Gallipoli 2. Naval attempt to force the Straits

Sackville Hamilton Carden
1857-1930

The Admiralty's top heavy control of the world's greatest fleet did not always allow autonomy for its fleet commanders at sea. On this occasion the man on the spot benefited from a split between the First Lord (Churchill) and the First Sea Lord (Fisher). Forcing the Dardanelles Straits by naval bombardment of the defending forts had been strongly advocated by Churchill, and was preferred by Admiral Carden, leading the local forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Fisher was strongly in favour of action, but only as a (later) combined naval and land operation. Neither he nor Churchill held a particularly high opinion of Vice-Admiral Sackville Hamilton Carden. Carden had been part of the Mediterranean fiasco in the early days of the war that failed to intercept the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau. (Subsequently they had escaped via the Dardanelles into the Black Sea to support the Turks). Characteristically, Carden's early pessimistic assessment of  naval forced passage through the straits was followed some days later by a positive bombardment strategy. Churchill seized on the latter, and was to have his way. It began on 19^th February, three days after the War Office had agreed in principle to send land forces. 

The plan was for the capital ships to bombard the outer forts protecting the entrance to the Straits to silence resistance and allow short range destruction by smaller craft. Following this, minesweepers would move into the main straits to clear the passage for the main fleet.

Coastal fort defences and mines combined to make
passage of the Straits a daunting mission

The first attack was unsuccessful, and stormy weather precluded further attempts for another 5 days. However, on February 25^th the Navy attacked again, this time with more success. By the afternoon the forts were out of action. This allowed the minesweepers to move in and complete the first phase, and they advanced for 6 miles into the 38miles length of narrows. Optimism was high at this point, but the second phase faced stronger defences at the mid point of the narrows, and there were no clear plans to begin ground support against the Turkish defences.

HMS Cornwallis bombards the
fort at Kum Kale, Asian shore

From 3^rd March, matters deteriorated for the Navy. Hampered by the weather, their attacks were less successful, and the land defences became stronger. Long range, indirect, bombing of the of the forts from the Aegean side of the peninsula was started by the giant guns of the Queen Elizabeth but then called off to preserve ammunition. Direct attacks by HMS  Agamemnon and HMS Lord Nelson were tried for two fruitless days. These unsuccessful attacks continued until 12^th March, by which time Britain and France were ready to agree to Russia’s proposal to annex Constantinople, and the Italians seemed emboldened to declare war against Turkey in order to gain Adriatic coast territory. Nevertheless, the plan to force the Dardanelles Straits by Naval force alone had clearly failed. Despite this (see next post) the Admiralty soon sent new orders to Carden to attempt to force the straits again. Within two days Carden was overcome by illness (presumably stress) and had to be replaced by his deputy Vice-Admiral de Robeck, not without misgivings from Churchill. De Robeck signaled his willingness to comply with the order, and on March 18^th reported fine weather and the start of operations – another fateful day in the saga.

De Robeck’s mission depended on the battleships being able to operate in mine free waters. The 1915 minesweeping technology and aerial reconnaissance were limited in their scope. Twenty mines had been laid in Eren Kereni bay, but only 6 of them had been swept. This was the very bay where the battleships Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Lord Nelson and  Inflexible would make their long range bombardment of the forts. A massive land sea battle developed, as a French squadron moved in under cover of the battleships to engage with the many vigorously defended forts covering the straits. After about 3 hours, a number of the forts were out of action, allowing the minesweepers to start their part of the action. At this stage, it was looking good for the forcing of the straits, and the casualties had been low, with no ships badly damaged. But then disaster struck. 

The sinking Bouvet, March 18th 1915
Six hundred men perished

 Firstly, at 2pm the French cruiser Bouvet was mined and sunk with the loss of 600 men, as she was leaving the straits. Between 4 and 5pm both Inflexible and Irresistible were mined and badly damaged in Eren Kereni bay. This shocked the British command, and de Robeck broke off the action. 

Churchill writes, with feeling, “Never again did the British fleet renew the attack on the narrows which in pursuance of their orders they had begun on March 18^th, and which they confidently expected to continue after a brief interval. Instead, they waited for nine months, the spectators of the sufferings, the immense losses and imperishable glories of the army, always hoping that their moment of intervention would come, always hoping for their turn to run every risk and make every sacrifice, until in the end they had the sorrow and mortification of taking the remains of the army off and steaming away under the cloak of darkness from the scene of irretrievable failure”

Gallipoli 1. Background and build up

The Dardanelles Straits - guarded to the west by the Gallipoli Peninsula - gateway
to the Black Sea, reinforcements to Russia and control of the Turkish threat

In the Preface to his excellent book "Gallipoli" Peter Hart, oral historian and author opens with this withering assessment. "Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking". The proponents of the plan to capture the Dardanelles Straits that divide Europe from Asia, thereby knocking Turkey out of the war, would not have agreed - of course. To them (and Churchill was not the sole champion of the cause), not only was action in the Eastern theatre an imaginative alternative to the costly stalemate of the Western Front, it was necessary to support the ailing Russian effort on the Eastern Front and to persuade the wavering neutral nations of the Balkans to declare in favour of the Allies. On the face of it, they had a case (it seems to me). Tragically, a toxic cocktail of indecision, delay, incompetence, inexperience and hubris ensured the complete failure of the campaign. Over the course of a year, tens of thousands of men died and hundreds of thousands endured every kind of misery and deprivation in a lost cause. With great irony, the only part of the whole campaign to be conducted with efficient success was the final evacuation and abandonment of the Gallipoli Peninsula (qv Corunna, the Great Retreat of 1914 and Dunkirk).

