Cambrai

A German map of the Cambrai battlefield

Among the war weary belligerents of late 1917 there was an eager search for new approaches, different tactics, breakthrough – above all for surprise. The Germans had taken advantage on the chaos on the eastern Front to develop their ‘Hutier’ tactics. For those unaware of the first success of these at the capture of Riga in September, the news now reaching the Allies of the Italian collapse at Caporetto, brought the first evidence (see previous post 13/11/2017). At the same time the very worst example of relentless slaughter by attrition was continuing at Ypres, as the Empire troops inched their way towards Passchendaele.

On 29^th October, Lloyd George addressed the British Parliament on the need for such a breakthrough, just as news from Caporetto was arriving alongside Haig’s exaggerated claims of progress in Flanders. Yet, only a week before Haig himself had approved a plan demonstrating Britain’s willingness to innovate. Sir Julian Byng, now C-in-C of the 3^rd Army at the southern end of the British sector (and successor to Allenby who had been transferred to the Middle East (see Post 23/7/2017)) had submitted a bold plan to Haig in September. Byng had done well in the Battle of Arras, culminating in the Canadians capture of Vimy Ridge. He wanted the British to capitalise on the favourable terrain they now held in order to use the British equivalent to ‘Hutier tactics’ – the tank. Now, the tank’s record to date was not unblemished. After a striking debut in the Somme battles (some said too little, too soon – see post 18/8/2016) the tanks had proved mechanically unreliable, and currently were underperforming in the muddy morass of Flanders. Byng argued that the latest, improved tanks deserved a chance over better terrain. He proposed an attack on Cambrai*, a town that had come into play since the German strategic withdrawal to the Siegfried Line (see Post 18/4/2017). He argued the following in support: the advance to the Siegfried Line had allowed some ground cover for the British line, particularly in the trees of Havrincourt Wood where tank build up could be concealed; the ground to be attacked was open and relatively dry; the German defences although strong were (relatively) undermanned, and Cambrai itself was an important hub for German movement of forces behind their front line.

Thus, a novel proposal to break the new German defensive line. However, the consent from Haig, when it came, was rather predictable. As usual he overestimated the possibilities, and revived his dream of a cavalry breakthrough to open country behind the lines.  He preferred to push north of Cambrai to high ground. This, despite the knowledge that his reserves were weak – many of them still bogged down at Ypres – and his men must necessarily come under strong counter-attacks within 2-3 days when German reinforcements arrived. Haig was becoming Micawber like in his desperation for a break through.

Byng prepared his assault along a six mile front from just north of the Bapaume (Roman) road south-eastwards to Gonnelieu and Vendhuille (see map). He had six infantry Divisions and nearly 500 tanks. He hid the latter wherever he could find suitable shelter, with the majority in the welcome cover of Havrincourt Wood (On the Somme battlefields barely a tree stump remained, but this area had not yet been torn to shreds). Secrecy was essential, and British air superiority and misty autumn weather helped to preserve it to a remarkable degree. The plan was for the tanks to cut through the intimidating barbed wire barriers – no less than 50m wide on any part of the 6 miles – with the infantry following close behind, all of them being protected by a creeping artillery barrage. The 115,000 men of Byng’s divisions outnumbered the defenders by nearly two to one, but even after the barbed wire they would still have to overcome the Siegfried line and a second line that was heavily tunneled.

Communication trench to the
front line - Cambrai 1917

At 6.20am on 20^th November came a solitary shot that was the signal for the advance. There had been no pre-bombardment, but the creeping barrage started within minutes. The surprise element prospered. Within four hours the central section had overwhelmed the Siegfried line and was battling in the tunnels of the second line. Flesquières and Ribaucourt were taken by the stars of the day the 62^nd Division. Just to the south, Marcoing and Neuf Wood fell to the tanks of the 29^th Division; pushing through a gap created by the first wave. Even the Cavalry got in on the act, and were pushing north ahead of the infantry to capture Anneux and Cantaing. Unfortunately they could not get across the canal at Masnières, a vital crossing. However, the advance of the British on that first day was their greatest in a single day of the war to date. When news reached London, church bells were rung across the country for the first time since 1914. On the 21^st the cavalry were still in play, but the essential targets of the Bourlon ridge in the north, and the canal crossings in the centre at Rumilly and Crevecoeur could not be forced.

