The Western Front at end of 1914

The final desperate efforts of the Germans to break through to the coast were unsuccessful, and as the winter weather worsened, the activity on the northern aspects of the front quietened down into a phase of winter consolidation. In the five months of the war massive actions had occurred - the battle of the frontiers; Mons and the great retreat; the Marne and the multiple actions arising from the race to the sea.

Lord Kitchener

Of the senior military and political figures in the UK, only the War Minister, Lord Kitchener, had demurred from the experts' view that it would necessarily be a short, decisive war, probably all over by Christmas. By now it was depressingly clear to everyone that this was going to be a long, hard and painful conflict.


The thin line that stretched across those vital areas from Niueport to Arras had held and by 20^th November the assaults of the Germans had diminished, and it was possible to pull the front line British troops into reserve positions for a much needed rest. The French troops of d’Urbal and Maud’huy held the line from the coast as far down to Albert on the Somme for this phase of winter. Artillery fire did not cease completely, and there were sporadic actions. In mid December the  British attacked Wytschaete ridge and Givenchy without success. These were the main areas of the famous Christmas Truce. Deeper into France, the French poilus, defending their own soil, no doubt felt less festive.

Even Falkenhayn seemed to accept that a defensive strategy was necessary, at least for the coming winter months. He was further pressured by the need to reinforce the eastern front, where serious danger to German border integrity was posed by the Russian advances in the south. The front in most parts of Belgium was decribed as a “gigantic mud hole” with only a few drier areas around Zillebeke, the Messines Ridge and Wytschaete.

The Western Front at end December 1914

Of the 500 miles of the Western Front, only approximately fifty were held by the British, and the remainder by the French with some support from the Belgians in the north. The front ran from Nieuport on the Belgian coast, west of the Yser along the Ypres canal, in a salient in front of Ypres, behind Messines to just east of Armentieres; then west of Neuve Chapelle to Givenchy, across the La Bassee canal, east of Vermelles, west of Lens, to just east of Arras. From Arras it lay by Albert and Noyon to Soissons, east along the Aisne to to Rheims, to Varenne, thence making a wide curve around Verdun, to the west bank of the Meuse by St Mihiel, and then on the Pont-a-Mousson on the Moselle. From there it passed on to Luneville and St Die, ten miles inside the French border, and then onwards towards the Vosges mountains into German territory, Belfort and the Swiss border.

First Ypres - Part 2 Heroic action by the Worcesters

Among many heroes at Ypres 1, the
2nd Royal Worcester regiment took pride of place

Wellington's famous summary, 100 years earlier - "A damn close run thing" - certainly applied to the First Battle for Ypres. Amazing acts of tenaciousness, bravery and heroism featured in this all or nothing battle between overwhelming German forces and the dwindling numbers of the pre war British professional army, 'England's contemptible little army' (as dubbed by the Kaiser). In particular, the arrival of the 2nd Worcesters Regiment at Gheluvelt at a crucial moment in the battle, saved the day for BEF in its attempts to hold the salient.  

The 31st October provided the crisis point of the battle. The fighting began early along the Ypres-Menin road, and then in great force against Gheluvelt, which was being held just to the east of the town. The 1^st Division was driven back westwards to the woods between Hooge and Veldhoek. In the South, Hollebeke and most of the Messines ridge were lost. Between 2-3pm was the most critical hour of the whole battle. The Germans were pouring through the Gheluvelt gap; and the whole salient was under heavy pressure. French sent an urgent message to Foch for reinforcements and was refused (this was because Foch had none to send – his losses were greater than the British). Haig ordered a retirement to the west of Hooge and to hold the line there, although apparently he did not believe it would hold, and was sure they would have to abandon Ypres. At this point almost by a miracle, it seemed, the German advance paused. The explanation was not clear for several months afterwards, but the reason was the arrival of the 2^nd Worcesters Regiment, part of 2^nd Division, who emerged from Polygon Wood to plug the gap between the right of the northern flank and the left of the 1^st division on the southern flank. The Worcesters, under very heavy artillery fire, advanced in a series of rushes for nearly 1000yards to the northern edge of Gheluvelt. By nightfall, the German advance west of Gheluvelt had been halted, and the British line given breathing space to stabilise and strengthen. November brought more strong attacks, but the crisis had passed, and generally the British line was able to hold. The Germans broke through on the southern part to advance and take Wytschaete, with Messines and its ridge now firmly in German control. This made an ugly dent in the salient line, now running from Le Gheir to the west of Messines, west of Wytschaete, by St Elooi and Klein Zillebeke to the west edge of Gheluvelt. The following five days were mild in comparison – exchange of artillery fire and skirmishing, and on 5th November the line was adjusted to prepare for a further German onslaught, that was expected. This came on 11th November, when the Prussian Guard brigades were launched on either side of the Menin road. A massive attack on the Nonne Bosch wood area was convincingly repulsed by the Oxford and Bucks light infantry. This seemed to take the impetus out of any further attempts to break the point of the salient. On the left (northern) end of the salient the French armies to the left of Haig were holding the line Zonnebeke to Bikschote, and linked up to the battle of the Yser. The Germans attacked desperately along this line, but were unable to take Langemarck. By the 15th their attacks were waning. Similarly on the southern end, a great assault was made on 16th, and again on 17th, but these failed to break through. 
The shelling of central Ypres continued until the Cloth Hall and Church of St. Martin were in ruins. Presently, further French reinforcements did arrive, and at last the British troops were relieved from the trenches they had held for four stubborn weeks. The weather changed to high winds and snow blizzards, and First Ypres died away.

