The Arab Revolt 2: Lawrence of Arabia

Col. Thomas Edward Lawrence
1888-1935

Allenby’s position after the triumphant seizure of Jerusalem (see Post 3/12/2017) required a period of consolidation before he could move to the next phase. His aim was to move northwards on both sides of the River Jordan towards Damascus. With the help on his right flank of the Arabs, and their muse TE Lawrence, the taking of Damascus would isolate Turkish forces further south, thereby knocking the weakening Turks out of the war in the middle east.

Northern Palestine was still occupied by reasonable strong forces. To the east of the Jordan the key target remained the capture, or at least disablement, of the Hejaz railway. For this, the Arab forces of Sherif Feisal and TE Lawrence were essential partners.

Lawrence’s extraordinary two years of marauding partnership with the Arab forces came from his great affinity with the region and its culture, but in many ways he was an unlikely character for such a military drama. Re-reading his account in Seven Pillars of Wisdom fifty years on (I struggled through it for O level) I found him more in the war poet box than the military memoir. To anyone like me, to whom ‘desert’ conjures up only monotonous miles of sand dunes, his rich descriptions of desert life and topography are a revelation. He was a writer with a great memory; or a great sense of imagination, or keeper of a highly detailed diary – or possibly all three*. Lawrence’s liaison work with the Arabs became increasingly important to Allenby, and he spent much time shuttling between supporting Feisal and Cairo, Aqaba and Allenby’s field HQ. He understood that the Balfour Declaration of late 1917 meant that Britain would not keep all of its promises to Sherif Hussein in Mecca, and he had to live with that falsehood through the rest of the campaign.

Allenby spent the first months of 1918 strengthening his positions and improving supply lines. The route to Damascus was across difficult terrain, and included several important (and therefore well defended) junctions. He wanted to move north along the coast also, in order to enable supplies from accessible ports for his men as they advanced on Damascus and beyond. His preparations were rudely interrupted by Operation Michael on the Western Front in late March (see Post 21/3/2018). He was obliged to send all the troops he could afford (and others that he could not) to support the beleaguered 3^rd and 5^th Armies in Picardie. This coincided with the transfer of the German General Liman von Sanders (of Gallipoli fame) to replace Falkenhayn as the senior German Adviser to the Turkish Armies. He resolved to hold what he had in Palestine, although he was not helped by the indecision of the Turkish leader Kemal, who also wished to divert troops to the new opportunities appearing in the Caucasus (See previous post). Nevertheless, these two developments were checks to Allenby’s progress, and increased his reliance on support from Feisal and Lawrence’s Arab forces. They advanced from their base at Aqaba (See Post 23/7/17) and focused their disruptive attacks on and around Ma'an, a key railway town some 130 miles south of Amman and 250 miles south of Damascus. Allenby spent several weeks replenishing his force, borrowing and begging troops from wherever he could. Mainly men came from the British and French Imperial Divisions serving in Africa or Salonika. Indian and ANZAC troops comprised the majority, with additional Senegalese, Moroccan and Algerian troops making up a cosmopolitan ‘Egyptian Expeditionary Force’. Allenby dispatched a group, made up of the 60 Division, the ANZAC Mounted Division and the Camel Corps (!) to cross the Jordan and link up with Feisal, now harrying the railway to the north of Ma'an. Another Gallipoli veteran – the Australian General Harry Chauvel, commanded the Group.

This strategy did not, at first, succeed. Although Chauvel made initial progress from the Jordan’s east bank, this created a salient that was soon threatened by the arrival to its north of Turkish reserves. Allenby was forced to order his men to withdraw, and by 4^th May they were back on the west bank of the river. Although Feisal and Lawrence had reached the agreed position, they were struggling to advance further north. Allenby would have to wait until his centre and left flank were strong enough to push the whole Turkish line in Palestine further north, in order to protect Chauvel’s left flank. Allenby endured a difficult three months as he waited for more men and supplies to arrive. His battle was very much a sideshow to the unfolding dramas on the Western Front at this time. The impact of von Sanders’ organisational skills allowed for numerous testing counter-attacks on the weaker parts of Allenby’s line, but he able to hold firm.

