Foch's Masterplan for Victory

Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch

Ludendorff was in deep trouble. His Kaiserschlacht, with its shifting emphasis of attack, had resulted in a large strategic cul de sac. The sizeable territorial gains – presented to the German public as prelude to complete victory – could not disguise the failure to make the decisive breakthrough. The Germans had been held off – just – in front of Amiens; in front of Ypres and Hazebrouck, and now at the Marne in front of Paris. Ludendorff was left with an enlarged salient and greatly lengthened lines of communication across scarred battleground. From the second battle of the Marne, where improved French defensive tactics were followed by Mangin’s counter thrust (see previous post), his generals were requesting orderly withdrawals to consolidate. Ludendorff’s crisis was that he could not face withdrawal. To do so would surrender the initiative, and admit, tacitly, that Kaiserschlacht had failed.

The news from other theatres was not comforting. The Austrians, Turks and Bulgarians were looking distinctly vulnerable, and the old Eastern Front was unstable. The plea of Kuhlmann, German Foreign Secretary (see previous Post) in early July for a negotiated peace brought an abreaction from the highly stressed Ludendorff. He telephoned the Kaiser from his headquarters in Spa, and angrily demanded that Kuhlmann be sacked. The Kaiser, feebly, complied.

Thus, Ludendorff’s last chance was for a positive result on the Western Front. But here, the balance of men and materiel was slipping away from Germany. Reinforcements from Britain and significant numbers of Americans were arriving to recover from Allied losses from Kaiserschlacht. The Germans (who had suffered at least as many casualties) could rely only on the old and the very young for their reserves.

Foch assumed his role as Allied Supremo and Generalissimo following the dark first day of Operation Michael on 21^st March (see Post 21/3/2018). Since that time his unavoidable priority had been the marshalling and co-ordination of Allied defences (including, to a lesser extent, in Italy) against the formidable German assaults. He had not started well. He was slow to recognise Haig’s desperate position in Flanders, and was deceived over the German stroke on the Aisne. But by now he was growing into his role. The arrival of Americans to boost his reserves increased his confidence and he set about improving the Allied defences. He increased further the depth of the front lines (in the style of von Armin at 3^rd Ypres (See Post 1/10/2017). He reorganised artillery tactics to focus on newly identified concentrations, and increased the capacity for rapid counter attacks against early breaches of the line.

Mangin’s counter-attack at the second battle of the Marne was the product of these improvements. The move was between Soissons and the tip o the German salient at Chateau Thierry. Mangin's 10^th Army was even supported by four Divisions of Haig’s BEF – a sure sign of increasing co-operation. Nevertheless, they had to overcome stiff German resistance to succeed. The result was a further great boost to Foch as his thoughts turned to an offensive campaign. In addition to more men, he was able to draw on almost unlimited arms and materiel; a new breed of faster moving tanks, and near complete air superiority (increasingly important)*.

There was a comparative lull between Mangin’s success in mid July and the decisive battle for Amiens on 8^th August. Ludendorff was unable to act for lack of manpower. His casualties were high but, worse, more men were being incapacitated by the first wave of the Spanish Flu epidemic (of which more later). Whereas Foch was biding his time. His master plan was for complete victory, and unlike Ludendorff he had time on his side. At this stage he did not believ that the war could be won until 1919, and he planned accordingly. Politicians and public alike were still anxious from the reverberations of the great German offensives, and he was not under immediate pressure to break through. However, at the supreme war council meeting in July, Foch authorised his deputy, Weygand, to announce that Mangin’s victory was to be the turning point in the move from defence to attack.

The crucial railway lines at the turning point July 1918

Foch’s plan was for a series of devastating but brief attacks at multiple points along the whole front. In any such action, attacks would stop when progress was halted, and the emphasis would move to new target. If this sounds similar to Ludendorff’s erratic strategy for Kaiserschlacht there were important differences. Such complexity of action was now possible because of improved co-ordination and communication – a real weapons system with infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft working together coherently. They had come a long way from the unwieldy relentless attritional campaigns of 1915 and 1916.

The initial thrusts of Foch’s plan were to secure vital areas of the front that were most endangered by German positions. Three vital rail routes from Paris towards the front had to be removed from range. They were at Avricourt, Amiens and the St. Mihiel salient (see Map). He also prioritised assaults  in Flanders to secure Bethune, Hazebrouck and the Channel ports. Surprise and mobility were the watchwords of his approach – indeed these had been exemplified even before Mangin’s counter attack at the Marne, when the Australian Corps under Sir John Monash, had brilliantly captured the village of Le Hamel to the north east of Villers Bretonneux on 4^th July.

With these frequent surprise assaults, Foch believed he could push the Germans back to the Hindenburg line by winter, before launching final attacks in Spring 1919. To their great credit, it was Haig and Mangin among others who gradually persuaded Foch that victory might be achieved in 1918.

*French aircraft production had outstripped the rest, and by 1918 France had the largest air force of all the combatants.

Kaiserschlacht 7 - The (3rd) Battle of the Aisne

Operation Blucher-Yorck June 1918. Despite the gains, the
Germans did not get as close to Paris as in September 1914

The large territorial gains made in the early stages of Operation Michael and Operation Georgette (see Posts 21/3/2018 and 8/5/2018) brought a mixed reaction in their home country. The Kaiser, his military leaders and many politicians looked at the maps and became overconfident, missing the significance of the later stalemates and attrition. Talk of a negotiated peace trailed away to be replaced by more strident demands for territory and reparations in outright victory that was surely coming. Richard von Kuhlmann, now a high profile foreign minister following his success at the Brest-Litovsk treaty (See Post 22/1/2018) was one of a minority who argued for holding fast to the new gains, but to consolidate the position in the east, and strengthen Germany’s hand for a negotiated peace. The German people were less convinced by the extravagant claims of impending victory. Not only were they hungry and war weary, they were sick of the huge casualty figures resulting from the ‘triumphs’. They were now being discomforted further by British RAF air raids, penetrating as far into Germany as Cologne.

