Sunday, 29 May 2016

Battle of Jutland 4 - Beattie versus Hipper


Beatty and Evan-Thomas. A rare
shot of them together. Beatty un-
accountably made no contact with
Evan-Thomas in the days leading up
to Jutland.
As soon as he learned of Galatea’s contact with the enemy, Beatty changed course to get between Hipper and Horn’s Reef - both to engage with Hipper and to cut off his route of retreat. He did not wait for acknowledgement of his signal to the remainder of his group. His own squadron, knowing him well, followed immediately but Evan-Thomas (QE Squadron) did not receive a signal and was left behind. Evan-Thomas followed Admiralty procedures, à la Jellicoe. Inexplicably, during the week Evan-Thomas had been anchored in Rosyth before the battle, Beatty had at no stage briefed him on his own plans or tactics. (After the war each Admiral would blame the other for this cock-up). The eight minute delay caused by this created a gap of 10 miles between them, so on first engagement Beatty’s capital ships were six, not ten, and his firepower was less than half its maximum. Closing rapidly on Hipper, Beatty compounded his error by disregarding (apparently) his range superiority, and in fact it was Hipper who opened fire fractionally first at 15.48pm. Thus, two of the major factors favouring Beatty were ruled out before the battle started in earnest as the ‘run to the south’, which lasted for the next hour. After what might be conceded as an ‘unfortunate’ start to the undercard clash of the battle cruisers, the next signalling errors were to prove disastrous.

Beatty now had his six battle cruisers in battle line, together with the now gaining QE Squadron (the latter all outgunned Hipper and were as fast in a race to the south). Initially German salvoes were far more accurate than the British, who were firing way too long into gloomy visibility to the east. However, even worse than the gunnery was the signalling from HMS Lion. Beatty intended to take advantage of having six battle cruisers to Hipper’s five, ordering Princess Royal (No 2 in line) to fire with Lion (leading the line) on Hipper’s flagship Lützow, while Queen Mary (No 3) fired on Derfflinger the second in the German line instead of the German third in line Seydlitz. Tiger (No 4) was to fire on the German number three Seydlitz, New Zealand (No 5) on the number four Moltke; and Indefatigable (No 6) to fire on the number five von der Tann. These last two were the oldest ships in the contest. However, Queen Mary (not receiving the signal) fired on her opposite number Seydlitz in accordance with Grand Fleet standing orders, and Tiger and New Zealand both fired on Moltke. This left Derfflinger, the most powerful German battle cruiser, free from fire for some ten minutes until the British ships saw their mistake. (This was a repeat of the Dogger 1915 error, where Derfflinger had been let free by a similar misunderstanding).
After about 20minutes the British gunners had found their range, recording hits on  Lutzow, Seydlitz and Derfflinger, but by this time Beatty had lost Indefatigible and had serious damage to his own ship Lion and to the Princess Royal. The Lion had been hit amidships in the main gun turret, killing all men except the Captain - Harvey - who was dying, with both legs crushed. The turret was ablaze. Harvey had the presence of mind to flood the magazines, an action which saved the ship and resulted in a posthumous VC award. Indefatigible was not so lucky. One of the oldest Dreadnoughts, she had nevertheless been shooting well and had scored several hits, when she too was hit in the main gun turret. A massive explosion occurred and at 16.04 she disappeared. All 57 officers and 960 seamen of the crew were lost.
It was now five versus five in capital ships, and Lion was so badly damaged she had to withdraw temporarily from the firing line. Beatty’s force was now in serious trouble, but was rescued by the arrival of Evan-Thomas’s QE Squadron, now close enough to disrupt the German attacks. Nevertheless, Seydlidtz and Derfflinger took the opportunity to concentrate their fire on Queen Mary.
The destruction of Queen Mary by an explosion
in the magazine.
At 16.18, she also blew up following a direct hit to her main turret, in exactly the same way as Indefatigible, and sank within 8 minutes. The following battle cruisers Tiger and New Zealand had to take evasive action from the debris. When Princess Royal was straddled by two enormous shell explosions, and appeared to be going the same way as Queen Mary and Indefatigible, the watching Beatty made his famous comment “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today”. It was more than the ships (bad workmen?.....tools?).  
In desperation Beatty sent in his destroyers to launch torpedoes and disrupt the German fire. These smaller vessels thus became tied up in maoeuvering that slowed them down, making them prey for the German battle cruisers.  Two British destroyers Nestor and Nomad were sunk in this way. At 16.38 the Southampton, furthest forward of Beatty's light cruisers gained the first sighting of Scheer’s approaching GHSF. As soon as he learned this, Beatty put about, reversing roles and seeking to lure both Hipper and Scheer’s fleet towards the approaching BGF. By 5.00 all of Beatty’s ships except for the look-out Southampton were on the ‘run to the north’.

