Battle of the Somme 2 - Build up to the bombardment

General Sir Douglas Haig - 'controversial'
figure in WW1 history, faced his first major
challenge as C-in-C at the Somme.

"Battle of the Somme" conjures up the image of a campaign across a river, but the Somme is a departement as well as a river. In fact only the French portion of the battlefront was placed astride the marshy ground close to the river. The British sector passed to the north and extended into the next departement, the Pas de Calais. On account of the pressures of Verdun, more and more French divisions were diverted there and, much to Haig's displeasure, their contribution to the planned front shrunk from the expected 25 miles down to eight. As the British troops made their way south to fill the places, they moved into what had become a quiet part of the Western Front. The forces on both sides of no man's land pursued an implicit ‘live and let live’ policy, and offensive reactions were desultory. As the British took over more sections, their Generals determined to put a stop to this, and ordered constant small attacks and raids to gain information and to prime their men for the main action. While understandable, this certainly let the Germans know that significant changes were afoot. They were also well aware of the tremendous build up of British resources behind the lines. For the first time in the war Britain was now able to match Germany in artillery output.

The shape of the front had been determined in 1914 as the battles of Marne and Aisne were followed by the outflanking actions of the race to the sea. Once this started, with General Castelnau attempting to get around the Germans north of the Aisne, the front straightened out northerly rather than its previous northwesterly direction. The consequence for the Somme battlefield was that the British part of the line was approximately L-shaped, with a five miles east to west stretch at the southern end, and 11-12 miles running north (see map, and map of previous post). The main feature of the battle area in addition to the rolling chalk hills already described were: two rivers; the dead straight Roman road linking the only two towns of any size - Albert and Bapaume; and many woods and copses. The two rivers were the Somme itself to the south, and its small tributary the Ancre, which had created a chalk valley in its course that ran south east though the front line between Beaucourt and Thiepval, then on to Albert, where it ran under the famous Basilica, and joined the Somme to the south of the town.

Since 1914 the Germans had made general and specific improvements to their defensive lines. Being so deep into French territory they were perfectly willing to cede the odd mile of ground here or there, if it gave them the higher ground and advantageous aspects. This was particularly so in the undulating terrain of the Somme, creating numerous mini hills and valleys. The trenches weaved their way through these. No mans land was in some places as narrow as 50 yards and in others nearly half a mile. With these tortuous courses the actual length of the front was extended by two miles to 18 miles.

The Allied Front Line June 1916. The nine fortified villages incorporated
int the German lines are shown in purple, and the key objective of
Pozieresin orange. (Adapted from Mapping the First World War.
Peter Chassaud. IWM Publications)

From the north, the opening line ran as follows (see map): the Gommecourt salient protruded into the British line, comprising the village itself and the associated Chateau. It was the westernmost position of the German army on the front. Running south into the Ancre valley it ran through two key villages, Beaumont Hamel and Serre. The five miles running south from the Ancre were to be the critical points of the first day advance. They incorporated the main Roman road, which ran between two German fortified villages - Ovillers and La Boisselle; and Pozieres ridge, a key first day target for the attackers. Passing south to the village of Fricourt, another fortified German defence point, the front then turned sharply east toward the villages of Mametz and Montauban, and the junction with the French troops was just south of the latter.

Thus, on the whole of this eighteen miles, the German occupied carefully selected positions, strongly fortified and with at least three lines of defences. They had stitched in 9 villages to their fortifications, from north to south: Gommecourt, Serre, Beaumont Hamel, Thiepval, Ovillers, La Boisselle, Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban. All of these were already severely damaged by artillery fire, and made ideal defensive warrens and hidden machine gun posts. In several particularly good vantage points the Germans had also built redoubts - heavily armed strongpoints well supplied by tunnels and ammunition.

Against this formidable set of defences, Haig set about making his plans and dispositions. His main advantages were unprecedented artillery resources, and in infantry divisions - his troops outnumbered the Germans by 7 to 1. All the leading British generals, however, were concerned by their men’s inexperience - a problem exacerbated by the diversion of so many experienced French divisions to Verdun.

Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Staunch believer in the power of artillery
to overcome entrenched defence.

However, they were not in accord about the detail of the plans. There was a hierarchy amongst the four senior men. Haig, clearly, was the Commander in Chief, but he was less than six months in post, and of the same rank and not much older than Rawlinson. Of the four, only Rawlinson was an infantryman through and through (Haig, Allenby and Gough were cavalry officers). Allenby was slightly off side, given a minor role in the battle and a diversionary one at that, which he viewed as hazardous in the extreme. Gough was the youngest, and was waiting in the rear, with his reserve 'army' of cavalry, which had not yet been fortified with the promised infantry divisions. So, the crucial decisions were made by Haig and Rawlinson. Haig was a good delegator and he tended to defer to Rawlinson's infantry experience, but he was determined that his cavalry should be prepared and on hand to take advantage of the breakthrough he confidently expected from the artillery barrage and follow up attack. Rawlinson was overly influenced by the power of his artillery and wanted the maximum barrage as a prelude to a more modest 'bite and hold' advance, which could then be built on by further artillery attacks on the deeper German defences. Haig wanted a shorter bombardment to preserve an element of surprise for a breakthrough (really), and Rawlinson wanted longer to ensure there was no resistance for his infantry to overcome at the first day's objectives. Neither of them seemed much influenced by the stream of information coming back (from the very raids they had ordered) about the strength and complexity of German defences. A British compromise ensued. The first day's objectives would be more limited to the first German positions, except in the centre, where Pozieres ridge was seen as a vital target (remember Gallipoli?). The pre-bombardment would be for five full days. Haig was under pressure to begin as soon as possible to relieve the Verdun position, but was not prepared to start earlier than 24th June. Rawlinson set orders for his infantry to march slowly across no man's land, rather than traditional rush and shelter, apparently on account of his men’s inexperience and the considerable weight of equipment each man had to carry. He also had concerns about keeping his men behind the fall of the supporting artillery, but the full 'creeping barrage' was not employed at this stage.

Preparations continued apace for U day - the beginning of the artillery Armageddon.