The 1000 strong 1st Queen's Royal Battalion
on mobilisation August 1914

(Buchan). Between Armentieres and the sea, the Germans had ranged  (apart from their cavalry, which was double that of the Allies) 31 Divisions and 32 Battalions, a total of 402 battalions as against 267 Allied battalions.

Against the part of this force that faced them, the British opposed 5 infantry Divisions, three of them very weakened by previous fighting. In the actual salient of Ypres they had 3 Divisions and some cavalry. For the better part of 2 days one division held a front against two army corps. When the division was afterwards withdrawn from the firing line to refit, it was found that out of 400 officers who set out from England, there were only 44 left, and of 12,000 men, only 2,336.

The remaining QRB members reviewed after Ypres 1
Only 17 survived to the Armistice.

These men were all that remained of the ‘old contemptibles’. Thereafter they would join and be part of the new and much larger volunteer British armies.

Ypres was a decisive victory that achieved its purpose, albeit at terrible losses. The Allied line stood secure from the Oise to the sea as the year drew to a close.

First Ypres Part 1 The next great decisive event

Pre-war Ypres in 1914

As a result of the strength of the German pressure on the north and south side of Ypres, the salient - pointing due east and created by the town and the surrounding heights - became more pronounced and more pivotal to the outcome. Ypres had for centuries sat at the centre of trade routes criss-crossing the flat terrain of Flanders. The beautiful Cloth Hall dated from the 12th Century, and along with St. Martin's Church, formed the centre piece of the proud Flemish town. It was to become a focal point of bitter action throughout all years of the war. Like Verdun at the other end of the western front, it almost comprised a bookend for the stalemate and intermittent carnage that continued in between. If the third battle for Ypres (Passchaendale) involved the infamous and most grisly slaughter; and the second held the horrors of the gas attack, it was the first that was perhaps the most important and significant for the entire war. Had Ypres been lost in 1914, Falkenhayn's alternative strategy - control of the Channel ports - would likely have succeeded, and changed the entire course of events.

Post First Ypres 1914

On the evening of 20th October, Sir John French in Ypres had an anxious conversation with his senior generals. It was now evident, despite earlier optimism,  that the most they could do was to hold the Ypres salient from the Lys to Dixmude until Joffre could send help in the form of the French reinforcements. This would not be for at least 3 days, leaving a precariously and thinly stretched line of defence.

On 22nd October Haig’s 1^st Corps, now north of Ypres ran into a heavy German assault at Pilkem, and they had to dig in there. Heading north to Bixschute and Langemarck the Germans were unable to break through, and held their line there. Further south there was a long line from the Zandvoorde ridge to south of Messines held only by two cavalry divisions, dismounted in trenches. The loop round Ypres from Bixschute to Messines was approximately the line holding on 23rd October. 
Falkenhayn was determined to push this line and break through and he began to move reserve armies and redirect front line troops from elsewhere to create an unstoppable force that he intended to unleash by 30th October. Continuing pressure on the left of the British line came from direction of Zonnebeke, and it was only thanks to some timely French reinforcements from the extreme left of the allied line towards the coast that it held. On the 24th the eastern point of the salient cracked, and the Germans penetrated into Polygon Wood at Becelaere for the first time, following through to Kruseik, close to Zandvoorde. Heavy fighting continued for several days.

Advanced posts on the salient were pulled back gradually over the next few days to try and stabilize the line. On27th Haig and French met and decided to relieve Rawlinson’s exhausted and depleted 7^th Division, with Rawlinson returning home to supervise formation of the 8^th Division reinforcements, and to take the remains of the 7^th under command of Haig.