Hipper had unquestionably won the ‘run to the south' encounter. His own flagship Lutzow was seriously damaged and his other battle cruisers had been hit, but he had sunk two capital ships and badly damaged two more. The QE class Dreadnoughts could probably have destroyed his squadron, but now Scheer was on the scene. Scheer and Hipper did not know about the BGF. They thought they had Beatty isolated and that they would be able to catch and destroy him, but in fact both both Beatty and Jellicoe had received Commander Goodenough’s signal from the Southampton, sighting Scheer. Beatty was now turning the tables on Hipper, and luring the GHSF towards the BGF. Hipper responded immediately, continuing his running battle with Beatty, now on the run to the north. Also, Scheer’s most advanced Dreadnoughts were almost in range of Beatty’s battle cruisers (now down to four). Again, the QE Squadron did not receive (or perhaps see) the signal to turn, and within ten minutes Beatty and Evan-Thomas were passing each other, less than a mile apart, at a combined speed of nearly 60 knots. Yet another error by Beatty’s signal officer Seymour meant more delay before Evan-Thomas turned north, by which time he was in range of the leading GHSF battleships. Three of his four ships were hit directly, although they were better protected than Beatty’s battle cruisers, and continued unaffected. Beatty’s remaining ships continued to take hits, but their speed saved them, gradually pulling out of range of Hipper. This left the four QE Dreadnoughts of Evan-Thomas - Barham, Valiant, Warspite and Malaya - on their own against Hipper’s force and the advance party of Scheer’s GHSF. For almost an hour, before linking with the BGF line, it was them against twenty German capital ships. Britain was close to a major defeat at this stage, but the four were able to maintain their course and speed, all the time firing effectively, and they inflicted damage on six of the German Dreadnoughts, of which Seydlitz suffered the most severely.
German fire had less impact now, on account of damage they themselves had suffered, but Scheer – still unaware of Jellicoe’s proximity – scented victory and urged his ships on to the north. The British ships outpaced them and drew away out of sight.

Then, at 17.30 Beatty, anticipating Jellicoe’s arrival, changed course to NE. This soon brought him back within sight of Hipper, who was forced also to change course to NE by Beatty’s smart move. At 17.45 Beatty caught sight of Jellicoe’s advanced ships to his NW. He pushed further east to prevent Hipper from realising what was about to happen, and so it was, that in deteriorating light at 17.59, the GHSF almost ran into the BGF. They saw each other at a distance of 16,000 yards, and the clash of the Titans was imminent.