The political struggle – to persuade in favour of a near East operation to relieve Russia – was started in the new year of 1915 by Lloyd George and Churchill. At this time the Russians were coming under major pressure in the Caucasus. They were short of men and weapons, in addition to their struggles to maintain the Eastern front. Lord Kitchener was prepared to show support, but not to commit land forces to such a move. Fisher was strongly against a navy only action, but supportive of urgent, decisive combined action  included forcing the passage of the Dardanelles. Grey, still in the Foreign Office, was beginning to view the plans sympathetically.

On 5^th January Churchill telegraphed Carden, the Admiral of the Dardanelles squadron, about the feasibility of breaching the Dardanelles. Carden’s response was that the Straits could not be rushed, but might be forced by a larger operation. On the 8^th January, the War Council met again, and gave consideration to a major operation, involving ground forces of up to 150,000 men. By 11^th January, Carden’s more detailed plan for the bombardment of the Dardanelles defences was received. Churchill sent it straight to Asquith, and then the following day moved further on implementing it, by bringing into play the Queen Elizabeth – the first of five new fast battleships to be ready. Her fifteen inch guns would be able to pound the forts defending the Straits from a safe distance. On 13^th January, the War Council approved unanimously the plan, and Churchill promoted it to the French and Russians.

Contrasting fortunes: Churchill
(left) was almost destroyed
by Gallipoli......

 Churchill’s eagerness for an Eastern campaign to force the Dardanelles was matched by Kitchener”s (and Joffre and French's) reluctance to provide any land force to support it for fear of weakening the Western Front position. Fisher, as First Sea Lord, was vehemently opposed to a navy only operation, despite Carden’s opinion that it was feasible. Eventually Fisher was pressured to support it, but he remained anxious for a matching campaign on land, and he turned out to be right.

But it was Kitchener who reigned supreme over the decisions (or indecisions) of the War Council. Churchill expresses the view that the lack of challenge to him in Cabinet was a bad thing, and that only he and Lloyd George were prepared to do so. Kitchener was more persuaded by the views of French and Joffre than those warning of the impending collapse of Russia, and the need for the Eastern initiative. He was also burdened by the crisis of insufficient and inadequate munitions for the successful conduct of war on either front (a crisis that would soon bring down the Government).

...whereas Mustafa Kamal (later
Ataturk) gained his reputation for
the fiercely successful defence
of Gallipoli by the Turks

On February 16^th the War Council finally made four significant decisions in favour of the Eastern campaign: the newly formed 29^th Division would be transferred to the Dardanelles (ostensibly to support the Greeks); further forces would be transferred from Egypt; the Royal Naval Division would be added to land forces there; and equipment and horses were to be provided as necessary to support the troops.

Opponents of the decisions challenged and delayed, and again Kitchener came under pressure to change them. He wavered for a further week, between 19^th and 26^th, at the end of which Churchill formally disclaimed responsibility for any consequences of this inaction. Even Asquith was unable to persuade Kitchener to decide. He finally relented on 10^th March, and ordered the 29^th Division to set sail for the Dardanelles.

Hesitation, delay and uncertainty characterised these first months, forfeiting all possible advantages of surprise in naval and military plans. So, from the outset, where decisive and rapid action might have given an outside chance of success, the Gallipoli campaign was virtually doomed. If only Kitchener had  been totally convinced by the doubters. As it transpired, the embarrassing failure of the Naval attempt to force the Straits (see later) had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the land force arguments.

The U-Boat war develops

British E-Class Submarine

The invention and development of submarines led to step change in war at sea, as did the development of air power in later conflicts.  The first submarines, or 'submersibles', dated back to the 17th century, but it was in the American Civil War when an enemy vessel was first sunk by one, and the late 19th century when gains in mechanical power increased their scope. They threatened the end of conventional engagements between single warships and fleets, with the striking of colours to end engagements.  Traditionalists viewed submarines (U-Boats) with distaste, and felt they sank to new depths (sic) in the dishonourable conduct of naval warfare. Nevertheless, their potential was enormous.

When Churchill was appointed to the Admiralty in 1911, this scope and potential was barely appreciated. Although Britain had substantially more U-Boats than Germany, they were primitive and short range – thought to be of use only for the defence of home ports. In fact Germany had more of the sea-going quality vessels, and much more incentive for developing them. It was the British Empire’s vast merchant fleet that would be most vulnerable to hostile action from U-Boats. Overall, the Admiralty underestimated this threat - viewing it as both cowardly and inhuman, and therefore unlikely. Only Admiral Fisher (at that time First Sea Lord) differed. His memorandum of 1913 warned of precisely what would happen, but he was overruled. Partly, this was because there was not much that could be done about the German U-Boat threat. Britain building bigger and better U-Boats would not negate the German threat, and they would have no comparable targets to speak of (Nevertheless, they would prove their skills and worth during the Dardanelles campaign).

