Gallipoli 1. Background and build up

The Dardanelles Straits - guarded to the west by the Gallipoli Peninsula - gateway
to the Black Sea, reinforcements to Russia and control of the Turkish threat

In the Preface to his excellent book "Gallipoli" Peter Hart, oral historian and author opens with this withering assessment. "Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking". The proponents of the plan to capture the Dardanelles Straits that divide Europe from Asia, thereby knocking Turkey out of the war, would not have agreed - of course. To them (and Churchill was not the sole champion of the cause), not only was action in the Eastern theatre an imaginative alternative to the costly stalemate of the Western Front, it was necessary to support the ailing Russian effort on the Eastern Front and to persuade the wavering neutral nations of the Balkans to declare in favour of the Allies. On the face of it, they had a case (it seems to me). Tragically, a toxic cocktail of indecision, delay, incompetence, inexperience and hubris ensured the complete failure of the campaign. Over the course of a year, tens of thousands of men died and hundreds of thousands endured every kind of misery and deprivation in a lost cause. With great irony, the only part of the whole campaign to be conducted with efficient success was the final evacuation and abandonment of the Gallipoli Peninsula (qv Corunna, the Great Retreat of 1914 and Dunkirk).

The political struggle – to persuade in favour of a near East operation to relieve Russia – was started in the new year of 1915 by Lloyd George and Churchill. At this time the Russians were coming under major pressure in the Caucasus. They were short of men and weapons, in addition to their struggles to maintain the Eastern front. Lord Kitchener was prepared to show support, but not to commit land forces to such a move. Fisher was strongly against a navy only action, but supportive of urgent, decisive combined action  included forcing the passage of the Dardanelles. Grey, still in the Foreign Office, was beginning to view the plans sympathetically.

On 5^th January Churchill telegraphed Carden, the Admiral of the Dardanelles squadron, about the feasibility of breaching the Dardanelles. Carden’s response was that the Straits could not be rushed, but might be forced by a larger operation. On the 8^th January, the War Council met again, and gave consideration to a major operation, involving ground forces of up to 150,000 men. By 11^th January, Carden’s more detailed plan for the bombardment of the Dardanelles defences was received. Churchill sent it straight to Asquith, and then the following day moved further on implementing it, by bringing into play the Queen Elizabeth – the first of five new fast battleships to be ready. Her fifteen inch guns would be able to pound the forts defending the Straits from a safe distance. On 13^th January, the War Council approved unanimously the plan, and Churchill promoted it to the French and Russians.

Contrasting fortunes: Churchill
(left) was almost destroyed
by Gallipoli......

 Churchill’s eagerness for an Eastern campaign to force the Dardanelles was matched by Kitchener”s (and Joffre and French's) reluctance to provide any land force to support it for fear of weakening the Western Front position. Fisher, as First Sea Lord, was vehemently opposed to a navy only operation, despite Carden’s opinion that it was feasible. Eventually Fisher was pressured to support it, but he remained anxious for a matching campaign on land, and he turned out to be right.

But it was Kitchener who reigned supreme over the decisions (or indecisions) of the War Council. Churchill expresses the view that the lack of challenge to him in Cabinet was a bad thing, and that only he and Lloyd George were prepared to do so. Kitchener was more persuaded by the views of French and Joffre than those warning of the impending collapse of Russia, and the need for the Eastern initiative. He was also burdened by the crisis of insufficient and inadequate munitions for the successful conduct of war on either front (a crisis that would soon bring down the Government).

...whereas Mustafa Kamal (later
Ataturk) gained his reputation for
the fiercely successful defence
of Gallipoli by the Turks

On February 16^th the War Council finally made four significant decisions in favour of the Eastern campaign: the newly formed 29^th Division would be transferred to the Dardanelles (ostensibly to support the Greeks); further forces would be transferred from Egypt; the Royal Naval Division would be added to land forces there; and equipment and horses were to be provided as necessary to support the troops.

Opponents of the decisions challenged and delayed, and again Kitchener came under pressure to change them. He wavered for a further week, between 19^th and 26^th, at the end of which Churchill formally disclaimed responsibility for any consequences of this inaction. Even Asquith was unable to persuade Kitchener to decide. He finally relented on 10^th March, and ordered the 29^th Division to set sail for the Dardanelles.

Hesitation, delay and uncertainty characterised these first months, forfeiting all possible advantages of surprise in naval and military plans. So, from the outset, where decisive and rapid action might have given an outside chance of success, the Gallipoli campaign was virtually doomed. If only Kitchener had  been totally convinced by the doubters. As it transpired, the embarrassing failure of the Naval attempt to force the Straits (see later) had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the land force arguments.

