"Kaiserschlacht" 3: Operation Michael 21st March 1918

German Infantry advancing through Saint-Quentin
March 1918

All along the Western Front expectation was high. The much anticipated German offensive was at hand, but where would the first, vital blow land? In estimating the probabilities, both Army Commanders-in-Chief had unwittingly contrived to leave the German chosen sector as their weakest. For Britain Haig was more concerned to protect the Pas de Calais and communications to the Channel ports than the southern end of his line. He was prepared to accept the weak position of Gough’s 5^th Army in front of Saint-Quentin to keep his defences stronger in Flanders. Petain was pre-occupied with the danger to Paris of an assault through Champagne, and his vulnerability further to the south east. Although he had reserve Divisions available, as agreed with Haig, to support Gough’s army, they were placed too far south to reach the area rapidly in a crisis – and a crisis was shortly to develop. On 14^th and 15^th March British aircraft had reported on a concentration of German forces behind Saint-Quentin, so the warning signs were there, but in the eerie calm of 19^th and 20^th the weather was drizzle and mist and at dusk on 20^th a dense fog set in. This enabled 30,000 German troops to infiltrate stealthily to their forward positions less than two miles from the British ‘blue’ line.

Before the term assumed its modern significance, an ‘eleventh hour’ warning of the German attack was issued along the British front at 2am on 21^st March. At 4.30am followed an order to move men into position in the Battle (secondary) zone. Scarcely in time, for at 4.45 a devastating German artillery barrage commenced. Accurate fire landed all across the forward and battle zones, but also into the rear areas, up to 20 miles behind the front line. Large amounts of poison gas were added to the barrage. For good measure, a more general artillery attack took place all along the front from the Channel coast to the far south east section. In the fog covering the 3^rd and 5^th Army positions confusion reigned. Only wireless messages could be communicated, and these were slow and unreliable. Coincident with the opening of the barrage, the elite storm troopers surged forward to the British blue line, and rapidly made their way through to the deeper areas of the Forward Zone (see Previous Post 2/3/2018). As dawn arrived, the thickness of the fog allowed for no improvement in visibility. The fog was hazardous for both sides, but definitely conferred an advantage to the early German spearheads.

The red line shows the 21st March advances, the
orange shows the eventual limit of Germany's advance

Between 8am and 10am the main German infantry moved forward to exploit the holes punched in the British defences. The Tommies were already uncomfortable in their new, distributed, defence mode, compared to their usual ‘hold the line’ mode. Add to that the blanket of fog, with super-added poisonous gas clouds and ceaseless barrage and it is not difficult to understand how defenders were simply overwhelmed in so many places.

By 11am news was filtering through to Divisional HQs of large German incursions – the largest being in the marshy southern end of the 5^th Army’s front on the Oise (where trouble had not been expected). Further bad news came from the Bapaume/Cambrai road area; Lagnicourt and Bullecourt in the northern half of the front (see map). At Ronssoy, in the centre, the attackers had broken right through the battle zone. This was very serious news, and such reserves as there were moved in to plug gaps as quickly as conditions allowed.

By early afternoon the fog had lifted, and the Germans were able to launch their planned supporting air attacks, targeting the remaining strong points in the forward zone. Desperate defence, much of it heroic but piecemeal, continued through the afternoon. The risk of a major rupture of the line between 3^rd and 5^th Armies grew alarmingly.* But the worst news came from south of St. Quentin. The German were well beyond the battle zone, and by evening had reached the Crozat canal (part of the longer Saint-Quentin canal, linking the Rivers Oise and Somme – see map).

At the northern end of the sector, Byng’s 3^rd Army was holding hard to its positions. Byng had more men to hold a shorter section of the line, and his defensive positions were better prepared. Heavier casualties were inflicted on the attackers, and the deeper battle zone held firm (in some places only just). Most ground was lost between Demicourt and Croisilles (see map). One result of this (alongside a corresponding loss of ground to the south) was to accentuate the Flesquieres salient, increasing the risk of encirclement of the large number of troops inside it. The salient itself had a relatively quiet day, other than heavy repeated poison gas attacks, leaving its occupants confined and unaware of the major events to the north and south. (Haig finally ordered Byng to withdraw from most of the salient later that night).