Tanks made life easier for the Infantry on Day 1

By the third day, all effects of surprise were gone, as had the chances for a cavalry coup. Inevitably, German reinforcements were pouring into the area. Haig faced a decision to order Byng to press on, or pull back to a defensible position. Inevitably, he chose the former, and most of the battle’s 45,000 British casualties occurred in the next few days of brutal combat. By the 27^th, one week in, the British had captured some 10,000 prisoners of war, and nearly 150 heavy guns. They had gained ground over a rectangular salient ten miles wide and six miles deep. But the men were exhausted, and vulnerable to counter attacks.

On 29^th Marwitz, C-in-C of the German II Army, issued a rallying cry to his men to reverse the gains and “turn their embryonic victory into a defeat by an encircling attack”. The next morning at 7.30am the Germans surged on to both flanks of the British salient, employing storm troopers and gas attacks and overwhelming the improvised British defences. It was only a heroic defensive action in the centre by men of the 29^th Division (who had also performed with distinction at Gallipoli and at the Somme) that prevented a rout. By the evening the 29^th had managed a staged withdrawal from Masnières to la Vacqerie, linking with the British line on either side to form some sort of defensive front. Both sides were now exhausted, and after two further days of inconclusive local actions Haig bowed to the inevitable and shortened his line by drawing back from the Bourlon ridge areas, for which the men had fought so hard.

By 7^th December the withdrawal had been achieved and the battle for Cambrai was over. The British held around one quarter of the area they had gained on days 1-3 – on a line from Flesquières to Ribecourt. At the northern end they were back at their starting point, and to the south of Gonnelieu they had actually been pushed back beyond their starting line by up to a mile.

The Battle of Cambrai was over by 8^th December. Militarily it must be judged a score draw. Both sides had around 45.000 casualties. The British tanks had demonstrated their ability to break through the enemy’s strongest defence lines. But their  lack of reserves and follow up resources (the cavalry were not quite up to it) enabled the Germans to respond devastatingly with their own innovations. It was a bittersweet ending to the last major action on the Western Front in 1917. The church bells had rung, but not for long.

* Cambrai was a historically important junction. A Roman road to the west linked to Bapaume 16 miles away (the strategic aim of the Somme campaign) and another to the east to Le Cateau (15 miles), the place of 2 Corps heroic stand on the Great Retreat in 1914)

Caporetto

Strangely, the increasing toll taken on both sides meant that the decisive 12^th Battle of the Isonzo, better known as Caporetto, was completely different to the preceding eleven. The results of the artillery barrages of 10 and 11 had put the Italians across the Isonzo in the south, and on to the plains of Bainsizza and the Carso. But the efforts had exhausted the Italian armies, while the Austrian army under Borosevic was so weakened that he believed his only chance lay in a last desperate counter offensive.

Italians rounded up as prisoners
at Caporetto

In fact, Caporetto presaged the strategic change on the Western Front. In Isonzo 1-11 (as in every major Western Front action from Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 to Third Ypres)the pattern had been of Allied bombardment followed by the infantry throwing themselves against the well formed defences of the Central Powers. Ludendorff soon recognised the opportunity, provided by the collapse of the Russian front, to change the game. A combination of innovation in tactics and technology, linked with the weakness and exhaustion of the combatants made it possible. Much of the German army’s activity in the summer of 1917 was focused on the tactics – those of shock troops supported by rapid deployment of reserves; of gas attacks rather than prolonged opening bombardments. In summary, surprise rather than pulverisation. They were often known as ‘Hutier tactics’, after the General who first employed them in the capture of Riga in September 917, but he could not claim to have invented them.