However, Ludendorff was not prepared to make any concessions in his Kaiserchlacht. In the relative calm during May, he had managed to replace more than 70% of the half million casualties  from the offensive so far. Frustrated near Amiens and in Flanders, he still aimed to split the British and French armies as a prelude to victory.

Ludendorff now resolved to attack at the southern limit of the great salient created by Operation Michael. His plan was to drive through and weaken further Foch’s reserves by drawing them south from Flanders. He would then return to the Somme region in the centre to apply the coup de grace, separating the British and French. In that sense the Battle of the Aisne* was a diversionary action. Some diversion, some action.

Ludendorff’s selection of the Aisne was for reasons similar to his choice of the Lys for Georgette. It was sufficiently far from the central thrust to weaken Allied reserves there, and it threatened key Allied possessions. At the Lys it was communications and the Channel ports. At the Aisne it would be the main communication routes to Champagne (south of the Marne), and Paris itself. Operation Michael had created a large salient, like a nose, from the Hindenburg line into the heart of France, and his plan now was to create another salient – a large pimple on the nose – towards the river Marne; and then another, further west towards Compiegne (see map). In the final phase, he would consolidate these, and link with his existing salient at Montdidier (See Post 4/3/2018) thereby isolating Amiens and Paris. Having sucked all Allied reserves into these areas he would be enabled to resume his advances further north.

The Army Group under Crown Prince Wilhelm had forty Divisions between two armies to carry out this surprise move. The I Army was commanded by the veteran von Below, and the VII Army was under von Boene. The armies were to attack on a 30 miles front between Reims and the river Ailette (a tributary of the Oise) to the west. Their first objective would be the high plateau of the now infamous Chemin des Dames (See Post 13/5/2017).

Once again, the German concealed their preparations well, and would find themselves advancing against a weak section of the Front. This time it was the French that would bear the brunt of the attacks, although on the right of their defensive line stood the ill-fated British 9^th Army Corps. It had been formed specifically for the Gallipoli campaign in 1915 before transferring to France at the end of that terrible saga. It had been commanded by General Hamilton Gordon since 1916, and had recently taken a severe mauling at the Battle of the Lys; being transferred south to this quiet (sic) sector to recuperate. Marshall Foch still believed the main German resumption would come against Arras or in Champagne, and had opted to leave the Chemin des Dames lightly defended by five divisions of the 6^th French Army, under General Maistre (who had finally won it from the Germans in the Battle of Malmaison in October 1917 (see Post 10/12/2017)).

The German assault began with the now familiar gas and heavy artillery barrage through the night of 26-27^th May. Soon after dawn an irresistible attack of storm troopers and infantry broke through the weak defences on the plateau, and before long they were on the Aisne. On the right, the British had more initial success in holding the Germans but by afternoon they were forced back across the Aisne at Berry au Bac.

Men of the Worcestershire Regiment
defending the Aisne south bank

Ludendorff’s day 1 success was, for the first time in Kaiserschlacht, beyond his objectives (see map). He was in a position to advance rapidly to the Marne, and if his flanks could broaden the sharp salient he was creating, he could sniff Paris. By the end of the next day, his forces were on the high ground north of Soissons, and infiltrating to the east of the town.

However, that same day saw the first significant involvement of the American army. Its 1^st Division, acting with the French 1^st Army, was part of a successful counter-attack and capture of Cantigny, near Montdidier. This pressurised the north-west of the German advance, and was an ominous sign, since 250,000 American troops were now arriving in France every month.

On 29^th came the next German surge towards the Marne. Soissons fell, and by the evening of 30^th von Boehne had control of a ten mile stretch of the Marne, around Chateau Thierry. However, on his flanks he could not advance beyond Soissons, nor could von Below take Reims.

Paul Maistre - somewhat
harshly sacked for caving
in at Les Chemin des Dames

Ludendorff was reaching the limits of his advance. He needed desperately to broaden the base of his salient, the tip of which was Chateau Thierry. The lure of Paris was too great for him to stop, but it meant he must commit all of his forty Divisions and most of his reserve – the very trap into which he had planned to force Foch. A series of actions, very costly for the Germans, created an uneasy stalemate by 3^rd June, and a need for Ludendorff  to switch the focus of his attack. This came on 9^th June, with a major attack to the west, led by von Hutier in the Montdidier-Noyons sector. He was seeking to reach Compiegne, from where he could attack Paris from a more northerly direction. Desperate attack encountered desperate defence (shades of Verdun), and von Hutier’s storm troopers had only limited success. Nevertheless, on 10^th June the French were falling back towards Paris, before a defensive arrangement by General Mangin (now back in favour, see Post 13/5/2017) defined the furthest point of the German effort.

From now, counter-attack tactics by Mangin and increasing numbers of American reinforcements began to turn the tide on a battle front before Paris that now stretched for nearly 100 miles – recalling the great 1914 Marne battle.

Final German efforts to break through at Courcelles, on 13^th June, and Reims, on 19^th June, were repulsed with very heavy German losses. The German storm troop tactics had finally been blunted, then exhausted. A lull followed for nearly one month, but when hostilities resumed the Allies would be the ones on the front foot.

* codenamed by Ludendorff, as with other Kaisershlacht initiatives, as Operation Blucher-Yorck (after two Prussian generals of the Napoleonic wars)