The Capitulation of Germany's Allies: 1 - The End for Austria-Hungary

Austria-Hungary. The unsustainable empire of 1914
shown in today's money.

The great swathes of Eastern Europe occupied by Germany and her allies not only created an enormous buffer zone to the east of Germany’s border, but also provided essential food and raw materials for the German war effort. Since Bulgaria’s entry war in 1915 – swiftly followed by the occupation of the Balkans (see Post 29/9/2015) there had been no real threat to the communications between Germany in the west and Turkey’s (now shrinking) Ottoman Empire in the east, despite Roumania’s brief ambitious flickering in1916.

Now, as the one hundred days on the Western Front unfolded, all was about to change. Austria-Hungary’s last major front in Italy was far from secure, although nearly impregnable in its northern and western reaches in the mountains. Allenby and the Arabs had opened up northern Syria (See Post 30/8/2018) and General Marshall’s British forces were pushing into north Mesopotamia. The largely forgotten front at the Salonika beachhead now stretched for more than 200 miles to the Adriatic coast of Albania. The Allied forces comprised a multinational force of 26 Divisions. From Salonika at its eastern end, Greek, British, French, Serbian, South Slav and Italian troops lined up against modest Bulgarian forces but formidable geographical barriers. The Commander-in-Chief was now General Franchet d’Esperet, previously the French 5^th Army commander, and another hero of the first Battle of the Marne (See Post 13/12/2014).

The days were numbered for Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey – in fact they had less than the one hundred being endured by the Germans in the west.

Austria-Hungary. The Austria-Hungary Empire, created in 1867 and ruled with difficulty by the Habsburg Dynasty, had been in trouble since before the war. A largely unsuccessful war had brought it to its knees – militarily and in morale terms. Its armies’ greatest success had been in the German-led rout at Caporetto in late 1917 (See Post 13/11/2017). Then, the advance on the plains had been held at the River Piave in front of Venice and was in a precarious position (although the Italians were still weak after Caporetto and posed little offensive threat). As Germany’s longstanding and closest ally, the Austrian leadership was, however, put under pressure by Ludendorff to contribute to his Kaiserschlacht. Some Austrian troops were sent to the Western Front (for the only time in the entire war), but principally Ludendorff wanted them to advance in Italy to keep up the pressure on that front.

C-in-C Armando Diaz. More
human and more effective
than predecessor Cadorna.

The Italians, under their new Commander-in-Chief General Armando Diaz, became aware of Austrian movements all along their front in late May. Diaz made prompt and effective improvements to his defences, even though he had lost the British and French Divisions (and even some of his own troops) to the crisis of Kaiserschlacht in France. The Austrians’ aim was to sweep down from the higher ground they occupied in the north and west of the front, thereby isolating the coastal front at the Piave. The two Austrian army groups were led by the long suffering Boroevic (See Post 16/9/2017 and 13/11/2017) in the plains, and the hapless, deposed Chief of Staff von Hotzendorf. They disliked each other, and were badly divided in their tactics and communications. This contributed to a feeble implementation of an ‘Operation Michael style’ offensive in mid-June. Just before this, as some kind of harbinger, the Austrian Grand fleet had been effectively neutralized by the loss of its two dreadnought battleships to an Italian torpedo boat raid – a further embarrassing blow to depressed Austrian morale. True to form, Hotzendorff’s offensive from the mountains failed miserably, and with it went Austria’s last chance. Although Boroevic had more success initially, crossing the Piave in several places, poor back up and communications meant that his advance stalled. Within a few days Diaz’s planned counter-attack was ready, and by late June Boreovic was forced to retreat across the Piave river, and by July the Austrians were back beyond their starting lines. They had suffered 150,000 casualties and lost 20,00 prisoners, and Austria-Hungary was all but finished. 

Diaz decided, for his own reasons, not to pursue the enemy out of the country and further into the Alps at that point. Shrewdly, he developed his plans gradually until October, by which time Austria-Hungary was in even greater disarray. President Wilson had rejected emphatically a desperate appeal by Emperor Charles for peace negotiations in mid-September. Czechoslovakia; the South Slavs, and Croatia were issuing independent state claims. Hungary wanted a divorce. Diaz judged that the time was right to attack the last vestige of Habsburg power – the Austrian army in Italy. By means of three main assaults on the plains and through the mountains, the final campaign began on 23^rd October. It must be said that it faced fierce and determined initial resistance, but by 2^nd November the Austrian army was collapsing at all points.