Wednesday, 25 May 2016

Battle of Jutland 3 - The morning of May 31st

The BGF leaves Scapa Flow 1916
We have seen how Scheer single-mindedly pursued his plans to bring about the definitive fleet action. The British side was no less anxious for the confrontation, which they believed would convincingly deal with German pretensions. Beatty's continuous chafing for actions to provoke the Germans was echoed in other quarters, and tested Jellicoe's prudence to the limits. The boredom and frustration of officers and men cooped up in Scapa Flow or Rosyth for weeks at a time added to the tension, and numerous ploys were evaluated. In fact, Jellicoe had planned a sweeping action of his cruiser squadrons in the Kattegat and Skagerrak waters off Denmark for 2nd June to tempt Scheer out. Before that however, they learned from various sources, including Room 40, of unusual activities indicating German preparations. At noon on 30th May the Admiralty informed Jellicoe and Beatty of the likely emergence in force of the Germans. At 5pm the Admiralty ordered the fleet to raise steam. By dusk, the BGF in Scapa Flow was beginning to move. At 10.30pm Beatty's six battle cruisers and the four Queen Elizabeth class Super Dreadnoughts of Admiral Evans-Thomas slipped under the  great Forth railway bridge towards the North Sea.
So - ironically - before Scheer's fleet had even weighed anchor, the BGF was at sea. Jellicoe's orders to Beatty were to head for Horn's Reef** off Jutland, to reach there by 2pm on 31st, by which time Jellicoe's Dreadnoughts would be around 60 miles to the north, and within easy reach.  


The battle zone, in the eastern North Sea
off the coast of Jutland

The scene was thus set for the greatest confrontation in naval history. In reality it was like a complicated ritual dance, in which neither side knew what the other was doing or planning. Controversy and debate still follow on as we arrive at the centenary.
Both great fleets operated with two components - a strong, but relatively small advance force, followed by the main fleets with their greatest capital ships.


The BGF sections were:
North. Jellicoe from Scapa Flow 
             24 Dreadnought battleships in 3 battle squadrons
               1 Battle cruiser squadron (3rd, led by Hood)
               2 Cruiser squadrons (1st Arbuthnot, 2nd Heath)
               1 Light cruiser squadron (4th, Le Mesurier)
               3 Destroyer flotillas (4th, 11th, 12th)

South. Beatty from Rosyth        
              2 Battle cruiser squadrons (6 ships)
              1 Battleship squadron (5th, Evan-Thomas) of 4 QE class Super dreadnoughts
              3 Light cruiser squadrons (1st, 2nd, 3rd)
              4 Destroyer flotillas (1st, 9th, 10th, 13th)


The GHSF, also in two sections, comprised:
Scheer                                                
              15 Dreadnought and 6 preDreadnought battleships
              3 Cruiser divisions
              7 Destroyer flotillas

Hipper’s 1st Scouting force       
              5 Battle cruisers

              Light cruiser and destroyer flotillas.

In overall numbers the BGF fielded 150 versus 99 of the Germans. The Dreadnought count was 37 British versus 21 German. All the forces were in play, but nobody yet had caught sight of the opponent, although they were sailing on direct collision course.

Light Cruiser HMS Galatea. Her captain
Commodore Edwyn Alexander-Smyth ordered the
first shots of the Battle of Jutland
As the southerly of the two British groups, Beatty had sent his scouting cruisers further to the south to look for the enemy. Beatty himself was zig-zagging for several hours, both to avoid submarines and to search for the enemy. By late morning nothing had been sighted. The distance of Beatty's scouting force from the main fleet of Jellicoe was becoming an issue and at 2.10pm Beatty, late for the rendezvous, sent orders for his scouts to head north eastwards - closer to the designated area.
Signalling was still an imprecise science in 1916. Beatty had had problems with haphazard and incompetent signalling at Dogger Bank in 1915, but done little about it. His flagship HMS Lion had the same signalling officer in charge as then. At the north east extreme of Beatty's force the light cruiser HMS Galatea did not receive the signal immediately, and as she continued to the southeast spotted smoke on the horizon to the east. Within minutes Galatea was sure she had sighted two German battle cruisers, and at 2.20pm signalled "Enemy in sight" to the rest of the squadron. At 2.28pm it fell to the Galatea to fire the first shots of the Battle of Jutland as she approached Hipper's cruisers at a speed of 28 knots. 

