Gallipoli 7. Suvla Bay

West Beach, Suvla Bay 1915

After a break, we return to Gallipoli, and 100 years ago today began the Allied (and Hamilton's) final desperate assault to achieve a significant hold on the Gallipoli peninsula, with the landings at Suvla Bay. Like its predecessors this foray was to be marked by misjudgements, abysmal communications, futile bravery and eventual failure. The version below is based on the near contemporaneous accounts of Churchill and Buchan. Other more recent sources including the excellent books by Hart and by Travers are much more critical of the High Command in general and certain individuals in particular. John Masefield's classic account "Gallipoli", written in 1916 for an American audience, and to counter the German propaganda highlighting British failures, is an unashamedly patriotic and one sided view, but contains some vivid passages. 
It would seem that much uncertainty persists about who was responsible for many of the failings, even 100 years on. There was a good deal of collusion amongst senior figures and creating of scapegoats in the early years after the war, prompted by the Dardanelles Inquiry . 
Depending on your viewpoint Suvla Bay was the crux of an ingenious Hamilton plan to take control of high ground in the centre of the Peninsula; or a longer term landing base to support and follow up the definitive break out to the high ground from the ANZAC beach head. It seems that Kitchener pushed for a large breakout assault from ANZAC early in July, but yet again delays in arrival of new Divisions of troops led to modification and Hamilton's version. His plan was wrapped in secrecy (because of the need to surprise the Turks) and intricate, with many separate actions requiring carefully timed co-ordination. In other words, doomed to fail, particularly so as many of the officers and all of the men were not let in on the secret of the cunning plan, and were understandably confused. They were also inexperienced; led by inexperienced or ailing commanders; and short of munitions - artillery in particular - and supplies. The shortage of drinking water in the deadly heat of August may be the most significant factor in their failure to consolidate the Suvla landings.

Nevertheless, this was Hamilton’s all or nothing opportunity to take control of the peninsula and he developed his typically ambitious and optimistic plan. He aimed to wrest control from the Turks by occupying the ground between ANZAC Cove and Suvla Bay on the west, and Maidos on the eastern shore, including the highest points on the Sari Bair ridge. He devised four separate actions:

• Two diversionary actions; one in the Gulf of Saros to the north, and yet another attack on Krithia, north of Cape Helles, to ensure Turkish defences there were kept fully occupied.
• A breakout attack from ANZAC to the west of Sari Bair mountain from Koja Chemen
• A landing at Suvla Bay by IX Corps to cross the Suvla Plain and occupy the Anafarta ridge prior to an assault on the northern aspect of Sari Bair, linking to the ANZACs.

The opposing sides were each able to muster around 120,000 men for the actions, although approx. 30,000 of the Turks were on the Asian shore near Kum Kale, and unable to contribute in the short term. The British forces included three 'new' Divisions contributing to a a new Army Corps, the 9th.

The Helles diversionary attack lasted a week, and again was a bitter and costly stalemate.
On 6^th August, an ANZAC attack on Lone Pine hill began, as a feint to occupy the heavily defended Turks. It was another bloody battle, in which the now battle hardened Australians distinguished themselves in hand to hand combat. Seven of 9 Victoria Crosses won at Gallipoli in August were won here. While they were so engaged, on their left, 16,000 men launched the main ANZAC advanced towards Sari Bair. However, they had underestimated again the tenacity of the Turkish defenders, and by the 8^th had still not been able to reach Sari Bair. Worse, they had revealed their intentions and the Turks were able to bring up strong reinforcements.

The main source of the disaster however was at Suvla Bay, where the new 10^th and 11^th Divisions comprising 9 corps landed variously at Beaches A B and C with little problem, in newly designed landing craft known as ‘Beetles’. Their objectives were to capture Lala Baba Hill and Hill 10 situated either side of the salt lake that fills in much of the west end of the plain inland from the beach. From there they were to move on quickly to the higher ground of the Anafarta hills. Predictably, their plans were over ambitious and foundered against redoubtable Turkish defence. To the south, approaching Lala Baba, it was as much the incompetence of the British commanders as the strength of the Turks that limited the advance. In fact the Turkish defence was down to a few hundred ‘gendarmes’ holding their line against the invaders, and von Sandars was unable to get reinforcements there to counter attack for 2-3 days. It was at this point that he put the entire Turkish defence in the Anafarta area under the inspirational control of Mustapha Kemal Bey (later Ataturk).

After a day’s regrouping, the Gurkhas, British and ANZACs resumed their attacks on the summits of Chunuk Bair and Sari Bair. The NZ troops of the Wellington battalion had the most success and were able to entrench themselves on the ridge of Chunuk Bair, but overall it was the familiar story of Turkish re-supply and reinforcements making timely interventions, while the British and ANZACs struggled on with neither. One group of ghurkas actually made it to the top of Sari Bair, where they had a perfect view of the ANZACs below; the failing Suvla Bay attacks to the west, and Maidos and the Straits to the east. No-one could join to support them, and tragically they were blown off the summit by friendly fire from the naval bombardment.

Gen Frederick
Stopford

In the overall disaster of the Suvla Bay attacks, much opprobrium has been heaped on Lt. General Frederick Stopford, Commander of IX Corps, who showed no sense of urgency to press on to the hills while von Sandars was fretting about his flimsy lines of defence. Two vital days were lost after the successful landing on 6-7^th – just one more example in the litany of incompetence and indecision that marked the whole campaign. On receiving news of this from his staff on the spot, Hamilton rushed to Suvla himself, to try to inject some urgency into the attacks, but the forces were unready and dispersed. Not until the 9^th could the assault begin, by which time Kemal, courtesy of von Sandars’ decisions, had three times the resources he would have had only 24 hours earlier. It was another costly failure – 8,000 men were killed or wounded at Suvla Bay in the unsuccessful attacks of 9^th and 10^th. Following this successful defence, Kemal then launched his own costly counter-attack on the ANZAC Cove positions. One thousand North Lancs and Wiltshire Rifles were wiped out in the first stages of this attack, but the Turks lost more than 3,000 men when they hit the lower defences, and the ANZACs held firm.

Two further forlorn attempts were made by Hamilton on 15^th and then 21^st August to establish significant positions on high ground, but both were nullified by strengthened Turkish defences. The action of the 21^st was, in fact, the largest action fought in the whole Gallipoli campaign, but it was destined to be the last. In those three weeks of August the Allies had 40,000 casualties, 30,000 of them in the period 6-10th - a higher rate of loss that at Ypres 1 or 2.
Hamilton’s response was to plead for another 50,000 men for reinforcements, but this time his voice would not be heeded. A painful end to the campaign was now unavoidable.