Anticipating this, the government in Vienna had, on 27^th October, declared itself ready to agree to any conditions set by the Allies for an armistice and separate peace, regardless of Germany’s intentions.

Austrians arriving in Padua 4th
November 1918 to sign the Armistice

At 3pm on 4^th November an armistice was signed at Villa Giusti in Italy, ending all Austro-Hungarian hostilities. By this point, most of the empire was in open revolt. On 31^st October the Hungarian President, Tisza, was murdered in Budapest. Ironically, in July 1914, he had been the one person in Government who had argued against declaration of war on Serbia. He now paid the price for losing the argument. The Emperor Charles retreated to his palace and awaited his fate.

One Hundred Days - 4: The Battle for the Saint-Quentin Canal

A famous moment. On the canal bank by
the captured Riqueval Bridge, soldiers of
49th Division relax, having been
relieved by 32nd Division.

Ludendorff was back in command, to some extent recovered from his physical and mental breakdown in July. He saw a position that was desperate but not yet terminal. His forces still held firmly to key defensive positions around Ypres: on the high ground east of Rheims; in the Meuse valley and, most importantly, at the Siegfried zone in Picardie. If he could keep this line until winter he would have time to reinforce, thus strengthening Germany’s negotiating position.

From top to bottom of the Western Front the armies were lined up against each other for the denouement of this grotesque war*. Ludendorff concentrated his limited reserves in Lorraine – his communications nerve centre. The previous post outlined how the French and Americans had moved to threaten this with the opening of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. If Germany were to lose either Longuyon in Lorraine or the security of the Siegfried zone defensive, then Ludendorff’s hopes for the winter would be ruined. 

Allied supremo Foch appreciated this, but was now in the enviable position of being able to continue with devastating assaults on multiple points of the entire front to tie down and weaken the German resistance.

Notwithstanding Foch’s tactical policy, the central attack on the Siegfried zone in front of Saint-Quentin was the most critical of this phase. The responsibility fell to Rawlinson’s 4^th army, which covered the front from Cambrai to Saint-Quentin. There was considerable anxiety in London about potential for high casualties from a full frontal assault on the most strongly defended section of the Western Front. Once again, Haig’s resolve that his forces could, and would, succeed prevailed. Rawlinson would receive flank support from Byng’s 3^rd army on the north, and from Debeney’s 1^st French army to his south. For his own part, Rawlinson wanted his army’s Australian Corps to spearhead the attack. Like Haig, he was confident of success, but on this occasion Monash, the Australian commander was hesitant. Just as Rawlinson's British Corps had been in action since March with little relief, so had the Australians, and they had been leaders in many of the crunch confrontations. Mounting casualties and tiredness were having their effects. Then Monash was greatly cheered by the assignment of two USA Divisions (27^th and 30^th), each comprising 15,000 fresh troops, under his command. He now agreed to Rawlinson’s request to devise an attack to break through the Hindenburg line and open up the Germans’ whole defensive zone**.

The Siegfried zone was formidable. Not only were the entrenchments, fortifications and machine gun nests several miles deep, they were given added sophistication by a network of water barriers. These comprised the Sensée and Scheldt rivers and several canals, the most forbidding of which was the Saint-Quentin section of the Canal du Nord – Rawlinson’s target. The main German trenches were on the eastern bank, but advance posts on the west bank were skilfully positioned to deter effective artillery support for the attackers. The map shows, however, that for a 3.5 miles stretch from Vendhuile to Bellicourt the canl ran through a tunnel. The tunnel had multiple shafts connecting to the trenches above, so that large numbers of men could rest and shelter there during bombardments. As it emerged from the tunnel, the canal’s cutting was very deep, becoming shallower as it proceeded south to Bellenglise, where it was incomplete, and dry. In effect, these forward areas comprised the Hindenburg line, whereas the several miles of defences behind, that extended on a line from Beaurevoir to Fonsomme, comprised the Siegfried ‘zone’.