Meanwhile Jellicoe, to the north, had no information to suggest to him the the GHSF was out in the North Sea. To make matters worse, at 12.48pm he received completely erroneous information from the Admiralty to reassure him that Scheer was still anchored in the Jade (from Robert Massie: Castles of Steel). This howler was the responsibility of the aforementioned Operations Division in the Admiralty, who had not troubled to check information coming in from Room 40. Captain Thomas Jackson of Admiralty OD had previously stated that the Room 40 staff were "a party of very clever fellows who could decipher coded signals" but they should never be allowed to interpret them. So, Jellicoe continued on his set course to the east, unaware of what was unfolding to the south. Had he known, he could have changed course and increased speed to the British advantage. When, less than two hours later, Jellicoe heard that Beattie was in direct contact with the GHSF, his fragile confidence in information from the Admiralty was broken.

** Horn's Reef off Esbjerg, Western Denmark, is today a giant wind farm. In 1916 the sandbanks there guarded a gateway to a safe, mine free passage for the German ships to travel north from or south to their home ports

Tuesday, 24 May 2016

Battle of Jutland 2 - The build up

Beatty's 'Guard Fleet' in the Firth of Forth 1916
As already noted, the firepower and numerical superiority of the British Grand Fleet (BGF) over the German High Seas Fleet (GHSF) meant that the Germans would not seek a pitched battle confrontation against the greatest see fleet ever assembled. Instead they developed their tactics of brief sorties and raids to lure smaller detachments of the BGF into battle on a more advantageous footing. From the 1914 and subsequent raids on Scarborough, Whitby and Lowestoft they had succeeded, at least to a degree, in fragmenting the BGF. When he was appointed C-in-C Jellicoe had selected Scapa Flow off the Orkneys as the safe haven for his fleet. Although initially vulnerable to U boat and mine attack, by 1916 it was fully functioning. However, the public outrage at 
the impunity of the German raids, augmented by Zeppelins, far to the south of Scapa Flow, pressured Jellicoe into stationing a significant battle cruiser fleet, under Admiral David Beatty, at Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. Regular sweeps by this force, added to Tyrwhitt's smaller squadron at Harwich calmed government and public fears. Nevertheless, this enabled Scheer to develop his plans.

Reinhard Scheer was 51 at the outbreak of war. An able and fast-thinking flag-officer in the German Fleet, he was much admired by his subordinates and fellow officers. By end 1915 he was Commander of the 2nd Battle Squadron of the GHSF. Following the Dogger Bank battle of early 1915, the cautious C-in-C Ingenohl had been replaced by the like minded Hugo von Pohl, aged 60. Pohl's only aggressive move was to support strongly Tirpitz's arguments for unrestricted submarine warfare, which was declared in February 1915 and led, among others, to the infamous sinking of the Lusitania.
Alfred von Tirpitz
Direct rival to Jacky Fisher
and architect of German
Naval Power
As a disciple of Tirpitz, Scheer was enraged when the politicians won the argument with Tirpitz and the unrestricted campaign was called off in September 1915. By January 1916, Pohl was seriously ill with advanced cancer, and could not continue. Scheer was thus appointed as C-in-C, at a time when public opinion was pressing for action from the GHSF, since the previous heroics of the U boats were now much reduced. One of his first acts was to recall U boats from the high seas, and to begin a process of U boat ambushes on British fleet ships in the North Sea.

