Strangely, the
increasing toll taken on both sides meant that the decisive 12th
Battle of the Isonzo, better known as Caporetto, was completely different to
the preceding eleven. The results of the artillery barrages of 10 and 11 had put
the Italians across the Isonzo in the south, and on to the plains of Bainsizza
and the Carso. But the efforts had exhausted the Italian armies, while the
Austrian army under Borosevic was so weakened that he believed his only chance
lay in a last desperate counter offensive.
Italians rounded up as prisoners at Caporetto |
In fact, Caporetto
presaged the strategic change on the Western Front. In Isonzo 1-11 (as in every
major Western Front action from Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 to Third Ypres)the
pattern had been of Allied bombardment followed by the infantry throwing
themselves against the well formed defences of the Central Powers. Ludendorff
soon recognised the opportunity, provided by the collapse of the Russian front,
to change the game. A combination of innovation in tactics and technology,
linked with the weakness and exhaustion of the combatants made it possible.
Much of the German army’s activity in the summer of 1917 was focused on the
tactics – those of shock troops supported by rapid deployment of reserves; of gas attacks rather than prolonged opening bombardments. In summary, surprise
rather than pulverisation. They were often known as ‘Hutier tactics’, after the
General who first employed them in the capture of Riga in September 917, but he
could not claim to have invented them.
Ludendorff, apparently
the source of the ‘shackled to a corpse’ disparagement of Austria in 1915, was
not keen to launch his new tactics in an Austrian cause, but on this occasion Hindenburg
overruled him, and resolved to give German support to Austria’s hopes to knock Italy
out of the war.
In October 1917 Italy was in a precarious
state – economically, politically and militarily. Her population was worn down
by the heavy losses – and hungry. In several cities there was unrest,
particularly in Turin, the centre of armaments production. Sedition and
propaganda caused a turmoil with riots in August 1917, superficially over bread
shortages, but for much deeper reasons. Turin was declared a warzone under
martial law, and many of the able bodied men were conscripted into battalions
and sent, with no training, to the front near….... Caporetto.
The Italian government was struggling to
retain its authority as a loose coalition. Its pacifist sections had been
strengthened by a widely issued peace note from the Vatican in 1917 – much more
influential in Italy than in other belligerent country. The Prime Minister
Boselli was under attack from all sides, and would not survive the initial
shock reactions to Caporetto.
The Italian army was exhausted and
depleted. The Isonzo front was held mostly by Capello’s shattered 2nd
army, with d’Aosta’s 3rd holding the southern section from the Carso
to the sea (See Post 16/9/2017). Italian casualties from the 10th
Isonzo battle outnumbered the total for first nine, and losses in the 11th
were even worse than the 10th. The situation was desperate, but
Cadorna, the Commander-in-Chief, accommodate miles behind the front line,
continued his merciless approach, which was to do little more than issue
strident orders, blaming his officers and men for every failure. He was hated,
and the men’s morale was at rock bottom.
German preparations, carried out with
their customary efficiency and stealth, brought several Divisions trained in
Hutier tactics and two Divisions of crack Alpine troops. More importantly they
took over military command of operations. General Otto von Below was moved from
the western Front to take control from the Austrian High Command (including the
wretched von Hotzendorf). Below planned for surprise by selecting the upper
Isonzo as his breakthrough point, rather than south of Tolmino nearer to the
plains.
Italian intelligence was weak, and
consequently their preparations were poor. Some rumours of German involvement
reached Cadorna but he felt it more likely they would head for the Trentino
region than the Isonzo. He kept most of his artillery in the south Isonzo
front, leaving the upper reaches more vulnerable to attack.
The onslaught began on 24th
October 1917. Below ordered initial infantry attacks along the whole 60 miles front, but he was concentrating on three sites between Tolmino and Saga
in the mountains to make his breakthrough. The town of Caporetto was the middle
of these, and it was the first to give way. Stunned and terrified by the speed
of advance and the gas attacks, the Italians in Caporetto panicked, and either
surrendered or fled in huge numbers. Within hours, thousands of Below’s men had
poured through the widening gap and were surrounding defenders on the higher
ground positions west of the river. Within two days the crucial Monte Maggiore
defensive line had been passed, and Capello’s army was in full retreat on the
plains to Udine, pursued by, among others, a certain Erwin Rommel.