As night fell, both sides looked to shore up their positions in preparation for the 22^nd. In a tumultuous day, 32 British Divisions had been involved against 64 German, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Only on the disastrous first day of the Somme did the British have more casualties (49,000) in a single day than on this (38,000). As the attackers, the Germans were prone to heavier casualties, although on this first day the fog had afforded them a good deal of protection. Middlebrook estimates German day 1 casualties of Operation Michael at almost 40,000.

Right along the line the forward zone had been lost. The battle zone rear edge was just about intact along its length, except at the southern end where Gough’s men were authorised to make their stand behind the Crozat canal and its link to the Somme canal. The Royal Engineers moved in to prepare all the bridges for destruction.

As the 22^nd March dawned, the heavy fog had returned, frustrating the British artillery’s hopes to stall the next German waves of attack. The beleaguered 5^th Army had no relief at all, and stood vulnerable, outnumbered by four to one.

* This was the source of bitter controversy in the blame culture surrounding these events back in London later in 1918 and 1919.

Postcards from the heart of the Western Front

Road signs in Cambrai, at the heart of 1918 actions

Criss crossing the mainly deserted roads of 
northern France today it's apparent that very few buildings are more than 100 years old. Many civic buildings and churches have been lovingly restored but the signs of reconstruction are everywhere. Although maybe no more than 10-15% of the country was caught up in the carnage of German occupation, the impact was huge. To a country still hurting from the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany after the 1870 war this was a further affront and humiliation. The French, and by their Alliance the British military tactics tactics for three years were dominated by the desire to remove the invader from French soil. It was a terrible position to be in. British and French forces had to be be thrown against the formidable defences of the invader, or else accept the occupation. The many awful and attritional campaigns of 1915-1917 were, on this account, understandable but fruitless. 1918 brought drastic changes to the wretched status quo. Lines moved rapidly  - first to the east with the final German assaults, and then to the west in the dramatic efforts of the final 100 days. Within a few miles between Le Cateau to the east of Cambrai to Albert to its west battles from every year of the war are marked and remembered



Hard to blame the German artillery for this one - the amazing remnants of the Abbaye on the Mont St. Eloi. It lies to the north of Notre Dame de Lorette and Vimy Ridge, thus contributing a good strategic vantage point for much of the war.

At Le Cateau-Cambresis, below, British and German cemeteries lie alongside each other, separated only by a non-barbed hedge. The Britsh dead here are nearly all 'old contemptibles', victims of Smith-Dorrien's heroic stand against the German juggernaut at the beginning of the great retreat.

British on left, Germans on right

Battle of Cambrai 1917
Bullecourt, and the statue of 'Digger' representing the Australian forces who held on gallantly in the face of von Marwitz's fierce counter attacks in the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. The Bullecourt fighting was some of the fiercest, and the result shaped the Flesquieres salient, a focal point for Operation Michael that announced the German offensives in March 1918.

This multinational monument is on the edge of the village of Flesquieres, that formed the tip of the salient resulting from Cambrai. Facing east, the central concrete mound represents the Hindenburg line in the Cambrai sector, and the tank tracks represent the breakthrough by tanks on the first day of Cambrai, with the footprints of the infantry who followed up the breach in the Hindenburg line.
The lower photo turns 180 degrees to the west, and a sign points out the landmarks to the west, whence came the British assault.
The tanks, alongside Byng's 3rd Army performed superbly on the first day, but as so often the actions were so severe that them men became exhausted; there were insufficient reserves to follow up the success, and the inevitable German counter attacks reclaimed much of the ground lost, at high price to both sides.

Operation Michael March 1918
The first of the German hammer blows of 1918 fell upon the positions of the 3rd and 5th Armies of the BEF. In particular Gough's 5th army, stretched out along weak positions inherited from the French line came under massive pressure in the first days, and was forced to concede a great deal of ground. In the midst of all this multiple acts of heroism occurred against formidable odds.
One remarkable instance was the courageous (bordering on reckless) leadership of Lt Colonel Dimmer who led his men, on horseback, in a Balaklava style counter attack against the oncoming might of German forces. Aged 34, and recently married, Dimmer was one of those larger than life characters who appear frequently in the annals of war. At the outbreak of war he had been in Africa. He immediately returned home and found himself a posting in the front line within weeks, and he won the VC in defence of the Ypres salient in Klein Zillebeke in November 1914. He continued to hold off the enemy from his machine gun post despite having been hit five times. He was back in the front line in no time and continued to lead by example until his sacrificial charge against the fateful German onslaught on 21st March 1918.

