A German map of the Cambrai battlefield |
Among the war weary belligerents of late
1917 there was an eager search for new approaches, different tactics,
breakthrough – above all for surprise. The Germans had taken advantage on the
chaos on the eastern Front to develop their ‘Hutier’ tactics. For those unaware
of the first success of these at the capture of Riga in September, the news now
reaching the Allies of the Italian collapse at Caporetto, brought the first
evidence (see previous post 13/11/2017). At the same time the very worst
example of relentless slaughter by attrition was continuing at Ypres, as the
Empire troops inched their way towards Passchendaele.
On 29th October, Lloyd George
addressed the British Parliament on the need for such a breakthrough, just as news
from Caporetto was arriving alongside Haig’s exaggerated claims of progress in
Flanders. Yet, only a week before Haig himself had approved a plan
demonstrating Britain’s willingness to innovate. Sir Julian Byng, now C-in-C of
the 3rd Army at the southern end of the British sector (and
successor to Allenby who had been transferred to the Middle East (see Post 23/7/2017))
had submitted a bold plan to Haig in September. Byng had done well in the
Battle of Arras, culminating in the Canadians capture of Vimy Ridge. He wanted
the British to capitalise on the favourable terrain they now held in order to
use the British equivalent to ‘Hutier tactics’ – the tank. Now, the tank’s
record to date was not unblemished. After a striking debut in the Somme battles
(some said too little, too soon – see post 18/8/2016) the tanks had proved
mechanically unreliable, and currently were underperforming in the muddy morass
of Flanders. Byng argued that the latest, improved tanks deserved a chance over
better terrain. He proposed an attack on Cambrai*, a town that had come into
play since the German strategic withdrawal to the Siegfried Line (see Post
18/4/2017). He argued the following in support: the advance to the Siegfried
Line had allowed some ground cover for the British line, particularly in the
trees of Havrincourt Wood where tank build up could be concealed; the ground
to be attacked was open and relatively dry; the German defences although strong
were (relatively) undermanned, and Cambrai itself was an important hub for
German movement of forces behind their front line.
Thus, a novel proposal to break the new
German defensive line. However, the consent from Haig, when it came, was rather
predictable. As usual he overestimated the possibilities, and revived his dream
of a cavalry breakthrough to open country behind the lines. He preferred to push north of Cambrai to high
ground. This, despite the knowledge that his reserves were weak – many of them
still bogged down at Ypres – and his men must necessarily come under strong
counter-attacks within 2-3 days when German reinforcements arrived. Haig was
becoming Micawber like in his desperation for a break through.
Byng prepared his assault along a six mile
front from just north of the Bapaume (Roman) road south-eastwards to Gonnelieu
and Vendhuille (see map). He had six infantry Divisions and nearly 500 tanks.
He hid the latter wherever he could find suitable shelter, with the majority in
the welcome cover of Havrincourt Wood (On the Somme battlefields barely a tree
stump remained, but this area had not yet been torn to shreds). Secrecy was
essential, and British air superiority and misty autumn weather helped to
preserve it to a remarkable degree. The plan was for the tanks to cut through
the intimidating barbed wire barriers – no less than 50m wide on any part of
the 6 miles – with the infantry following close behind, all of them being
protected by a creeping artillery barrage. The 115,000 men of Byng’s divisions
outnumbered the defenders by nearly two to one, but even after the barbed wire
they would still have to overcome the Siegfried line and a second line that was
heavily tunneled.
Communication trench to the front line - Cambrai 1917 |
At 6.20am on 20th November came
a solitary shot that was the signal for the advance. There had been no
pre-bombardment, but the creeping barrage started within minutes. The surprise
element prospered. Within four hours the central section had overwhelmed the
Siegfried line and was battling in the tunnels of the second line. Flesquières and Ribaucourt were taken by the stars of the day the 62nd
Division. Just to the south, Marcoing and Neuf Wood fell to the tanks of the 29th
Division; pushing through a gap created by the first wave. Even the Cavalry got
in on the act, and were pushing north ahead of the infantry to capture Anneux
and Cantaing. Unfortunately they could not get across the canal at Masnières, a vital crossing. However, the advance of the British on that
first day was their greatest in a single day of the war to date. When news reached London,
church bells were rung across the country for the first time since 1914. On the
21st the cavalry were still in play, but the essential targets of
the Bourlon ridge in the north, and the canal crossings in the centre at
Rumilly and Crevecoeur could not be forced.
Tanks made life easier for the Infantry on Day 1 |
By the third day, all effects of surprise
were gone, as had the chances for a cavalry coup. Inevitably, German
reinforcements were pouring into the area. Haig faced a decision to order Byng
to press on, or pull back to a defensible position. Inevitably, he chose the
former, and most of the battle’s 45,000 British casualties occurred in the next
few days of brutal combat. By the 27th, one week in, the British had
captured some 10,000 prisoners of war, and nearly 150 heavy guns. They had
gained ground over a rectangular salient ten miles wide and six miles deep. But
the men were exhausted, and vulnerable to counter attacks.
On 29th Marwitz, C-in-C of the
German II Army, issued a rallying cry to his men to reverse the gains and “turn their embryonic victory into a defeat
by an encircling attack”. The next morning at 7.30am the Germans surged on
to both flanks of the British salient, employing storm troopers and gas attacks
and overwhelming the improvised British defences. It was only a heroic defensive
action in the centre by men of the 29th Division (who had also
performed with distinction at Gallipoli and at the Somme) that prevented a
rout. By the evening the 29th had managed a staged withdrawal from
Masnières to la Vacqerie, linking with the
British line on either side to form some sort of defensive front. Both sides
were now exhausted, and after two further days of inconclusive local actions
Haig bowed to the inevitable and shortened his line by drawing back from the
Bourlon ridge areas, for which the men had fought so hard.
By 7th December the withdrawal
had been achieved and the battle for Cambrai was over. The British held around
one quarter of the area they had gained on days 1-3 – on a line from Flesquières to Ribecourt. At the northern end they were back at their
starting point, and to the south of Gonnelieu they had actually been pushed
back beyond their starting line by up to a mile.
The Battle of Cambrai was over by 8th
December. Militarily it must be judged a score draw. Both sides had around
45.000 casualties. The British tanks had demonstrated their ability to break
through the enemy’s strongest defence lines. But their lack of reserves and follow up resources (the
cavalry were not quite up to it) enabled the Germans to respond devastatingly with
their own innovations. It was a bittersweet ending to the last major action on
the Western Front in 1917. The church bells had rung, but not for long.
* Cambrai was a
historically important junction. A Roman road to the west linked to Bapaume 16
miles away (the strategic aim of the Somme campaign) and another to the east to
Le Cateau (15 miles), the place of 2 Corps heroic stand on the Great Retreat in
1914)
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