On 28th came the crisis that
reverberated throughout the allied countries. Von Below had taken Udine and was
heading across the plain to the River Tagliamento the next great natural
barrier (see Map). Up to this point, the Duke d’Aosta’s 3rd army had
performed well, and held its positions on the plains east of Gorizia. But Below’s
rapid progress towards the Tagliamento brought the risk of isolation beyond
communication lines. An urgent retreat to the Tagliamento was begun, and on
that day Gorizia, so hard won, was abandoned. Somehow, the nightmare retreat
was managed. Buchan’s graphic account “For
a moment it seemed that the Duke of Aosta would share the fate of Capello. A
million of men were retreating along the western highways, encumbered with
batteries and hospitals and transport, while by every choked route peasants and
townsmen fled for refuge from the Austrian cavalry. Units lost discipline,
orders miscarried, roads were blocked for hours, and all the while down from
the north came the menace of Below, swooping southward to cut off all retreat.
There had been nothing like it before in the campaign, not even in the Russian
debacle of 1915, for then there had been great open spaces to move in.”
The 3rd army (most of it) just won the race to its river crossings.
By 31st October they had crossed to support the temporary line of
the 2nd army, strung out northwards on the right bank of the Tagliamento. D’Aosta’s rear-guard troops
and masses of equipment were cut off and captured.
The first news of the Caporetto
breakthrough had reached the Allies on 26th October, and the British
and French governments at once agreed to send five Divisions each to support
the defence of Italy’s front. The British force would be led by Plumer, their
best general, but it would take time to get there.
Cadorna realised that the Tagliamento line
could not be held, and that a more extensive withdrawal would be necessary. The
best defensive positions were to be found behind the River Adige, nearly one
hundred miles back, but such a move would concede Venice and with it control of
the north Adriatic Sea. Instead, the right bank of the River Piave, 30-50 miles
back, was selected. Here the upper reaches were vulnerable, and it would be
necessary to pull back the 4th Army of de Robilant to the line of
the river, so it would form a link between the remnants of the 2nd
army on its right, and the 1st army, currently facing the Austrians
on the Asiago plateau, on its left (see Map, and post 3/11/2016).
Through early November the plan was
executed with determination and skill. On 7th November final
positions on the Tagliamento were relinquished, and by 10th a new line
had been achieved. This retrenchment, allied to the actions of a new
Government, led by Vittorio Orlando, restored some pride and a new sense of
national unity. This was timely, as serious attempts were being made by the
Austrians to break the new line. In this critical phase many gallant defensive
actions were fought, upstream from the important town of Montello and the high
ground of Monte Grappa between the Piave and Brenta rivers (see Map). De
Robilant led his troops brilliantly, even though many of them were raw reserves
or new recruits. Attempts further south by Borosevic to break through to Venice
were repulsed.
Vittorio Orlando The new PM helped turn around Italy's prospects in late 1917. |
Cadorna was finally sacked, being replaced
by Diaz, and in early December a significant conference took place in Rapallo,
northern Italy. The senior leaders there - Lloyd George and the new French and
Italian Prime Ministers (Painlevé and Orlando) - took firm steps towards creation
of the Allied Council at Versailles and a unified military command (Ferdinand
Foch, who would be the first supreme commander, was also present).
In December, the British and French
Divisions took their place alongside the Italian 4th Army in the
Montello sector. Von Below and his senior officers were recalled to the Western
Front for planning purposes, and the immediate danger had passed.
So, from the disaster – desertion and
humiliation – at Caporetto arose a new national unity in response, and a
magnificent defence of the new line under its new Command. Italy’s losses were
officially estimated at 800,000 ‘effectives’ (10,000 dead; 30,000 wounded;
265,00 prisoners; 350,000 missing and deserters, and 150,000 sick). She had all
but collapsed, which might haver brought a premature overall defeat for the
Allies. A close run thing.
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