German UC-1 Class U-Boat

On 4^th February 1915 the German Admiralty declared all waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland to be a war zone, and that all allied and neutral shipping would be subject to attack. Although disturbed by this, the British could see the potential political and propaganda advantages of this new situation. They, imbroiled as they were with the USA in lengthy arguments about the legality of their own North Sea block of trade with Germany, foresaw that tension would be removed if the Germans began to sink American or other neutral ships in the zone.  Home waters defences were strengthened by indicator nets at strategic points across narrow channels such as the Straits of Dover, and by Q Boats. These were essentially decoys, camouflaged as merchant or fishing vessels, but heavily armed. Other gadgetry rapidly appeared – hydrophones were trialled as an early version of sonar. In the first week of Germany’s offensive, 11 ships were attacked of which seven were sunk, but 1381 ships entered or left British ports safely. In the whole of March >6000 vessels arrived or sailed, of which only 21 were sunk. During the same period, German losses to the defensive strategies of the British were significant. By early May, this first attempt to strangulate British sea trade was effectively over – but it would return in a major way in 1917. Indeed, within weeks, on May 7^th in the Atlantic the Lusitania tragedy unfolded.

The Battle of Neuve Chapelle

An unacceptable loss of lives was paid for this
small blip pushed eastwards
in the front over 3 days

 Neuve Chapelle was the first significant action on the northern stretch of the Western Front in 1915. As initially planned by Sir John French it was to be little more than a pilot study for much larger subsequent Allied offensive. It assumed greater significance partly because of the nature and course of the battle, but also politically. French and Joffre were at last agreed on something – that the transfer of attention (and resources) from the Western Front to the eastern theatre for the Dardanelles campaign should be opposed. They sought an early and dramatic breakthrough at Neuve Chapelle to break the current stalemate.

Neuve Chapelle at that time was a small village sitting to the south of the Ypres salient on the La Bassee Estaires road that runs north-south, and around 20 miles to the west of strategically important Lille, held by the Germans. Smith-Dorrien's 2^nd Corps had taken Neuve Chapelle in mid October, but had been pushed back by the Germans within 10 days. By early March 1915, the surviving BEF had been greatly reinforced from Britain and the Empire. If they could break through at Neuve Chapelle and gain control of the ridges to the east, they would be well placed on the elevated approaches to Lille.

French briefed his generals on the 8^th March. The 1^st army would make a two-pronged approach at the north and south edges of the village, while supplementary attacks would be made at nearby Givenchy, and to the north just below Armentieres. The military tactic to be piloted was a concentrated artillery barrage to open up the front line defences for the infantry assault – a harbinger for the fatal Somme offensive of 1916.

At 7.30am on 10^th March an intense artillery bombardment opened up on the German line. A mere 35 minutes later, the artillery range was increased, the whistles blew, and the infantry advanced. Initial progress and success was considerable, but before long resistance from intact defences and murderous machine gun fire were encountered. At the north end of the village, the 2^nd Middlesex regiment found themselves in barbed wire and defences not touched by the artillery – they were almost wiped out. Beyond the first line the battle developed into a series of close quarters fighting through the village and surrounding woods, with heavy losses on both sides. By the end of the 10^th Neuve Chapelle was in British hands, but a renewed assault on 11^th was less successful, the Germans were better prepared, and after another long day of bitter fighting little further progress towards the ridges was made. On the night of 11^th the Germans brought in reinforcements, and on 12^th they launched a counter attack. The most severe of these was well to the north at the edge of the Ypres salient. They took the village of St Eloi, and threatened more general damage to the allied line. The allies fought back strongly, particularly the newly arrived Canadian Light Infantry, and restored St. Eloi within three days.

The ruins of Neuve Chapelle post battle

By the end of 12^th March a stalemate had been reached. The British had taken the village, and advanced for one mile along a front of three miles, but the Germans still held the ridges guarding Lille. Perhaps a Pyrrhic victory, but one aspect of the battle was great success – the actions of the Flying Corps. For the first time the aviators fought almost alongside the ground forces, and their bombs repeatedly disrupted the German communications. 

Buchan writes “Neuve Chapelle was a test action, and the deduction from it was to have a sinister effect  on the Allies’ conduct of the war”…”Guns could blast a way through the strongest defences. Clearly the attack must be on a broader front, otherwise the avenue of advance would be too narrow and degenerate into a salient; but on a broad front, granted limitless supplies of guns and shell, it seemed that success was assured. This view…dominated all the plans for 1915, and its many weaknesses were left undiscovered in the obsession which had fallen on the Allied commands.” “A false step had been taken which for three years was to be left unretrieved.”