On the morning of 29th, the British intercepted a German wireless message, and became aware of the huge assault force about to break all over them. The next week produced the most severe carnage of the whole of the Ypres 1 phase, characterise by desperate Allied defence against overwhelmingly superior numbers and weaponry. The points of maximum danger were at the northern (Bixschoote/Zonnebeke) and southern (Zandvoorde/Messines) aspects of the salient. However, the first full frontal assault came at the point, on Gheluvelt crossroads, as a reconnaissance for even stronger reinforcements behind. In the south Pulteney’s 3^rd Corps came under heavy attack at Ploegsteert.

30th October was the day for the main attack. Early on Wurtemberg took Bixschoote, but failed to drive the French from Langemarck. The Germans blew the British trenches on the Zandvoorde ridge to pieces, and soon the whole Division was compelled to fall back a mile towards Klein Zillebeke, and south westwards back to Hollebeke, which fell to the Germans. This made Gheluvelt a very sharp point to the salient, but Haig resolved that the line to the canal south of Klein Zillebeke must be held at all costs, in order to protect the lines of communication, otherwise Ypres would fall. Kaiser Wilhelm was with the German army at the front, and had told the Bavarian army that winning control of Ypres would determine the war. He expressed the wish to stay in Ypres that day.

Arras, Lille and la Bassee

Map of Lille and la Bassee areas. Arras to the south. The
BEF were responsible for the front line north of Bethune/Lille

While the drama was unfolding at Antwerp, and across the Belgian north,  throughout late September and October the outflanking efforts of both sides continued in a northerly direction as they desperately sought control of the Channel ports. The Allies  felt they had the initiative, and were in a position to exploit the German lines, although for this purpose it was essential for them to have control of the two crucial positions of La Basseee and Lille. La Bassee provided strong defensive positions and was a gateway to the channel ports; and Lille was strategically important above all for its railway connections. Castelnau and Maud’huy led the French 10th Army reinforcements, and joining Maunoury and d’Urbal at the northern end of the front. Maud’huy was made responsible for holding Lille. He was lined up alongside d’Urbal, the BEF and the Belgian army  - all of them aiming to prevent the Germans wheeling through to the coastal ports. Yet again they failed to appreciate the strength of the counter measures achieved by the Germans, and they would be severely tested during October and November. Having been frustrated by the flooding of the Yser plain, probably there best chance to reach and control the coast would be through the gap between Lille and Bethune, and la Bassee lay in the middle of that.

The action unfolded in three linked but distinct phases. The first was the build up and actions up to 20^th October when both sides were adjusting the positions of their available forces. Secondly came the attacks by the Germans overwhelming Lille,  and threatening La Bassee and Arras (and menacing the coastal plain of the Yser as already described). Thirdly came the first battle of Ypres, defending the crucial salient, and covered in the next instalments.  

(i) The Allies outflanking efforts were thwarted at every point through early October. The Germans has responded to Falkenhayn’s strategy by moving vast numbers of men and arms into Belgium, and the 40 mile stretch between Lille and Nieuport on the Belgian coast became the critical terrain of the war. The road between Bethune and Lille was set as the dividing line between the French forces and the BEF. By 1^st October Maud’huy had occupied Arras and was pushing east towards Douai, but was still some way short of Lille, his target, and he found himself opposed by much greater numbers. He was pushed back and by 8^th Oct was in a serious battle for control of Arras. On 12^th October, Lille fell to the Germans.

The British line to the north gradually came together In the first three weeks of October. On 11^th, Smith-Dorrien marched the 2^nd Corps from Abbeville to the line of the canal between Aire and Bethune. Like the others he found very strong counter pressure from the Germans, and before long found himself in a struggle to retain La Bassee. Wheeling on Givenchy, they fought their way on, and by 16^th were at Aubers, and on 17^th took Herlies. Up to this point they had been fighting mainly German cavalry, but beyond here they were up against the full strength of German infantry. From 20^th onwards he felt the full effects of the German strength, and from 22^nd October to 2^nd November La Bassee was under full frontal attack by the Germans, until the battle at Ypres took some of the strength from the area.

Arras was similarly pummeled between 20-26^th October. Although the town was almost completely destroyed, the Germans could not take control of it.

The relatively new 3^rd Corps of the BEF was under command of Pulteney, and they marched to Hazebrouck, from where they planned to move on a line from Armentieres to Wytschaete, in order to line up the La Bassee – Ypres section of the front. Much of the Allied presence between Armentieres and Ypres was Cavalry, and to the north the exhausted and near-broken Belgian Army.

