the third Battle of Ypres, better known as Passchendaele. They were fought out one year apart. Both lasted from July until November; both are filled with harrowing memories and misery and are viewed as tragic attritional campaigns. In one respect they were completely different. The first day of the Somme was a disaster - the worst single day in the history of the British army. The first day of Ypres 3 was, by the standards of the Western Front, a tactical triumph.

From the high (literal and metaphorical) of the Messines assault in June (see Post 6/6/2017) seven long weeks were to pass before the launch of the next stage of Haig’s grand plan. Surely, with the disarray amongst the German command resulting from that cataclysm they would be vulnerable to a breakthrough on their positions to the north of the Menin Road before they had time to reorganise? In retrospect the delay seems unaccountable, and unforgiveable.

However there were three main reasons. Firstly, there was the logistical issue of providing sufficient supplies, men and reserves for another major campaign. One of Haig’s main justifications for his plan was the parlous state of the French army after Nivelle’s offensive. He had to negotiate with Petain for French occupation of the Arras area, in order to bring more of his own troops north from France. Along with the very practical issues of moving and supplying these troops in war torn country, the discussions with the French took time and they, ironically, did not want to be left out of the battle completely.   Secondly, the German defences were not in complete disarray – in fact they had long prepared the muddy terrain involved with redoubts and pill boxes, many of them hidden. Haig wanted some time for air reconnaissance and raids to inform his preparations. Thirdly, and most tellingly were the strategic and political aspects. Lloyd George and most of his government were highly sceptical of Haig’s proposals. They wanted to avoid another Somme; felt that even with the capture of Passchendaele Haig had little chance of moving beyond, through Klerken to the coast; and were getting advice that even the capture of Zeebrugge and Ostend would not necessarily blunt the effectiveness of Germany’s U-boat campaign (Haig’s other main argument). With the CIGS (Sir William Robertson) as his only strong ally in Government, Haig had to wait until mid July before gaining grudging permission to go ahead from Lloyd George, who was far more interested in a switch of emphasis to the Italian Front.

With the Germans re-doubling their defensive preparations – and adding new troops from the Russian front all the time - Ypres 3 became another race against time that was lost conclusively by the British.

The front for this battle was an 8 miles portion of the salient stretching from the northern limit of the Messines offensive near Bellewaerde. At it’s northern end was Boesinghe, and Anthoine’s French 1st Army would take up this flank. The land in between was a gradual climb of battle scarred earth, rising through a series of small ridges to the highest ridge of Passchendaele and its village, seven miles to the east. To make the best of summer conditions (sic) Haig needed to reach Passchendaele within two weeks, before moving onwards north east to the coast. Most of this ground was already a mass of mud, and so the Germans built their redoubts and pill boxes rather than attempt to entrench themselves. Their new flexible style of defence was to concede first lines early and then counter attack from these redoubts. Each pill box contained 20-40 men and bristled with machine guns. Buchan describes the defences as “highly elastic rather than the cast iron of the Siegfried line”.

Only the British 3^rd Army remained in France (now under Byng, since Allenby had been sent to Cairo – see previous post). The redistribution of forces left Gough’s 5^th Army with the main responsibility for the battle. With Anthoine on his left flank and elements on Plumer’s victorious 2nd army on his right. Rawlinson’s 4^th Army wheeled round to the north of Anthoine, replacing the small Belgian army there, and planning for the breakthrough to the coast. Plumer’s orders were to push south eastwards towards Lille from Hollebeke to draw off German artillery from the main thrust.