Scheer's aim was to pressurise the BGF, by means of raids, torpedo attacks and Zeppelins, into abandoning its distant blockade of German ports and be forced to engage more directly with the GHSF  His strategy was approved in principle by the Kaiser in February. He developed a plan to bombard Sunderland with a scouting force of battle cruisers led by Vice-Admiral Franz von Hipper to lure out Beatty to the jaws of the GHSF. He would also lay down a gauntlet of U boats off the Firth of Forth, and further north on the route south from Scapa Flow. He aimed to destroy Beatty's squadron before the BGF could arrive from Scapa Flow in sufficient strength.
Scheer planned initially for this attack to be on 17th May, and he sent his U boats out well ahead to take up position. Crucially, events conspired to delay the operation by two weeks. Firstly, there were some technical problems with some of the German Dreadnoughts, and repairs were needed to the Seydlitz, one of Hipper's scouting battlecruisers, after a recent raid on Lowestoft. Secondly the weather intervened, making it difficult for Scheer's Zeppelins to provide him with the badly needed aerial observations.  By the time all arrangement were in place, the U-boats were at the end of their cruising scope and were forced to return towards Germany, ending that part of Scheer's plan. Partly as a result of this, Scheer made a late change of plan to avoid Sunderland, and proceed northwards closer to the coast of Jutland and nearer to the GHSF's own safety zones.

Admiral Scheer's fleet set sail from the Jade - natural harbour of Wilhelmshaven that was its home -early on the morning of 31st May. They were accompanied by Hipper's 1st Scouting group.

Sir Reginald "Blinker"Hall
Director Naval Intelligence 1914-19
Scheer's vigorous, attack minded approach was well known in the British Admiralty, and a bolder policy in the North Sea was anticipated. Furthermore the nascent intelligence services  in Room 40 of the Admiralty, led by 'Blinker' Hall,  had made numerous signal interceptions alerting them to Fleet activity, and the likelihood of U boat ambushes. Shamefully and (as it turned out) very unfortunately for Jellicoe, the value of this intelligence to the coming battle was almost completely lost due to incompetence and petty rivalries within the Admiralty. Those responsible for passing on the messages held the newest branch of the service, Room 40, in contempt, and they failed, or delayed, in passing on messages. This later caused such confusion that Jellicoe disregarded new messages, preferring to rely on the evidence of his own eyes and his own men.


Tuesday, 17 May 2016

Battle of Jutland 1 - Background

Lord Admiral Horation Nelson
His victories allowed the expansion
of the British Empire

The British Empire began with early 17th century colonisation. It reached its zenith in the late Victorian period, and by 1901 Queen Victoria was Empress of one quarter of the world's population. Imperial success was predicated on sea power to protect its trade and possessions. Nelson's victory over the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1805 was the culmination of a series of actions that gave Great Britain almost a century of unchallenged rule of the waves. However, by the time war was declared in 1914, major and subtle changes produced different scenarios for the Royal Navy to deal with.



The faith of the British public and politicians in the Royal Navy was unwavering -  to the point of complacency and arrogance. Not surprising, since the same attitudes pervaded and emanated from the Admiralty.  In the century since Trafalgar the Admiralty had become bloated and bureaucratic; full of nepotism and class prejudice. It was the drive and determination of First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher (See The War at Sea 1915, posted 17/11/2015) that energised and modernised the Navy. In an unlikely partnership with Churchill, a Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, Fisher oversaw major cuts to the naval budgets - decommissioning hundreds of redundant ships and removing layers of bureaucracy - while simultaneously provoking an arms race with the Germans over Dreadnought battleships.
Fisher was viewed by many as the Britain's finest sailor since Nelson, although his reforming approach made for him bitter enemies within the Admiralty establishment. Fisher's blind spot was the primacy of firepower over armoured protection for his ships. This would rebound on him tragically at Jutland. However, unlike many of his peers, he was not slow to appreciate the potential of newer forms of sea warfare - mines and submarines - and invested in their development. He was forced out of office as First Sea Lord by his enemies in 1911, not before predicting war with Germany in October 1914. When his prediction came to pass three months early, Churchill, now First Lord, reappointed him as First Sea Lord to replace Mountbatten. Fisher resigned only seven months later, amidst bitter arguments with Churchill over the Dardanelles campaign, and so was not directly involved in Jutland, the pivotal naval action of the war.

