Gallipoli 1. Background and build up

The Dardanelles Straits - guarded to the west by the Gallipoli Peninsula - gateway
to the Black Sea, reinforcements to Russia and control of the Turkish threat

In the Preface to his excellent book "Gallipoli" Peter Hart, oral historian and author opens with this withering assessment. "Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking". The proponents of the plan to capture the Dardanelles Straits that divide Europe from Asia, thereby knocking Turkey out of the war, would not have agreed - of course. To them (and Churchill was not the sole champion of the cause), not only was action in the Eastern theatre an imaginative alternative to the costly stalemate of the Western Front, it was necessary to support the ailing Russian effort on the Eastern Front and to persuade the wavering neutral nations of the Balkans to declare in favour of the Allies. On the face of it, they had a case (it seems to me). Tragically, a toxic cocktail of indecision, delay, incompetence, inexperience and hubris ensured the complete failure of the campaign. Over the course of a year, tens of thousands of men died and hundreds of thousands endured every kind of misery and deprivation in a lost cause. With great irony, the only part of the whole campaign to be conducted with efficient success was the final evacuation and abandonment of the Gallipoli Peninsula (qv Corunna, the Great Retreat of 1914 and Dunkirk).

The political struggle – to persuade in favour of a near East operation to relieve Russia – was started in the new year of 1915 by Lloyd George and Churchill. At this time the Russians were coming under major pressure in the Caucasus. They were short of men and weapons, in addition to their struggles to maintain the Eastern front. Lord Kitchener was prepared to show support, but not to commit land forces to such a move. Fisher was strongly against a navy only action, but supportive of urgent, decisive combined action  included forcing the passage of the Dardanelles. Grey, still in the Foreign Office, was beginning to view the plans sympathetically.

On 5^th January Churchill telegraphed Carden, the Admiral of the Dardanelles squadron, about the feasibility of breaching the Dardanelles. Carden’s response was that the Straits could not be rushed, but might be forced by a larger operation. On the 8^th January, the War Council met again, and gave consideration to a major operation, involving ground forces of up to 150,000 men. By 11^th January, Carden’s more detailed plan for the bombardment of the Dardanelles defences was received. Churchill sent it straight to Asquith, and then the following day moved further on implementing it, by bringing into play the Queen Elizabeth – the first of five new fast battleships to be ready. Her fifteen inch guns would be able to pound the forts defending the Straits from a safe distance. On 13^th January, the War Council approved unanimously the plan, and Churchill promoted it to the French and Russians.

Contrasting fortunes: Churchill
(left) was almost destroyed
by Gallipoli......

 Churchill’s eagerness for an Eastern campaign to force the Dardanelles was matched by Kitchener”s (and Joffre and French's) reluctance to provide any land force to support it for fear of weakening the Western Front position. Fisher, as First Sea Lord, was vehemently opposed to a navy only operation, despite Carden’s opinion that it was feasible. Eventually Fisher was pressured to support it, but he remained anxious for a matching campaign on land, and he turned out to be right.

But it was Kitchener who reigned supreme over the decisions (or indecisions) of the War Council. Churchill expresses the view that the lack of challenge to him in Cabinet was a bad thing, and that only he and Lloyd George were prepared to do so. Kitchener was more persuaded by the views of French and Joffre than those warning of the impending collapse of Russia, and the need for the Eastern initiative. He was also burdened by the crisis of insufficient and inadequate munitions for the successful conduct of war on either front (a crisis that would soon bring down the Government).

...whereas Mustafa Kamal (later
Ataturk) gained his reputation for
the fiercely successful defence
of Gallipoli by the Turks

On February 16^th the War Council finally made four significant decisions in favour of the Eastern campaign: the newly formed 29^th Division would be transferred to the Dardanelles (ostensibly to support the Greeks); further forces would be transferred from Egypt; the Royal Naval Division would be added to land forces there; and equipment and horses were to be provided as necessary to support the troops.

Opponents of the decisions challenged and delayed, and again Kitchener came under pressure to change them. He wavered for a further week, between 19^th and 26^th, at the end of which Churchill formally disclaimed responsibility for any consequences of this inaction. Even Asquith was unable to persuade Kitchener to decide. He finally relented on 10^th March, and ordered the 29^th Division to set sail for the Dardanelles.

Hesitation, delay and uncertainty characterised these first months, forfeiting all possible advantages of surprise in naval and military plans. So, from the outset, where decisive and rapid action might have given an outside chance of success, the Gallipoli campaign was virtually doomed. If only Kitchener had  been totally convinced by the doubters. As it transpired, the embarrassing failure of the Naval attempt to force the Straits (see later) had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the land force arguments.