The U-Boat war develops

British E-Class Submarine

The invention and development of submarines led to step change in war at sea, as did the development of air power in later conflicts.  The first submarines, or 'submersibles', dated back to the 17th century, but it was in the American Civil War when an enemy vessel was first sunk by one, and the late 19th century when gains in mechanical power increased their scope. They threatened the end of conventional engagements between single warships and fleets, with the striking of colours to end engagements.  Traditionalists viewed submarines (U-Boats) with distaste, and felt they sank to new depths (sic) in the dishonourable conduct of naval warfare. Nevertheless, their potential was enormous.

When Churchill was appointed to the Admiralty in 1911, this scope and potential was barely appreciated. Although Britain had substantially more U-Boats than Germany, they were primitive and short range – thought to be of use only for the defence of home ports. In fact Germany had more of the sea-going quality vessels, and much more incentive for developing them. It was the British Empire’s vast merchant fleet that would be most vulnerable to hostile action from U-Boats. Overall, the Admiralty underestimated this threat - viewing it as both cowardly and inhuman, and therefore unlikely. Only Admiral Fisher (at that time First Sea Lord) differed. His memorandum of 1913 warned of precisely what would happen, but he was overruled. Partly, this was because there was not much that could be done about the German U-Boat threat. Britain building bigger and better U-Boats would not negate the German threat, and they would have no comparable targets to speak of (Nevertheless, they would prove their skills and worth during the Dardanelles campaign).

German UC-1 Class U-Boat

On 4^th February 1915 the German Admiralty declared all waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland to be a war zone, and that all allied and neutral shipping would be subject to attack. Although disturbed by this, the British could see the potential political and propaganda advantages of this new situation. They, imbroiled as they were with the USA in lengthy arguments about the legality of their own North Sea block of trade with Germany, foresaw that tension would be removed if the Germans began to sink American or other neutral ships in the zone.  Home waters defences were strengthened by indicator nets at strategic points across narrow channels such as the Straits of Dover, and by Q Boats. These were essentially decoys, camouflaged as merchant or fishing vessels, but heavily armed. Other gadgetry rapidly appeared – hydrophones were trialled as an early version of sonar. In the first week of Germany’s offensive, 11 ships were attacked of which seven were sunk, but 1381 ships entered or left British ports safely. In the whole of March >6000 vessels arrived or sailed, of which only 21 were sunk. During the same period, German losses to the defensive strategies of the British were significant. By early May, this first attempt to strangulate British sea trade was effectively over – but it would return in a major way in 1917. Indeed, within weeks, on May 7^th in the Atlantic the Lusitania tragedy unfolded.

The Battle of Neuve Chapelle

An unacceptable loss of lives was paid for this
small blip pushed eastwards
in the front over 3 days

 Neuve Chapelle was the first significant action on the northern stretch of the Western Front in 1915. As initially planned by Sir John French it was to be little more than a pilot study for much larger subsequent Allied offensive. It assumed greater significance partly because of the nature and course of the battle, but also politically. French and Joffre were at last agreed on something – that the transfer of attention (and resources) from the Western Front to the eastern theatre for the Dardanelles campaign should be opposed. They sought an early and dramatic breakthrough at Neuve Chapelle to break the current stalemate.

Neuve Chapelle at that time was a small village sitting to the south of the Ypres salient on the La Bassee Estaires road that runs north-south, and around 20 miles to the west of strategically important Lille, held by the Germans. Smith-Dorrien's 2^nd Corps had taken Neuve Chapelle in mid October, but had been pushed back by the Germans within 10 days. By early March 1915, the surviving BEF had been greatly reinforced from Britain and the Empire. If they could break through at Neuve Chapelle and gain control of the ridges to the east, they would be well placed on the elevated approaches to Lille.

French briefed his generals on the 8^th March. The 1^st army would make a two-pronged approach at the north and south edges of the village, while supplementary attacks would be made at nearby Givenchy, and to the north just below Armentieres. The military tactic to be piloted was a concentrated artillery barrage to open up the front line defences for the infantry assault – a harbinger for the fatal Somme offensive of 1916.

At 7.30am on 10^th March an intense artillery bombardment opened up on the German line. A mere 35 minutes later, the artillery range was increased, the whistles blew, and the infantry advanced. Initial progress and success was considerable, but before long resistance from intact defences and murderous machine gun fire were encountered. At the north end of the village, the 2^nd Middlesex regiment found themselves in barbed wire and defences not touched by the artillery – they were almost wiped out. Beyond the first line the battle developed into a series of close quarters fighting through the village and surrounding woods, with heavy losses on both sides. By the end of the 10^th Neuve Chapelle was in British hands, but a renewed assault on 11^th was less successful, the Germans were better prepared, and after another long day of bitter fighting little further progress towards the ridges was made. On the night of 11^th the Germans brought in reinforcements, and on 12^th they launched a counter attack. The most severe of these was well to the north at the edge of the Ypres salient. They took the village of St Eloi, and threatened more general damage to the allied line. The allies fought back strongly, particularly the newly arrived Canadian Light Infantry, and restored St. Eloi within three days.