From the outset there was bound to be uncertainty surrounding any great actions between the British Grand Fleet (henceforth BGF) and German High Seas Fleet (henceforth GHSF), if and when it came. The Kaiser's declaration of an arms race for superiority in Dreadnought class battleships was crippling economically for both sides, but when it was called off in 1912, the British had 29 Dreadnoughts against the Germans' 17. Overall by 1914, the Allies could call upon 43 Dreadnoughts to the Central Powers' 20. The British public, and likely Churchill himself, believed this meant that a definitive Trafalgar style encounter of the two great fleets would inevitably result in a defining victory for the Royal Navy. But the days of set battles between 'ships of the line' were long gone. New tactics involving destroyers, submarines and mines brought unknown risks to the Dreadnoughts. More ironically, the ridiculous expense of building Dreadnoughts engendered a defensive mindset - that they were too valuable to be risked unless the conditions were absolutely right (as with Hitler's Tirpitz in WW2).

Hence by May 1916, the GHSF and the BGF had still not had that defining showdown. A near miss event on the Dogger Bank in early 1915 had been the closest, and a few skirmishes had resulted from German raids on the east coast of England. Overall the Royal Navy's performance had been patchy at best. A morale boosting victory off the Falklands in late 1914 had barely compensated for the bungling of matters in the Mediterranean in August 1914; the ill fated Dardanelles ventures of 1915; and the perceived failure to protect the civilian population from Zeppelins and naval bombardments from the Germans. The facts that the Navy was enforcing successfully a blockade against Germany's imports, while keeping open the high seas for imperial trade did not feel like success. The public were puzzled, and not a little frustrated. Similarly, in Germany the public saw no action at all from the much vaunted GHSF, while the land armies fought heroically, gaining victories but taking heavy casualties.
Reinhard Scheer - Aggressive,
ambitious and dashing
It was the U boats that had created the major threat to Britain, not the GHSF. The men in both navies, and more particularly their commanders felt the pressure of public opinion, and railed against the frustrations of inaction. A major engagement must surely come soon - but how, and in what form?

Churchill refers to “battle or encounter?” between two great, but unequal, fleets. For the latter, the weaker fleet (almost inevitably the GHSF in this scenario, given the superiority of the BGF) may launch a raid, but will need to escape before the odds ranged against them become overwhelming. The stronger fleet, conversely, will need to take greater tactical risks to force the pitched battle it seeks.


Admiral Sir John Jellicoe
The only man who could "lose the
war in an afternoon" by his decisions

Notwithstanding, the consequences of defeat in such a pitched battle would be severe for Germany, but disastrous for the British. Starvation and defeat for Britain would be inevitable, with loss of control over trade on the high seas; of communications with its armies in action around the world, and the likely withdrawal of the United States from the war. Here lay the source of the Commander of the Grand Fleet’s greatest responsibility – that his actions could “lose the war in an afternoon”. Even the defeats and carnage on day 1 of the Somme campaign shortly to follow carried nothing like that implication. The BGF C-in-C, Sir John Jellicoe was a fine man, sailor and planner. In characteristic style, Churchill had sacked his predecessor Admiral Callaghan on the outbreak of war, appointing Jellicoe, who protested strongly at the treatment of his colleague. After the event his prudence and control over detail came in for severe criticism, but ahead of Jutland there appeared to be universal approval of his appointment and his performance to date. “The safety and overwhelming strength of the Grand Fleet was Jellicoe’s all embracing aim” (Churchill). 
On 14th October 1914, within weeks of taking up his post, Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty in very measured terms, setting out the potential vulnerability of the BGF to 'modern warfare' underwater tactics. He closed his detailed letter with "The object of this letter is to place my views before their Lordships and to direct their attention to the alterations in preconceived ideas of battle tactics which are forced upon us by the anticipated appearance in a fleet action of submarines and minelayers..."
Thus the prudence of the man with the overbearing responsibility of national safety was clearly set out - and was approved by all his superiors, some of whom were highly critical after the events of the Battle of Jutland. On the German side, a relatively new Commander of the GHSF, Reinhard Scheer, was champing at the bit for some definitive actions....