Hubert de la Poer Gough.
Frustrated by commanding the reserve
at the Somme, he was centre stage this
time

Still fuming at the tardy support for his mission, Haig sent increasingly urgent orders to Gough in the second half of July to prepare for the launch. Continuous bombardments covered raiding parties and attempts at aerial surveillance, although the cloudy weather made the latter difficult. After more problems and delays, zero hour was settled as 3.50am on 31^st July. Gough had four army corps at his disposal (see map) and his spearhead was expected to occupy Passchendaele within two weeks. Like the Somme the objectives were wildly optimistic, although the day one targets proved achievable. From the jump off at 3.50, all of the German first positions along the designated front were taken within a few hours. At the northern end, Anthoine’s troops advanced to take Steenstraat. Southwards: the shattered village of Pilkem (but more importantly Pilkem ridge); the village of St. Julien (epicentre of the 1915 poison gas battle); Verloerenhoek; and the village and ridge of Fresenburg were all conceded to the 5^th Army vanguards. The formidable Pommern redoubt north of Frezenberg was taken by Lancashire Territorials, and by noon many of the units were beyond their day one objectives. Progress was most difficult at the southern end of Gough’s line. Sanctuary Wood (what remained of it) was taken, and after a bitter struggle so was the fortification known as Stirling Castle. But beyond that the German defence was very strong, and through the afternoon from here up to St. Julien they launched their planned counter-attacks. Some of the British gains had to be conceded but by nightfall they remained in good positions. From the Pilkem ridge round to Frezenberg (although just short of St. Julien at its centre) Gough’s divisions had reach the crest of the first ridgeline. To the north of St Julien, the troops had moved beyond Pilkem towards Langemarck, and on the right flank to the south, Plumer’s forces had taken Hollebeke with relative ease. In the course of the day over 6000 German prisoners had been taken, but in a taste of things to come, British casualties had been heavy, particularly from the afternoon counter-attacks that enfiladed fire on to newly taken positions. Where the British had had to pull back the ground was littered with corpses.

Most significantly the rain – the legendary rain of the third battle of Ypres – had started during the afternoon. A great low pressure system originating in the mid-Atlantic had swept up the Channel and arrived in Belgium, where it proceeded to dump its contents. In her superb book ‘They called it Passchendaele’, Lyn Macdonald gives this graphic description of the the rain that created a quagmire in which men, horses, supplies and ammunition sunk without trace; and that turned the tiny Sonnebeek stream (a first day objective) into an impassable torrent: “It went on raining as if some malevolent deity had opened a tap in the heavens. It rained in sheets, in torrents, in cataracts. It rained as no man since Noah had remembered it raining before. It rained without stopping for four days and four nights.” It would be a further two weeks before the 5^th Army could resume its mission before Passchendaele. Whatever may be said about Haig, it cannot be said he was lucky with the weather.

The Arab Revolt 1: Its Origins

Ottoman Empire c1700

The symbol of the Ottoman Empire was the crescent and, at its height in the 16^th century, the empire enveloped the Mediterranean like a huge misshapen crescent, covering the north African coast all the way round to the western limits of the Balkan peninsula. It continued from the 13^th century to the end of WW1, but for its last 100 years and more was in constant difficulties, and seen to be crumbling. In Africa Napoleon and then the British pushed it back from the northern coast and the Horn, in order to control the strategic hub of Cairo. In Europe the Russian and Habsburg Empires, both more advanced militarily, pushed for territory and control of the Black Sea. For example, the Crimean War of 1856 saw Britain and the Ottomans in alliance against the expansionism of Russia (the British of course to protect their own interests, particularly the routes to India). The rise of nationalism put further pressure on the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-language Empire, particularly in the Balkans.

At the onset of WW1, the Ottomans controlled the northern half of the great Arabian peninsula (today predominantly Saudi Arabia). In the centre was the desert of Nefud (An Nafud), sparsely populated by tribes of nomadic Bedouins. To the east lay Mesopotamia, the setting for much WW1 activity already covered. To the west, following the littoral of the Red Sea, lay the coastal region of the Hejaz, the font of the Arab Revolt.

Showing the Hejaz and the vital
Turkish rail link to Medina

The Hejaz was a fertile region along the Red Sea rift, with the sea on its western edge and mountains comprising its eastern border (see map). It was ruled by the Hashemite dynasty that still rules Jordan from Amman today but, containing as it did then the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, it was influential as the birthplace of the religion of Islam, the dominant religion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, the Hajaz was a vassal state, ruled from Mecca by Sharif Hussein (great grandfather of the present King of Jordan) but controlled from Constantinople. Hussein was titled Emir of Mecca and King of the Arabs, but the Ottoman leadership relied on the uncontrollable factions and tribes of the Arabs to limit his authority. Following the Young Turks coup of 1908 there was a rejection of the religiously liberal nature of their empire, replaced by an aggressive secular approach of ‘Turkification’. Persecution of, and discrimination against non-Turks was widespread, and by the time war broke out, Arab resentment of their rulers had become a unifying factor.