Vargny sur Somme
This beautiful cemetery was an unexpected find on the west bank of the Somme between Ham and Peronne. This area was hammered by the Germans after they broke through the 5th Army defence zones on 21st March 1918. The British withdrew to the line of the Crozet Canal before taking up positions to keep the Germans on the east bank of the Somme, which in this section flows almost due north. Nearly all of the 1000 British men in this cemetery died trying to stop the Germans at the Somme crossings on 22nd and 23rd March 1918

Approaching Vargny from the North, it shimmers in
the distance until becoming recognisable as a CWG cemetery

The view from the southern end. Indescribably
peaceful and moving

"Kaiserschlacht" 2: Build up to Operation Michael

Gen Oskar von Hutier
Brought stormtroopers to the
Western Front

A successful first phase was essential to Ludendorff’s grand plan, which was larger and more ambitious than any attempted by either side on the Western Front to date. In the planning stages he had considered four options: either side of the Verdun salient (codenamed Castor and Pollux); through Belgian Flanders, south of Ypres (George); through Arras and French Flanders (Mars); and through the Saint-Quentin sector (Michael). For reasons set out in the previous blog Ludendorff settled on Michael, although extending its scope to include part of the Mars sector from just south of Vimy Ridge. Ironically, there was no plan for an initial route through Champagne – the shortest route to Paris. We have seen how Petain’s understandable concern to protect this area led to the extension of the British line a further thirty miles southwards to the marshy upper Oise region west of La Fere. The upshot of this was that the entire hammer blow of Operation Michael would fall upon vulnerable British defences. The tensions at the top of British command between Haig and Lloyd George further undermined the British forces by impeding development of co-ordinated planning by the fledgling Supreme War Council.

Along the 70 miles of Operation Michael front, the
Germans outnumbered the British by 2.5:1

 The operational ‘Michael plus’ battlefront stretched for seventy miles, more or less due south from north of Arras to La Fere (see Map).* The terrain in Spring would be less hostile than the clay swamps of Flanders. A series of valleys and their rivers ran east to west at intervals. In the northern part the rivers flowed east towards the Belgian coast, but further south they flowed to the west, mainly as tributaries of the Somme or Oise. There were some important areas of high ground and one critical section – the Flesquieres salient – created as an outcome of the Cambrai battles three months earlier. There was a westward bulge in the line in front of the town of Saint-Quentin. Breakthrough here would allow te Germans to fan out to the north west towards Peronne and the 1916 Somme battlefields; and south westwards towards Ham (also on the Somme) to block any moves north by the French to support the British. South of Saint-Quentin the front wound down to the canals and marshes around La Fere, and it was not anticipated that there would be major activity there.

The German preparations were typically detailed and meticulous. Intensive training of the elite storm troops entrusted to make the initial breakthrough was accompanied by artillery work planned in painstaking detail by the brilliant artillery supremo of the German military, Georg von Bruchmuller. This was to be war of movement, and not only would the regular infantry follow up the breaches made by the storm troops, but light artillery would follow closely, laying down pinpoint creeping barrages. Most of the ground to be attacked initially had been held by the Germans before their withdrawal to the Hindenburg line (see Post 4/1/2017). They knew the ground well and were able to plan their shooting ‘by map’ as well as direct observation.

Col. Georg Bruchmuller
German Artillery Supremo

As previously noted a German force of almost a million men was organised by Ludendorff into two army groups. Prince Ruprecht’s northern group comprised two armies – the 17^th and the 2^nd. The former was commanded by Otto von Below, veteran of the defensive operations against Allied offensives of 1915 and 1916, and of the overwhelming German offensive at Caporetto in late 1917. Another Prussian, Georg von der Marwitz, also a Western Front veteran, commanded the latter. He had led the dramatic German counter-attack at Cambrai. Both men knew well their areas and their opponents. Von Below’s first objective was Bapaume; von Marwitz’s was Peronne (see map). The southern army ‘group’ of Crown Prince Wilhelm comprised only one army, the 18^th.  Its commander was Oskar von Hutier, and he was new to the Western Front. His reputation had been made on the Eastern Front, and it was his eponym given to the storm trooper tactics – so important in the coming battle – after he had first implemented them in the capture of Riga in 1917. Von Hutier’s mission was to break through from Saint-Quentin, capture Ham, and then form a flank to prevent French reinforcements coming north to support the British. All the German Divisions had been brought up to strength with fresh (but experienced) troops.