September was the defining month for Allenby (See Map). On 1^st of that month the Turks were holding a line eastward from the coast just north of Jaffa, to the south of Nablus, across to the east bank of Jordan, then down the east bank to the Red Sea, and then east to the Hejaz railway line north of Maan. But Allenby was now ready to make his move in strength, and with cavalry back up Between 19^th and 25^th a number of decisive actions pushed and pulled the Turkish line apart, and enabled the near extinct tactic of a cavalry breakout to flourish. On 19^th Indian and French Divisions attacked on the Plain of Sharon in the Battle of Megiddo; and a third (this time successful) Trans-Jordan attack moved north rapidly towards Samakh on the Sea of Galilee, and Nazareth – where they nearly captured a desperate, fleeing von Sanders.

Freed from Turkish pressure to his left, Chauvel was back on the east bank of the Jordan and racing north, past Amman to Irbid, which he reached on 26^th. This in turn enabled Feisal and Lawrence to move north swiftly as the Turks fell into disarray. Allenby ordered them to bypass Amman and head for Deraa (today Daraa), where they would link up with Chauvel for a final advance on Damascus.

Maj-Gen Edward Chaytor.
Not much like a farmer in
this photo.

Amman itself fell to an eastwards moving group of 11,000 men known as ‘Chaytor’s force’ – infantry, mounted infantry and field artillery, commanded by the redoubtable New Zealand farmer Major General Edward Chaytor. Chaytor garrisoned the city, and proceeded to intercept and capture thousands of Turks as they straggled back in retreat from points further south.

Von Sanders hope now was to establish a defensive line based on Damascus, but events were moving too fast for him. Along the coastal areas Allenby’s advance had taken Haifa and Beirut, opening new supply routes to the east and north as far as Aleppo. In the centre, some forward units of Chauvel’s cavalry were already north of Damascus; and on the right Lawrence had taken Deraa on 28^th, sealing off the last route by rail north to Damascus. Von Sanders had no choice but to abandon the city. On the early morning of 30^th September, in quick succession, a detachment of Australian cavalry, Lawrence’s Camel Corps and General Chauvel entered the city to seal a decisive defeat and strategic loss for Turkey. She had lost the great majority of three armies in less than one month.

Further advance towards Aleppo continued while the Arabs and British negotiated testily about the administration of Damascus. The British force in Mesopotamia now forged further north meeting little resistance, and by the end of October, the remains of the Turkish army was back in Anatolia. On 30^th October, Turkey signed an armistice with the allies in total surrender.

The entry into Damascus proved to be the final act in the drama for Lawrence. A sensitive man who disliked violence and militarism, he had adopted both in pursuit of what he saw as his overriding duty to help his country prevail. He knew from the outset that ‘perfidious Albion’ would undermine promises made to the Arabs regarding self-determination – that British (and French) self-interest would outweigh the opportunities created by freeing the middle east from centuries of Ottoman rule. Lawrence’s contribution to the defeat of the Turks was a significant one, although by the time Damascus was taken he had become embittered and depressed. After taking his leave of Feisal he approached Allenby at his HQ and asked to be released. He returned to England on 4^th October. He attended the Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919 as a member of the Foreign Office delegation and adviser to Winston Churchill. He had gone to lobby for Arab independence, only to find that the British and French had already agreed their positions. Further disillusioned, he joined the RAF, seeking some degree of anonymity, but never fully recovered. He died in a motorbike accident in Dorset in 1935 – the famous first scene in David Lean’s film, Lawrence of Arabia.

* For example, this description of a desert sunset: “There Joyce and I sat and watched a sunset, which grew from grey to pink and to red; and then to a crimson so intolerably deep that we held our breath in trepidation for some stroke of flame or thunder to break from its dizzy stillness”

One Hundred Days - 2: Arras, Bapaume and Peronne

Part of the British advance on Bapaume
August 1918

The war was into its fifth terrible year, but events were now moving swiftly. The fourth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination on 28^th June had seen Germany’s final assault still advancing and the Allies apparently close to exhaustion along most of the Western Front. By the anniversary of the outbreak of war, the Germans were decidedly on the back foot, and the coordinated strategy of Foch was coming into play. Those 37 days were as eventful in 1918 as they had been in 1914.