On 17^th, realising the strength of the Germans in this sector French decided to effect the third of his strategic alternatives against the German right further into in Belgium. With Menin as a pivot, commanding an important railway and the line of the Lys, a flanking movement might be instituted against Courtrai, and the line of the Schelde. Accordingly, he instructed Rawlinson's 7th Division to  seize Menin, and await the support of Haig's 1^st Corps, which was due in two days.

They never got there - the Germans were too strong, and the nearest the 7^th Division got to Menin was the line Ledeghem/Kezelberg, about three miles short. They fell back and entrenched on a line of 8 miles just east of Gheluvelt cross roads. On 19^th October Haig detrained the 1^st Corps at St Omer, and marched to Hazebrouck. That evening, he was instructed to move through Ypres to Thourout, with the intention of advancing on Bruges and Ghent. This was wildly optimistic, and showed how out of touch with the German strength were the BEF HQ. Fortunately, Haig was then ordered to move in a more northerly direction from Ypres, and ended up forming the British left wing in the great battle for Ypres that developed.

The 20^th October saw the whole British line from Albert to the sea in the position in which it had to meet the desperate effort of the Germans to regain the initiative and the offensive.

For this second phase, the Allies were now in a bad state, and a parlous position - they were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the German forces, all along the near 100 miles of this front. The fall of Antwerp had destroyed the hopes of holding the line of the Schelde; the German occupation of La Bassee and Lille had spoiled the turning movement against the German right, and the failure at Menin and swift advance of new German forces had ruled out northern incursions into Belgium. They were forced to wait on the defensive.

La Bassee 1914

The Germans, poised to advance had three options to consider – Arras, La Bassee and the coastal route via Nieuport. They also had to consider the Ypres salient, which would pose a threat to their flanks if they were advancing either side of it. They wanted to flatten it out – literally.

As Buchan writes: "It is a sound rule in war, that strength should not be dissipated. On this principle it is at first sight hard to discover an explanation for the course which the Germans actually followed. For they attacked almost simultaneously at all four points, and for three desperate weeks persisted in the attack."

The Defence of Antwerp and the battle for North Belgium

Stower's portrait image of the siege of Antwerp October 1914

Antwerp, strongly fortified, was strategically and emotionally important to the Belgians. It was important to the Allies, particularly the  British, with access for their fleet along the Schelde estuary. For Falkenhayn, with his priority of controlling the Belgian coast driving strategy, it became essential to over-run Antwerp. The Germans had been bothered by two Belgian sorties from the fortress – the first at the time of Le Cateau, the second during the Aisne fighting - and they were determined now to remove the lingering threat to their communications. Westwards from Antwerp they would be able to establish control over coastal Belgium and beyond if they were quick enough.

The Belgians fought a strong rearguard action to stay as far south of Antwerp as possible, so that the fortress remained out of range of the giant guns that had destroyed Liege and Namur, but the Germans continued to press. A formal siege of Antwerp’s sixty-mile perimeter began on 28 September, though the road west, running along the Dutch–Belgian frontier, remained open for Allied reinforcements to reach the city. Large tracts of surrounding countryside had been flooded, to deny them to the enemy, but the consequence was that defenders outside the forts could not entrench themselves in the waterlogged ground. The outer forts, with Fort Wavre the largest, held out for four days, more than could be expected against the modern German artillery, definitely longer than Liege and Namur. However, by the night of Wednesday the 30th, the bombardment had become continuous and murderous.

British Naval marines assisting
the defence of Antwerp

As the Belgian leadership wilted under this immense bombardment, the British and French Governments urged further resistance and defence of Antwerp to help their defence of the Channel ports in the race to the sea. Along with a Division of naval marines, Churchill went personally to Antwerp, arriving there on 3rd October. The Belgians were being crushed by the 17 inch Howitzers destroying their defensive forts one by one. The Belgian view was that to lose Antwerp AND their Army would be disastrous, so they were better off retreating north and west towards the coast. Churchill and Kitchener’s efforts secured 53,000 British and French men to support the defence of Antwerp. All this was a supportive tactic to enable the left wing of the main allied forces to join up with the defence, and push the allied position on the coast as far east and north as possible. However, the Belgian spirit was pulverized and almost broken. British naval marines appeared in the line on the morning of 4th October, and Churchill, amazingly,  found himself trapped and in command of this front line. He telegraphed London offering to resign as First Sea Lord in order to continue, but was refused, and General Rawlinson was sent to relieve him, arriving on 6th. Despite the reinforcements, a retreat along the west bank of the Scheldt became necessary to give the best chance of meeting up with the Anglo-French left wing, and to cover Ghent. Churchill got back to England on 6th, subject to much criticism. Antwerp became untenable by the evening of the 8th, and was evacuated, with the Belgian army and the French and British reinforcements heading west to the Yser and Dunkirk. By the 10th, the Germans occupied it. 
However, the defence had been extended by five precious days, this stretched to ten days with German indecision post Antwerp. Gradually they constituted a new 4^th army, led by Beseler to strike west through Belgium towards Calais. This led to the battles of Yser and First Ypres, which would surely have been lost but for the time gained in defending Antwerp to the last.  It enabled French and Haig to get to Ypres, otherwise Calais, Dunkirk and even Boulogne may have fallen.

