Battle of Jutland 1 - Background

Lord Admiral Horation Nelson
His victories allowed the expansion
of the British Empire

The British Empire began with early 17th century colonisation. It reached its zenith in the late Victorian period, and by 1901 Queen Victoria was Empress of one quarter of the world's population. Imperial success was predicated on sea power to protect its trade and possessions. Nelson's victory over the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1805 was the culmination of a series of actions that gave Great Britain almost a century of unchallenged rule of the waves. However, by the time war was declared in 1914, major and subtle changes produced different scenarios for the Royal Navy to deal with.



The faith of the British public and politicians in the Royal Navy was unwavering -  to the point of complacency and arrogance. Not surprising, since the same attitudes pervaded and emanated from the Admiralty.  In the century since Trafalgar the Admiralty had become bloated and bureaucratic; full of nepotism and class prejudice. It was the drive and determination of First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher (See The War at Sea 1915, posted 17/11/2015) that energised and modernised the Navy. In an unlikely partnership with Churchill, a Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, Fisher oversaw major cuts to the naval budgets - decommissioning hundreds of redundant ships and removing layers of bureaucracy - while simultaneously provoking an arms race with the Germans over Dreadnought battleships.
Fisher was viewed by many as the Britain's finest sailor since Nelson, although his reforming approach made for him bitter enemies within the Admiralty establishment. Fisher's blind spot was the primacy of firepower over armoured protection for his ships. This would rebound on him tragically at Jutland. However, unlike many of his peers, he was not slow to appreciate the potential of newer forms of sea warfare - mines and submarines - and invested in their development. He was forced out of office as First Sea Lord by his enemies in 1911, not before predicting war with Germany in October 1914. When his prediction came to pass three months early, Churchill, now First Lord, reappointed him as First Sea Lord to replace Mountbatten. Fisher resigned only seven months later, amidst bitter arguments with Churchill over the Dardanelles campaign, and so was not directly involved in Jutland, the pivotal naval action of the war.

From the outset there was bound to be uncertainty surrounding any great actions between the British Grand Fleet (henceforth BGF) and German High Seas Fleet (henceforth GHSF), if and when it came. The Kaiser's declaration of an arms race for superiority in Dreadnought class battleships was crippling economically for both sides, but when it was called off in 1912, the British had 29 Dreadnoughts against the Germans' 17. Overall by 1914, the Allies could call upon 43 Dreadnoughts to the Central Powers' 20. The British public, and likely Churchill himself, believed this meant that a definitive Trafalgar style encounter of the two great fleets would inevitably result in a defining victory for the Royal Navy. But the days of set battles between 'ships of the line' were long gone. New tactics involving destroyers, submarines and mines brought unknown risks to the Dreadnoughts. More ironically, the ridiculous expense of building Dreadnoughts engendered a defensive mindset - that they were too valuable to be risked unless the conditions were absolutely right (as with Hitler's Tirpitz in WW2).

Hence by May 1916, the GHSF and the BGF had still not had that defining showdown. A near miss event on the Dogger Bank in early 1915 had been the closest, and a few skirmishes had resulted from German raids on the east coast of England. Overall the Royal Navy's performance had been patchy at best. A morale boosting victory off the Falklands in late 1914 had barely compensated for the bungling of matters in the Mediterranean in August 1914; the ill fated Dardanelles ventures of 1915; and the perceived failure to protect the civilian population from Zeppelins and naval bombardments from the Germans. The facts that the Navy was enforcing successfully a blockade against Germany's imports, while keeping open the high seas for imperial trade did not feel like success. The public were puzzled, and not a little frustrated. Similarly, in Germany the public saw no action at all from the much vaunted GHSF, while the land armies fought heroically, gaining victories but taking heavy casualties.

Reinhard Scheer - Aggressive,
ambitious and dashing

It was the U boats that had created the major threat to Britain, not the GHSF. The men in both navies, and more particularly their commanders felt the pressure of public opinion, and railed against the frustrations of inaction. A major engagement must surely come soon - but how, and in what form?

Churchill refers to “battle or encounter?” between two great, but unequal, fleets. For the latter, the weaker fleet (almost inevitably the GHSF in this scenario, given the superiority of the BGF) may launch a raid, but will need to escape before the odds ranged against them become overwhelming. The stronger fleet, conversely, will need to take greater tactical risks to force the pitched battle it seeks.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe
The only man who could "lose the
war in an afternoon" by his decisions

Notwithstanding, the consequences of defeat in such a pitched battle would be severe for Germany, but disastrous for the British. Starvation and defeat for Britain would be inevitable, with loss of control over trade on the high seas; of communications with its armies in action around the world, and the likely withdrawal of the United States from the war. Here lay the source of the Commander of the Grand Fleet’s greatest responsibility – that his actions could “lose the war in an afternoon”. Even the defeats and carnage on day 1 of the Somme campaign shortly to follow carried nothing like that implication. The BGF C-in-C, Sir John Jellicoe was a fine man, sailor and planner. In characteristic style, Churchill had sacked his predecessor Admiral Callaghan on the outbreak of war, appointing Jellicoe, who protested strongly at the treatment of his colleague. After the event his prudence and control over detail came in for severe criticism, but ahead of Jutland there appeared to be universal approval of his appointment and his performance to date. “The safety and overwhelming strength of the Grand Fleet was Jellicoe’s all embracing aim” (Churchill). 

On 14th October 1914, within weeks of taking up his post, Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty in very measured terms, setting out the potential vulnerability of the BGF to 'modern warfare' underwater tactics. He closed his detailed letter with "The object of this letter is to place my views before their Lordships and to direct their attention to the alterations in preconceived ideas of battle tactics which are forced upon us by the anticipated appearance in a fleet action of submarines and minelayers..."

Thus the prudence of the man with the overbearing responsibility of national safety was clearly set out - and was approved by all his superiors, some of whom were highly critical after the events of the Battle of Jutland. On the German side, a relatively new Commander of the GHSF, Reinhard Scheer, was champing at the bit for some definitive actions....