The ruins of Neuve Chapelle post battle

By the end of 12^th March a stalemate had been reached. The British had taken the village, and advanced for one mile along a front of three miles, but the Germans still held the ridges guarding Lille. Perhaps a Pyrrhic victory, but one aspect of the battle was great success – the actions of the Flying Corps. For the first time the aviators fought almost alongside the ground forces, and their bombs repeatedly disrupted the German communications. 

Buchan writes “Neuve Chapelle was a test action, and the deduction from it was to have a sinister effect  on the Allies’ conduct of the war”…”Guns could blast a way through the strongest defences. Clearly the attack must be on a broader front, otherwise the avenue of advance would be too narrow and degenerate into a salient; but on a broad front, granted limitless supplies of guns and shell, it seemed that success was assured. This view…dominated all the plans for 1915, and its many weaknesses were left undiscovered in the obsession which had fallen on the Allied commands.” “A false step had been taken which for three years was to be left unretrieved.”

The Battle of the Dogger Bank 24 January 1915

Although the victory of the Royal Navy in the battle of the Falklands (and the removal of German raiders from the high seas) had restored British confidence in the supremacy of the Fleet on the High Seas, there was still a lot of controversy and uncertainty about the activities of the Home Fleet. The early actions, largely indecisive, and the raids on the English coast in December, on Whitby, Hartlepool and Scarborough, worried the public, and raised the tension. There was tension too between Churchill and Jellicoe, the C-in-C of the Home Fleet. Churchill was unhappy with Jellicoe’s cautious approach and his constant demands to strengthen the existing battleships rather than have them ready, close to the likely action points.  

John Jellicoe, later
1st Earl Jellicoe

Jellicoe wished to strengthen the defences of the Fleet’s new home in Scapa Flow, rather than opt for the Firth of Forth, closer to likely action points in the North Sea. As always, Churchill wished to waste no opportunities to take the initiative.

On the German side, after the early encounters the Kaiser had also been cautious, and ordered that his main Dreadnought strength should be confined to exercise in the Baltic for the time being. The German Admiral Ingenohl was frustrated, yet emboldened by his December raids, and planned further exploratory actions in the North Sea. Fearing further intrusion by the British towards the Heligoland Bight, he decided to send an exploratory battle cruiser and destroyer flotilla to the Dogger Bank area. The British intercepted the signals for this, and feared the Germans were about to launch another coastal raid on England.

Churchill and Fisher immediately responded, and sent out orders for the nearest forces – Tyrwhitt’s in Harwich, and Beatty’s in the Firth of Forth to intercept the enemy. The orders were for these two group to rendezvous behind (i.e. to the east) of the anticipated positions of Admiral Hipper’s battle cruiser squadron. Contact with the Germans was made at 7.30am on 24^th January, and the first major naval action in home waters was started. Churchill describes the tension at the Admiralty:

“There can be few purely mental moments more charged with cold excitement than to follow, almost from minute to minute, the phases of a great naval action from the silent rooms of the Admiralty. Out on blue water in the fighting ships amid the stunning detonations of the cannonade, fractions of the event unfold themselves to the corporeal eye. There is the sense of action at its highest; there is the wrath of battle; there is the intense self-effacing physical or mental toil. But in Whitehall only the clock ticks and quiet men enter with quick steps laying slips of penciled paper before other men equally silent who draw lines and scribble calculations, and point with the finger or make brief subdued comments. Telegram succeeds telegram at a few minutes’ interval as they are picked up and decoded, often in the wrong sequence, frequently of dubious import; and out of these, a picture always flickering and changing rises in the mind, and imagination strikes out around it at every stage flashes of hope or fear.”  

The end of the Blucher - a wretched sight

At 9am, after a chase, the HMS Lion opened fire at 14,000 yards, a much greater distance than previously possible. The German cruiser Blucher was hit multiple times, and the Seydlitz and Derfflinger were also badly damaged. The Lion, Beatty’s flagship, was then hit by the Moltke, and in the confusion that followed the German capital ships were able to escape. Only the Blucher was stranded and quickly sunk. Once again the German fleet had escaped more serious damage. Under heavy escort, the badly damaged Lion limped back to safety at Rosyth. The Grand Fleet consolidated at Scapa Flow rather than at the Forth, much to Churchill’s disappointment, but the effect of the partial victory over the Germans was to keep them cooped up for well over a year until Jutland.This sea battle marked the first occasion on which capital ships were attacked by torpedoes from much smaller destroyers.

Germany was unhappy with the outcome, and Ingenohl paid the price, being replaced as Admiral of the Fleet by von Pohl.