Gallipoli 3. Early outcomes after the naval bombardments

Sir John Duckworth forced the Dardanelles in 1807 under orders
from Collingwood, only to have to fight his way out again for lack
of supplies, and no land presence on Gallipoli

The Allies, particularly the British High Command, had underestimated the resolve of the Turkish defenders, and continued to do so throughout the campaign. They were also flying in the face of hundreds of years of historical precedents underlining the hazards of forcing the Straits without controlling the Gallipoli peninsula (see Duckworth 1807). Despite damaging the fort defences seriously with their bombardments, they had not been able to make a significant breakthrough. However, the political impact of their early success was considerable. The Ottoman court prepared to retreat into Asia Minor; Russia pushed for control of Constantinople; neutral Balkan powers (although not Bulgaria or Roumania) were alarmed by Russia’s ambition, and moved closer to declaring on the side of the Allies against the Central powers.

Most important strategically was the position of Greece. Venizelos, the Prime Minister, had not declared for the Allies, despite Kitchener’s offer of military help at Salonika in the form of the 29th Division (on its eventual arrival). But following the Naval success on 25th, he was suddenly willing to provide naval and land support on the Aegean side of the Gallipoli peninsula. This would increase the likelihood of Turkey falling, and the entry of all Balkan powers on the Allies side. All looked promising for a couple of days, but then on 3rd March, for reasons relating to their wish to annexe Constantinople, Russia brought pressure to bear on Greece to remain neutral. The Greek King was swayed and countermanded Venizelos’ decision. Venizelos resigned within a week, and the chance was gone.
On that same fateful day, March 12th, Kitchener appointed Sir Ian Hamilton, scion of an aristocratic military family, as Commander in Chief of the Dardanelles forces. He left Charing Cross station on 13th March by rail to Marseilles and then onwards by sea.

General Sir Ian Hamilton
Repeatedly demanding more
forces, and recklessly optimistic

While Hamilton was in transit, Kitchener responded to further pressure from Churchill to order early land action. He did not feel it appropriate to attack unless there was good evidence of weak Turkish defences on the coveted heights of the Khilid Bahr Plateau. In the absence of such, he would wait until the 29th Division arrived in strength from France, not due for another three weeks. Here we see more consequences of vacillation – had the 29th been sent when first agreed, it would have been there already.
By mid-March however a point of no return had been reached for the whole operation, not just the naval attack. It was almost a month since the first naval bombardment, and the Turkish defence must have become much better prepared on land and sea for whatever followed. Alternative plans to the continuation of this route suggested themselves. Churchill is candid about this point. He was aware of plans to switch to Africa, Balkans or Palestine but he rejected them. He was convinced the Dardanelles would be taken, and in this he was backed by the Government and even by Lord Fisher, who had opposed strongly the navy only option.
The Cabinet and the War Office in London were steady on receiving this bad news on 19th, and resolved to press on and send reinforcements. At this point came the extraordinary military volte-face by Kitchener. Suddenly, where there had been no troops available to spare, a ‘Mediterranean Expeditionary Force’ (MEF) materialised. Firstly there was the Royal Naval Division, earmarked for action in Belgium (and possibly the Baltic) as they had at Antwerp, and numbering amongst its junior officers Rupert Brooke, destined to die of septicaemia before the first landings. Secondly, came large numbers of Empire troops en route from Australia New Zealand and India. Most had stopped in Egypt, but few were needed to withstand the weak Turkish attacks on the Suez Canal. In all, including also two French Divisions, an army of 150,000 men became available. Following a meeting with Birdwood, the Commander of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps,

Baron William Birdwood - another English
aristocrat placed in charge of Empire forces

Hamilton telegraphed on 23rd arguing for a delay until mid April to enable these land reinforcements to be brought up. Churchill was greatly disturbed by this, and drafted a countermanding order, but found himself strongly opposed by Fisher, Wilson and Jackson. Their view was (ironically) that the proposals of the commanders on the ground should prevail. Churchill went to Asquith, and considered resigning, but did not. This change of policy caused Hamilton to leave the Dardanelles for Alexandria on 24th to prepare for an assault in mid-April. On the same day, Colonel Liman von Sanders, previously only an adviser with the German Military Mission in Turkey, was summoned to Istanbul by Enver Pasha and placed in charge of the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula – he would consistently out-think the Allies' tactics.