There was still much to worry about. After a lull during the worst of the crisis, public discontent and industrial unrest had returned in Britain and France. Germany’s material gains from the overrunning of Eastern Europe post Brest- Litovsk (see Post 22/1/2018) were proving elusive, even illusory, but the Allies were still worried by the twin threats of Bolshevism and German advances through Europe into Asia. British and French forces had established bridgeheads at Murmansk (in March) and Archangel (on 2^nd August) in Northern Russia. Encouraged by the achievements of the Czech Legion (See Post 31/5/2018) the Allies wished to bolster the remaining nationalist forces in Russia resisting incursions by Germany (supporting Finland) in the northern Baltic; and also to link up with the Czechs to strengthen ‘White Russian’ resistance to the Bolsheviks further south. It was an impossible task, and from the Volga to the Caucasus, and into northern Persia the positions were dangerously confused and unstable. Turkey was by now nearly as weakened as Russia, but with German support (much reduced from earlier years) threatened to take key areas of the Caucasus, including the oil fields of Azerbaijan (shades of WW2). British forces moving north from Baghdad (see post 7/12/2017) were dragged hundreds of miles to the Caspian Sea to help save Baku from capture (they succeeded).

With the Central Powers’ positions in the east so uncertain, Ludendorff saw that he had little option but to hold on as best he could to his Western Front positions.

After the success of Amiens (previous Post), Haig agreed with Foch that a shift of emphasis further north was preferable to maintaining the focus on Chaulnes. Byng’s 3^rd Army lined up to the north of Rawlinson’s 4^th (see Map), and was closer to the Siegfried Line – now a realistic objective. Haig instructed Byng to plan an advance that would take the Arras-Albert railway link, and finally make Arras safe from counter-attack. This would put him in a strong position to attack the Siegfried line and push further north towards critical German positions in northern France. It had similarities to the 1916 Somme plan, but this time it was part of a much wider coordinated strategy commanded by Foch.

On 21^st August, on a nine mile front between Moyenville and Beaucourt (that included part of the 1916 front - see Map), Byng launched his attack at 5am. It was another wet and misty dawn. Although well dug in, the Germans were focused on shoring up their withdrawal further south. They were surprised, and overwhelmed., and by the evening the British had advanced to their railway objective. The following day, Rawlinson’s army on their right flank came into the attack, creating a southern pincer for a definitive attack on Bapaume. This took place on 23^rd August, and succeeded by 28^th. In the meantime, several of the infamous villages of the 1916 campaign were cleared, including Mametz, the Thiepval ridge,  Martinpuich and Le Sars. As these hard fought but convincing victories unfolded, Foch broadened the attack. On the southern flank the French pushed forward again towards the Canal du Nord. On the northern flank on 26^th August Horne’s army pushed east from its Arras line. These multiple attacks stretched the German attempts to withdraw in an orderly fashion to their deep defensive positions on the Siegfried line.

On 30^th August, amid advances along most of the line from Arras to Noyon, the Australian 2^nd Division captured Mont Saint-Quentin. This hill, rising from the east bank of the Somme guarded the town of Péronne. Having crossed the marshy Somme during the night, they surprised and defeated – with no artillery backing – an elite German garrison. Péronne was duly taken by the Australians the following day. This was a great prize, and a remarkable exercise by the Australians, planned and commanded by their leader General John Monash.

John Monash. Like the
Canadian, Currie, a
no nonsense leader of
Empire troops 

Now Foch was turning the screw. Horne’s 1^st and Plumer’s 2^nd armies in Flanders attacked, recapturing Bailleul and Mount Kemmel (see Post 10/5/18). East of Paris, Mangin resumed his advance, pushing further north and east. Most tellingly, Currie’s Canadian Corps (part of Byng’s 3^rd Army) attacked the pivot of the Siegfried line - the Drocourt-Quéant switch – and captured six miles of the line between Etaing and Noreuil.

Cumulatively, these actions pushed Ludendorff to despair. He had no option but to marshal his defences behind a line of water cover – the river Oise; the Canal du Nord and the marshy river Sensée (to the west of Douai). The main Siegfried line section covering Cambrai and Saint-Quentin was still intact, but both ends were now vulnerable.

Final small scale attacks by the British along their new front prepared the ground for the attack on these two decisive centres. In less than a month, the British had moved their line from an approximate north – south connection Arras-Bapaume-Péronne to be threatening Cambrai and Saint-Quentin. In the process the German withdrawal may have cost less casualties than their Kaiserschlacht offensive, but they had lost 70,000 prisoners of war, and over 700 artillery pieces.

One Hundred Days – 1: The Battle of Amiens

It seems strange to relate that the Battle of Amiens on 8^th August 1918 marked a mere one hundred days of WW1 remaining before the Armistice. Although it may be easy to identify this in hindsight, it was not immediately obvious. Popular opinion in August had expected a short violent war, over in months not years. By late 1916 and through 1917 public opinion despaired of any ending to the death and misery – unless it was in the different form of revolution and civil war in Russia. The spring of 1918 had seen the Kaiserschlacht bring Britain and France to the brink of defeat. Then the second battle of the Marne had recalled the ‘miracle’ of the first in 1914: but Mangin’s successes in pushing the Germans back to between the Aisne and the Oise was more of a relief than a harbinger of victory.