Sharif Hussein

Hussein held Mecca, but a strong Turkish garrison at Medina guarded the southern limits of the Ottoman Empire. Medina was the railhead of the major supply line from Damascus, 700 miles to the north, and this line would be the target of much of the Revolt’s actions. Hussein was a wily and ambitious man. Although attracted by British blandishments from 1915 onwards regarding Arab independence in exchange for alliance, he played his cards close to his chest, and gained intelligence from Constantinople by keeping his two sons, Feisal and Abdullad, in political positions there. The loss of British prestige from the disastrous campaigns of Gallipoli and Kut added to his caution. However, in June 1916 he made what is seen as the opening move of the Arab Revolt by denouncing the Turkish leadership for its anti-Arab, anti-Islamic policies. Enver Pasha the Turkish leader, after some deliberation with his German allies, resolved to oust Hussein from Mecca. In January 1917 a force left the Medina garrison to take control of Mecca, 200 miles to the south. By now however, the action had been anticipated. Hussein’s son Feisal (recalled from Constantinople) led an assembled force along the coast via Yenbo two hundred miles in the opposite direction, north to Wejh (Al Wajh). They encountered only a small Turkish force that lacked the resolve to challenge them, and Feisal completed a historic capture of Wejh, where he was able to consolidate his forces. This constituted such a threat to the railway link to Medina that the Turks pulled back to their garrison, and looked to strengthen the railway defences.

At this exciting time, and more by luck than judgement, a British officer – in peacetime an archaeologist in Syria – entered the fray. TE Lawrence is such an extraordinary character that he merits a blog post of his own, and this will follow later on in the saga. For the moment, suffice to say in cliché terms that his heart was Arab and his head was English. His love of Arab culture and geography brought an expertise that was harnessed, initially for intelligence purposes by Sir Archibald Murray from the British HQ in Cairo.

From the moment Lawrence and Feisal met they forged a strong partnership – and a strategy of leaving Medina alone as an increasingly isolated garrison. They focused on actions disrupting the railway supply line. Their subsequent aim was to move north and become part of a joint force with the British moving on Palestine, Amman and Damascus.

Lawrence became the chief negotiator in the complex discourse between the British, French and various Arab perspectives. His ambivalence to both his roles – diplomatic and military – is summarised in his own words: “I risked the fraud, on the conviction that Arab help was necessary to our cheap and speedy victory in the east, and that better we win and break our word, than lose”*

Meanwhile the main British preparations in Cairo were for an advance across Sinai towards Gaza on the coast and Beersheva inland. From there they would push towards Jerusalem and then Damascus. Having the Arabs on their right flank would help this with supporting disruptive action. Initially things went well for Murray. His forces took the important town of Rafa, on the border of Egypt and Sinai on 9^th January 1917, and made steady progress along the coast to Gaza. By March they had reached the most strongly defended Turkish position. This was an entrenched line stretching from Gaza to Beersheva. It was a thirty mile line, but the terrain allowed for only two ways to force it – at either end. Murray opted for Gaza, which not for the first or last time in its history, became the centre of fierce actions. Two battles for the control of Gaza were fought three weeks apart in March and April 1917. Casualties were heavy, more so for the British, and although some coastal objectives were gained, the Turkish garrison held out against both assaults.

Gaza was a serious reverse, as unexpected as Gallipoli. It signalled the end of Murray’s command. He was recalled to London and his replacement, Allenby, was dispatched from France, where he was leading the 3^rd Army at the Battle of Arras. One man’s nemesis proved to be the spur for the other’s greatest triumphs.

* TE Lawrence. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Chapter I