The towns of Cambrai and Saint-Quentin, already the focus of much attention in the war, were critical to the success of the Alies’ plans. Twenty miles apart on a north-south line they formed the bulwarks of Germany’s defences in Picardie. Cambrai was the railhead for all supplies to the area, and Saint-Quentin held the key to the Siegfried zone.

Monash planned to make his attack across the ground above the tunnel. Despite the strength of its defensive positions, it would allow him to deploy his tanks. He nominated the fresh American troops of the 27^th and 30^th Divisions to make the first wave breakthrough (see Map), and then his Australian Corps would ‘leapfrog’ them and break into the Siegfried zone and the north west of Saint-Quentin. Two British Corps, totalling six Divisions, would provide the follow up support. Rawlinson made one significant (and prescient) change to Monash’s plan. At the suggestion of its Commander, Sir Walter Braithwaite, he moved IX Corps*** into the front line to the right of the 30^th Division. Its role was to cross the canal south of its emergence from the tunnel. Success here would enable fire to be brought upon those defending against Monash’s tanks and infantry. The steep slopes of the cutting were fifty feet deep, and the Germans felt them to be impregnable, let alone the challenges of getting men and equipment across the canal – itself 50-60 feet wide and several feet deep. Monash thought the idea mad (possibly influenced by a widespread Australian distaste for Braithwaite, who had been Hamilton’s Staff officer throughout Gallipoli back in 1915). So, probably, did the infantry of the 49^th (Midland) Division, given the job of making the hazardous crossing.

Haig started the battle on 27^th September with a feint at the northern end, aimed at Cambrai. Byng’s 3^rd Army jumped off from the stalemated areas of the 1917 battle (See Post 20/11/2017). British and Canadian troops advanced on a thirteen mile front. As they advanced through Gouzeaucourt and Marcoing, they revisited the ground so fiercely contested in operation Michael around the Flesquieres salient. On the 28^th, Plumer’s 2^nd army stretched the feint to Flanders as they broke through north of Ploegsteert Wood (south of Messines) advancing and taking 10,000 prisoners. To Rawlinson’s south, Mangin also struck in Champagne. Meanwhile at the heart of the battle line, the 4^th army artillery had been pulverizing the German lines for 48 hours with new record breaking numbers of shell and gas canisters. The Americans launched their assault at 6am on 29^th, along the six miles from Vendhuile to Bellicourt; while the British opened their own attack on the next six miles down to Holnon.

Unlike the recent triumphs at Amiens and Bapaume, this operation did not go according to timetable. Whether because of inexperience of the Americans, or  because of the scale of the challenge (or a combination of the two) the 27^th Division's attack failed. Rawlinson brought in extra tanks in support, but these were badly mauled by improving German anti-tank guns. Fog again interfered with plans. In poor visibility, the American spearhead passed unaware a number of German outposts, resulting in heavy losses to their countrymen in the following waves. The 30^th Division fared better, and did break across the tunnel mound to capture Bellicourt, but with heavy losses, and the Australian leapfrog was not able to reach its objectives.

Sir Walton Pipon Braithwaite.
An egg. Zero at Gallipoli, hero at
Saint-Quentin

It was Rawlinson’s modification to the south that transformed disappointment to staggering success. Supported by a highly effective creeping barrage, the men of IX Corps under command of Braithwaite, moved forward. The 49^th Division went first, and other the helpful cover of fog they tackled the canal. The Royal Engineers provided floating piers and life belts, and on the eastern bank scaling ladders were used to climb up and into the trenches. The Staffordshire regiment famously seized the only remaining canal bridge at Riqueval before the Germans could blow it. With this secured, and support of a tank brigade – that had crossed the tunnel in the 30^th American sector and driven down the east bank – the 49^th established a strong bridgehead and moved on to reach all of their objectives. This included Bellenglise with its great supply and troop centre. Later in the day the 32^nd Division moved forward to relieve the 49^th, and to leapfrog them, and by nightfall the whole of the 32^nd was on the eastern side of the canal.

This stunning success unlocked the battle. The pressure on Monash’s advance was relieved. The following day progress east by the 1^st Division of IX Corps enabled the French 1^st army to advance and tighten the noose around Saint-Quentin. To the north Byng’s 3^rd army continued to encroach on the outskirts of Cambrai. The twin pillars of Cambrai and Saint-Quentin would hold for a further week, but their fate was sealed.

