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| General Sixt von Armin. Led defence at Passchendaele, led attack for the Lys |
From 21st March to 10th
April 1918 the armies of von Below and Marwitz in the north and von Hutier’s 18th
army in the south had punched themselves out in Operation Michael (OM). Von
Below’s subsidiary operation Mars, against Vimy Ridge and Arras had been
gallantly rebuffed by Byng’s 3rd Army. Von Hutier had gained the
most ground, against Gough’s wounded 5th Army, and he was nearly at
Amiens. But his lines were extended and his men were tired. His left flank,
close to Montdidier, was vulnerable (see previous post) and Ludendorff decided
to switch his main attack to Flanders. He hoped not only to break through the
British lines there, but also to draw Foch’s reserves away from the Montdidier
and Amiens areas.
An offensive through Flanders towards the
coast (and codenamed Operation George) had been one of Ludendorff’s preferred
Kaiserschlacht options before settling on Michael. Now, downgraded to Operation
Georgette, it became the focus of the next month. Although known to posterity
as the Battle of the Lys, it became a series of actions on a wider front than
the valley course of that small but significant river. As the month wore on,
rather like the mission creep of OM, it became an oversized pincer movement,
codenamed Tannenberg, to snuff out the Ypres salient, well to the north of the
Lys. This included an action along the coast between Nieuport and Langemarck.
This was held off so successfully by the modest Belgian forces now holding that sector that it provided more evidence of the German military machine
faltering from its invincibility of 1914 and 1915.
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| The early incursion south of the Lys, heroically resisted at Givenchy on German lef thttp://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/the-battles-of-the-lys-1918/ |
The revised Operation Georgette initially
would throw only nine Divisions against Horne’s 1st army (compared with 39
Divisions active on day 1 of OM).
Ludendorff’s aim was to break through in
French Flanders between La Bassée and Armentieres (both held by the
British since the early fierce actions of the Race to the Sea in 1914 (See
post 1/1/2015). He planned to establish a line on the Aire-La Bassee canal, whence he could advance and take control of Bethune and
Hazebrouck, paralyzing British communications, and leading to a retreat to the Channel
Ports. The marshy ground on either side of the Lys (and its tributary the Lawe)
made for difficult conditions – the main reason OM had been preferred as the
first strike. Nevertheless, Divisions of the 6th Army under von Quast’s
command, and the 4th Army under Sixt von Armin (the former south of
the Lys, the latter north of it) prepared their attack with customary
efficiency. The whole section was defended by the British 1st
(Horne) and 2nd (Plumer) armies, with two important exceptions. At
the very northern end, the Belgian army now defended from Nieuport on the coast
to Langemarck. Stationed in the centre of the British line were the two Portuguese
Divisions. Late into the war they had seen little actions to date and were
reluctant participants at this vital stage. In fact one of them had been
withdrawn to the reserves just before Georgette, but the 2nd
Division was placed right in the path of Quast’s stormtroopers.
The battle commenced on the evening of 7th
April with an intense bombardment of gas shells. Unlike the short burst of OM,
this continued for a full 36 hours, before the storm troopers charged early on
the morning of 9th. Within two hours the Portuguese line was broken and the
Germans were pouring through the gap. This caused turning of the defence lines
on both sides of the gap, and a day of chaotic and fierce fighting at close
quarters. By the end of the day, advance units of von Quast’s infantry were well on
their way to Bethune.
However, as in OM it was good progress but not sufficient
to meet Ludendorff’s demanding timetable. Further, as a result of the
unyielding defence on the British right, especially at Givenchy by the
Lancashire Division, Quast found his advanced infantry to be in a long, narrow
salient. Desperate fighting through the night saw both sides seeking to stabilise
their positions.
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| Ferdinand von Quast - another of Ludendorff's veteran Prussian Generals. Like von Armin he had fought in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 |
Next, Sixt von Armin’s infantry pressured
on the right flank towards Armentieres and upwards towards the Messines Ridge –
held by the British since the famous victory there in June 1917 (see Post 6/6/2017). Armentieres they had held since
1914, but by the night of the 10th had been compelled to withdraw
from the pulverised town. It seemed that between Givenchy at the southern end
and Messines to the north the Germans were certain to break through. They
renewed their attack the next day, making greater advances in the north, so
that Messines was conceded and the British line moved back to Wytschaete (how demoralising
that must have been). There was now a bulge in the British line that threatened
the rear of Ypres. This unplanned success away from his original targets led
Ludendorff to throw his reserves into a new action towards Ypres (reminiscent
of his actions in the southern zone in OM, where Amiens had replaced Arras as
his key strategic objective). It would prove to be a fatal error in the long
run, but the British crisis was far from over*. Although still some way
distant, both Bethune and Hazebrouck were threatened; while Plumer was forced
to move troops down from Passchendaele to support the defenders south west of
Ypres. The Germans continued to have greater success north of the River Lys,
pushing towards Bailleul, a key British administration centre and a major
obstacle en route to Hazebrouck.
*”Blindness seemed to have fallen for the moment on the German High
Command – a blindness born of too confident pride. It all but destroyed the
British Army; but it saved the Allied front, and in the long run gave them
victory” Buchan. A History of the Great War. Vol IV p225
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