A word in favour of Douglas Haig at this point. He has been widely criticised, even vilified (including by this Blog), as the Chief Donkey commanding the lions in the trenches. In 1915 Haig had become Commander in Chief of the largest, most complex British Army ever assembled. No previous leader had had to approach the scale of Haig’s tasks; and indeed, he and his generals made many mistakes. By 1918 Haig’s army was larger still and even more complex. The multiple advances - artillery tactics; shells and fuses; machine guns; mining and tunnelling; communications; tanks, and above all (sic) aircraft – had to be planned and co-ordinated by Haig and his staff to create the 1918 military juggernaut that finally could overcome the German military machine. In spite of his failings and errors (and his toxic relationship with the British Prime Minister) Haig’s doggedness, persistence, and unswerving belief had brought him to the verge of the 100 days, where he was to prove one of the stars. If Mangin had shown the way at the Marne, Haig was about to direct the first significant British assault against the new German front.

Through his improving relationship with Generalissimo Foch, Haig had earned some flexibility from the former in the way he deployed his forces. He could opt to go in Flanders, on the Lys, or south of the river Somme. This time he chose the Somme. For his main attack, Rawlinson’s 4^th Army was lined up between Morlancourt (near Albert) and south of the Amiens main road to Roye (see map). On Rawlinson’s right was Debeney’s 1^st French army – also under Haig’s command. Success on this front would further isolate von Hutier’s occupation of the Montdidier salient (see Post 3/4/2018). A major objective was Chaulnes, an important German communications hub, midway between Amiens and Saint-Quentin. Rawlinson assembled his best infantry – the Canadians and Australians – for the attack. By subterfuge the Germans were misled into expecting the Canadians to be part of an attack in

Complete air dominance allowed detailed survey
of German positions before the attack

Flanders. In the misty daybreak of 8^th August, that recalled the first day of Operation Michael in March (See Post 23/3/2018), Haig and Rawlinson implemented Foch’s tactics to near perfection. There was no pre-bombardment. Instead, the artillery opened simultaneously with the rush of the British and Empire ‘storm trooper equivalents’. They were supported by 400 of the new faster Whippet tanks. Rawlinson had 21 Divisions, including three of cavalry, at his disposal against seven depleted German Divisions. The ground had been thoroughly reconnoitred from the air in preparation, and in many places along the front the Germans were taken completely by surprise and overrun. By the end of the day, 6-8 miles had been advanced through the central areas, whereas on both flanks the resistance had been stronger, and progress slower (see Map). The Cavalry Divisions had advanced up to 23 miles behind the front, and attacked the railway lines east of Chaulnes – a feat unheard of on the Western Front to date in the war.

Shades of Dad's Army. But Whippets
were faster and more mobile

On 9^th August modest further gains were made, and north of the Somme the British advanced beyond Chipilly and Morlancourt. On 10th, forces from the French 3^rd army, moving to the high ground at Lassigny, effectively completed a pincer movement with Rawlinson and Debeney to surround Montdidier. Von Hutier’s substantial garrison there of men and arms was forced to surrender.

An extraordinary three days of success at an earlier stage of the war would probably have degenerated into a bitter attritional struggle. Foch was so delighted that he did initially propose further attacks but, ironically, it was Haig the over-optimist who played back his own tactics to Foch, and argued for a halt. (Haig himself had been told in no uncertain terms by his Generals Currie (Canada) and Monash (Australia) that they needed time to regroup before another push). Foch soon approved a shift in the British line of emphasis, which would come from Byng, further north. In the meantime further gains by the French consolidated the higher ground to the south above the Oise.

For Germany, Amiens was a serious reverse. Ludendorff’s only options now were for staged withdrawals all along the front, and these were promptly begun. He wrote in his memoirs shortly after the war “August 8^th was the black day of the German army in the history of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through… August 8^th made things clear for both army Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy”. He was by now on the verge of complete physical and mental breakdown. In the course of two days of anguished conference at HQ in Spa on 13-14^th August he offered his resignation to the Kaiser. It was refused, but he was sent away for rest and recuperation.

By contrast on the following day, 15^th, mass was celebrated in Amiens Cathedral in thanksgiving for the delivery of the city from the German threat.