By 8^th October, the final act of the Great war was opening, with Allied advances along the whole 250 miles of the Western Front. As Buchan summarises it:

“The Belgians and Plumer were threatening Lille from the north. Cambrai was outflanked, Saint-Quentin had fallen, and the larger part of the main Siegfried line had gone….. Mangin had regained the west part of the Chemin des Dames, and Berthelot had reached the Aisne and cleared all the land between that river and the Vesle. Gouraud was through the first position in Champagne, and close on the Brunehilde line. Pershing, though his advance was naturally slower, was feeling for a blow at the most deadly spot of all.”

In the months since July, the Western Allies had taken more than a quarter of a million German prisoners and 25,000 machine guns. In other theatres away from the Western Front the news was even worse for Ludendorff and the Kaiser.

*The Germans, by now significantly depleted in troop numbers (frequently 7,000 or less men per Division rather than 10,000), were still arranged in three Army groups comprising nine separate armies. From north to south these were: IV (under von Armin), VI (von Quast); XVII (von Below), II (Carlowitz), VIII (von Hutier), VII (Eberhardt), I (Mudra), III (von Einem) and V (von Marwitz). The Allied line up against them was (from the north also): Belgian army (King Albert); British armies: 2^nd (Plumer), ‘new' 5^th (Birdwood), 1^st (Horne), 3^rd (Byng), and 4^th (Rawlinson); French armies: 1^st (Debeney), 10^th (Mangin), 5^th (Bertelot), and 4^th (Gouraud); and the American 1^st Army (Pershing). 

** Terminology can be confusing here. Following the German withdrawal to their new line in early 1917, the Allies referred to the entire line as the Hindenburg Line. The Siegfried line (now zone) was but one section of this line, albeit the strongest and most significant. Other sections also were named after German mythological figures eg Brunehilde

*** IX Corps had been badly damaged in the Battle of the Lys, moved south to recuperate, only to get caught up in the German offensive on the Aisne. It had seen tough times.

One Hundred Days - 3: The Americans at St. Mihiel and the Argonne

Pershing - hubris at St. Mihiel,
nemesis in the Argonne.

The Allies were now making significant progress towards victory on the Western Front. Although in the war since April 1917, the Americans were about to make their first independent foray in this theatre. Previous posts have noted their contributions as part of the British defence in Operation Michael and, notably, in a stirring attack at Belleau Wood near Chateau Thierry in the second Battle of the Marne. Now, however, a US army – 500,000 strong – led by its own Commander and providing its own supplies and communications was about to make its mark at the southeastern section of the front.

General Pershing was a strong man, imbued with the hubris that often attaches to such roles. Plucked from a very different environment chasing revolutionaries in Mexico (see Post 9/3/2017) he had, since his arrival in France, argued for the creation of an independently led army, rather than a supplier of reinforcements to the British and French armies. Curiously, he still believed that the superior character and condition of his men would prevail, where British and French armies had been dragged into costly attritional fighting. Shades of Joffre in 1914. Admittedly Pershing’s men were well trained and in excellent physical condition, making them less vulnerable to the influenza that was sweeping through more tired and weakened ranks on both sides. But they had zero experience of the atrocious realities of modern warfare. Nevertheless, Pershing regarded lightly and condescendingly the lessons so painfully learnt over the past four years. Not surprisingly, Haig and Pétain opposed his views and Foch, as supremo who was able to give Pershing orders, had to manage the tensions. The large numbers of American troops arriving in Europe on a weekly basis strengthened Pershing’s case, of course, and Foch was minded to support him. There was also a certain logic to allocating the north section of the Western Front to Britain (with Belgian support at the coastal end); to the French controlling the largest, central sector in front of Paris and Verdun; and for the Americans to take the lead in the shortest section, to the south east and to the east of Verdun. Their chance came with the attack on the St. Mihiel salient.