But what of the British defence arrayed against this formidable threat? Several differences were apparent, the most important of which was the differing state of the infantry battalions. The British were either (relatively) inexperienced or exhausted – or both.  The British Army had four sources for its battalions and divisions: the dwindling numbers of regular army men; the Territorials; the volunteer ‘Kitchener’ army, and the Empire Divisions. The ten British Empire Divisions were, perhaps, the best and fittest of all (e.g actions at Pozieres, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele), but the regulars and territorials had the most experience.

Haig had less than three months to reorganize his forces and defend the line. On this front of seventy miles he deployed two armies – the 3^rd, commanded by Byng and the 5^th, led by Gough. As the map shows, Sir Julian Byng’s army comprised 14 Divisions charged with covering 28 miles from north of Arras to the southern end of the Flesquieres salient. Byng had succeeded Allenby in June 1917 (see Post 3/12/17), and had planned the attack at Cambrai, which had such mixed results. He was encouraged by Haig to withdraw from the Flesquieres salient in order to shorten his defensive line by three miles. This was an offer, rather than an order, and one that he rejected on the basis that the ground had been so hard won by his men. (A questionable decision, as it left many men vulnerable to encirclement by a flanking or pincer movement). Sir Hubert Gough’s army was responsible for holding forty miles of front from the southern end of the Flesquieres salient to La Fere on the River Oise. Gough’s star had been on the rise since the later actions on the Somme until the battles for Passchendaele, where not only his men but also his reputation had taken a battering. His depleted and weary army had been moved south to take over this section of front from the French. Such replacements and reinforcements as he was given were from the volunteer army Divisions, and also he was given three of cavalry, repurposed to makeshift infantry Divisions. Gough was thus expected to hold a much longer section than Byng with fewer (and inferior) forces. This was a conscious decision by Haig – Byng’s section, closer to the Channel ports, was more important to hold. Byng’s army had been in position for more than a year and was well dug in. By contrast, Gough’s unfortunate men inherited rather meagre ‘attack’ trenches from the French and had to start their defensive preparations from scratch.

Haig and his staff had a hectic three months during which they had to re-organise and restructure depleted divisions, but also switch from attacking to defensive formations. They had learned something from the German innovations, and determined to create a zonal defence system along the whole of their front (although they could not hope to match the sophistication of the the German defences). The front line trenches formed the “Blue Line’ at the front edge of a Forward Zone, and they were lightly held (relatively). Behind them were machine gun nests, and deep in the Forward Zone were heavily armed redoubts and battalion command positions. Some way behind the Forward Zone lay the main Battle Zone, and between the Zones was placed light artillery. The gap between the Zones varied along the front, but was such that the artillery could be withdrawn into the Battle Zone if necessary. Barbed wired protect the front of the Battle Zone; then came trenches named the Red Line. As per the Forward Zone, behind the trenches were redoubts and battalion positions. The Battle Zone was the most populated and was the core of the British defensive mind set. A third line, including the Brown Line of trenches was planned to the rear of the Battle Zone, in front of the reserves, field casualty stations and HQs etc. However, in most places this zone was partially completed at best. In Gough’s section, despite their valiant efforts, even the Battle Zone was far from finished when the hostilities commenced.

Ludendorff had been anxious to launch Operation Michael as soon as possible, in February. Such was the complexity and intensity of preparation that Prince Rupprecht pleaded, successfully, for a delay to 1^st March. Weather conditions then supervened (as they had with Haig so often before) and 21^st March was finally agreed upon. Diversionary attacks, particularly around Verdun, maintained the uncertainty, but the last few days for both sides brought an air of ‘unnatural calmness’. It was a calm before the perfect storm. Around one million German troops with more than ten thousand artillery pieces were ready to break.

  

*Its scope was huge compared with the British and French 1916 Somme offensive along a 16 miles front.