Battle of the Yser

Between Nieuport, the port on the coast a mile from the ocean, and the town of Dixmude, where the Yser turns sharply to the south west is a distance of ten miles. "The whole country there is blind and sodden, as ill fitted for the passage of troops and guns as the creeks and salt marshes of the Essex coast." (Buchan)

By 17th October Beseler was in position to the east of Nieuport, and early the next day he attacked, with the intention of seizing the Nieuport bridge. At this moment, unexpected help arrived in the shape of a coastal barrage from the  British Navy lying close in to the shore. Three shallow draught ships under command of Hood had left Dover the night before and arrived just in time to harry the German advance. But the battle for the coastal route was only just beginning. Further inland, out of reach of the British ships, the Germans had made a number of significant advances westward to challenge the line of the Yser. On 23rd October they succeeded in crossing at St. Georges and towards the railway at Ramscapelle. On 25th they were pushing hard and it looked as if they would cross the Yser line completely; but every yard was contested and the German progress was slow and costly. By 28th they were almost to the Nieuport-Dixmude railway, and the Allied left was almost broken. 

Flooding the plain of the Yser

At this point the Belgians played their last card. They broke the dykes of the Yser and gradually flooded the plains of the Yser to a depth of several feet. Germans were drowned in hundreds. They had to redirect their efforts further south and focused on Dixmude, which was the only point where a bridgehead, if won, could be maintained. The defence of the town by the Belgians was a truly valiant act. Although the town was reduced to rubble, it was held until the 10th November by which time the strategic importance had been lost, and the decisive action was further south in the Ypres salient.

The race to the sea develops

The next few instalments will take us to the end of 1914 on the Western Front. 
Although from the Aisne eastwards and south to the Swiss border the stalemate had set in, there was still considerable flanking activity taking place in the north and west as the Allies and Germans tried to outflank each other to gain strategic advantage for the next stage. The map shows the four main actions of this phase, in amongst the constant fighting that went on throughout the region. They were: 

• the Antwerp siege and resistance; 
• the Battle of La Bassee; 
• the Battle of the Yser; and 
• the 1st Battle of Ypres - second only to the Marne in its scale and significance following the great retreat. Each of these is covered in turn

In the previous post we saw how Joffre decided to push northward to get behind Kluck's right flank, thereby disrupting his lines, so a more general German retreat would have to take place.
Sir John French, for the BEF, realised what was happening, and was anxious to find his forces now sandwiched in the centre of the allied front, rather than on the French left. He wanted greater proximity to the Channel ports should things go badly wrong, rather than having his supply lines running across France from the Atlantic coast. He also knew that Antwerp, the last great remaining fortress was under great pressure, and its loss would open the Belgian coast to the Germans. He approached Joffre formally to discuss this, and on 1^st October Joffre approved a plan to move the BEF north, and arranged for the creation of a new reservist army, the 8^th, under d’Urbal, to replace them across the Aisne sector.

For their part, the Germans responded to Joffre's initiative by their own outflanking movement around Maunoury’s left. As the the implications of stalemate at the Aisne became clearer, the new German strategy to control the north of Belgium, even as far as Boulogne on the north France coast, drove Falkenhayn's planning. Falkenhayn had replaced Moltke on 14^th September, and embarked immediately on a new war strategy to supplant the failed plan of Schlieffen. He moved his GHQ from Luxembourg to Mezieres on the Meuse, and pushed for control of all of Belgium and its coast. Without this, he realised the German U boat campaign would be seriously weakened. He resolved that a definitive victory in the war could only be reached in the West rather than the East. The new C-in-C of Germany's forces could see the benefits of naval control of the Channel and North Sea in a way that the Prussian militarist in Moltke could not or would not.