The area around St Mihiel comprised the longest standing salient on the entire Western Front. It pre-dated Ypres, and was formed during the giant enveloping German movements of autumn 1914, which had only been halted by the desperate battles comprising the ‘miracle’ of the Marne. The map shows a sharply protruding triangle with its apex on the river Meuse at St. Mihiel. It stretched 15 miles to the north to Fresnes and 25miles to Pont-à-Mousson on the river Moselle to the east. Thus forty miles of line to defend rather than 25miles across the base of the triangle. The Germans had stayed in the salient because it enabled them to threaten key French railway routes – notably Paris to Avricourt – thereby isolating Verdun*, and its terrain made it relatively easy to defend. The French had made costly and unsuccessful attempts to recapture the salient through 1915, but since then it had been a comparatively uneventful area.

Foch now wanted to take it back, not only to relieve the pressures on his own rail links, but also to breakthrough to the Woeuvre plain and the Germans’ own railway supply routes to the upper Oise and Aisne areas. Coming south round Luxembourg these comprised one of the two vital arteries from the German heartland maintaining the German armies in France**. These two networks met at the major junction at Longuyon. If Foch’s forces could get here, the entire southern communication routes of Germany could be isolated.

The defending German army was the 5^th, commanded by General Max von Gallwitz. He had seven Divisions to defend his forty miles line, but numbers were depleted by influenza and long term casualties and he had only 50,000 men, with a few Austro-Hungarians as a weak reserve. Pershing’s first army comprised nearly ten times that number, although he deployed two divisions of 15,000 men each for the first attack. At great speed he proceeded to move his men around the salient during early September.

Gallwitz could read the writing on the wall. Even before the main American build up he had pressed Ludendorff for permission to withdraw and shorten his lines. As the gravity of Germany’s position worsened, Ludendorff recognised the inevitability and gave orders to pull back on September 12^th. Too late. At 1am on 12^th an enormous American bombardment fell on 11miles of the southern aspect of the salient. At 5am troops went over the top, and were followed soon by tanks. The Americans were pushing at an open door and the Germans – already preparing to leave – fell back as quickly as they could. Within four hours the Americans had control of the railways running through the area, and within 24 hours they had taken Vigneilles at the base of the salient. Some further advance were made, but the battle of the St. Mihiel salient was over in three days. The Americans, in their first major action in the Western Front, had secured a crushing victory with less than 1000 casualties, and the taking of 16,000 prisoners. Their most advanced units were within range of the defensive Howitzers of Metz. Pershing felt vindicated, and wanted to pursue the Germans hotfoot down the Meuse valley towards Belgium, but he was to be denied.

Americans (with British Helmets) after the
great victory at St. Mihiel.

The British and French at Supreme HQ were less than generous in their appraisal of Pershing’s success, viewing it as a picnic rather than a true battle. More importantly, Foch was determined that Pershing should join the fight alongside the French 4^th Army, east of Rheims in an operation moving through the Argonne to the north and east. Foch now believed in a victory in 1918, but only if the Siegfried line at the heart of the Western Front could be captured. In truth, the ‘line’ was now more of a zone, a rectangular area of nearly 40 x 25 miles of formidable defensive fortifications. He preferred to push well to the west of the Meuse valley to break through the Argonne and towards the junction at Longuyon (see above), thereby cutting supply lines to the Siegfried areas.

Pershing was obliged to fall in with Foch’s plan. In an impressive feat of logistics he moved his army and its support and equipment some sixty miles to the west in less than two weeks, to line up on the right flank of General Gouraud (a hardened veteran who had left an arm at Gallipoli in 1915). Gouraud and Pershing’s assault began on 26^th September. There was to be no repeat of St. Mihiel. Allied casualties were heavy***. The Americans advanced only seven miles in three days of hard fighting in difficult territory, and were becoming bogged down in stalemated local actions. Pershing was now experiencing the harsh realities of the Western Front. On 29^th, in line with Foch’s strategy he called off his attack. Ironically, on that day, the British were making perhaps the most significant breakthrough of the 100 days – at the Canal du Nord at St. Quentin.

* A factor in Falkenhayn’s decision to attack Verdun in 1916 (See Post 2/5/2016)

** The other ran north of Luxembourg and round the Ardennes and through Liege to supply Belgium and Northern France.

*** Two future famous generals fought in these actions, MacArthur and Patton - the latter being badly injured in the Argonne as he led a tank advance.