Ludendorff, apparently the source of the ‘shackled to a corpse’ disparagement of Austria in 1915, was not keen to launch his new tactics in an Austrian cause, but on this occasion Hindenburg overruled him, and resolved to give German support to Austria’s hopes to knock Italy out of the war.

In October 1917 Italy was in a precarious state – economically, politically and militarily. Her population was worn down by the heavy losses – and hungry. In several cities there was unrest, particularly in Turin, the centre of armaments production. Sedition and propaganda caused a turmoil with riots in August 1917, superficially over bread shortages, but for much deeper reasons. Turin was declared a warzone under martial law, and many of the able bodied men were conscripted into battalions and sent, with no training, to the front near….... Caporetto.

The Italian government was struggling to retain its authority as a loose coalition. Its pacifist sections had been strengthened by a widely issued peace note from the Vatican in 1917 – much more influential in Italy than in other belligerent country. The Prime Minister Boselli was under attack from all sides, and would not survive the initial shock reactions to Caporetto.

The Italian army was exhausted and depleted. The Isonzo front was held mostly by Capello’s shattered 2^nd army, with d’Aosta’s 3^rd holding the southern section from the Carso to the sea (See Post 16/9/2017). Italian casualties from the 10^th Isonzo battle outnumbered the total for first nine, and losses in the 11^th were even worse than the 10^th. The situation was desperate, but Cadorna, the Commander-in-Chief, accommodate miles behind the front line, continued his merciless approach, which was to do little more than issue strident orders, blaming his officers and men for every failure. He was hated, and the men’s morale was at rock bottom.

German preparations, carried out with their customary efficiency and stealth, brought several Divisions trained in Hutier tactics and two Divisions of crack Alpine troops. More importantly they took over military command of operations. General Otto von Below was moved from the western Front to take control from the Austrian High Command (including the wretched von Hotzendorf). Below planned for surprise by selecting the upper Isonzo as his breakthrough point, rather than south of Tolmino nearer to the plains.

Italian intelligence was weak, and consequently their preparations were poor. Some rumours of German involvement reached Cadorna but he felt it more likely they would head for the Trentino region than the Isonzo. He kept most of his artillery in the south Isonzo front, leaving the upper reaches more vulnerable to attack.

The Caporetto Disaster. Everything between the Isonzo front in the East and the River Piave to
the West was conceded to the Austrians (with a little help form the Germans).
(Modified from Liddell Hart's 'History of the First World War) 

The onslaught began on 24^th October 1917. Below ordered initial infantry attacks along the whole 60 miles front, but he was concentrating on three sites between Tolmino and Saga in the mountains to make his breakthrough. The town of Caporetto was the middle of these, and it was the first to give way. Stunned and terrified by the speed of advance and the gas attacks, the Italians in Caporetto panicked, and either surrendered or fled in huge numbers. Within hours, thousands of Below’s men had poured through the widening gap and were surrounding defenders on the higher ground positions west of the river. Within two days the crucial Monte Maggiore defensive line had been passed, and Capello’s army was in full retreat on the plains to Udine, pursued by, among others, a certain Erwin Rommel.

On 28^th came the crisis that reverberated throughout the allied countries. Von Below had taken Udine and was heading across the plain to the River Tagliamento the next great natural barrier (see Map). Up to this point, the Duke d’Aosta’s 3^rd army had performed well, and held its positions on the plains east of Gorizia. But Below’s rapid progress towards the Tagliamento brought the risk of isolation beyond communication lines. An urgent retreat to the Tagliamento was begun, and on that day Gorizia, so hard won, was abandoned. Somehow, the nightmare retreat was managed. Buchan’s graphic account “For a moment it seemed that the Duke of Aosta would share the fate of Capello. A million of men were retreating along the western highways, encumbered with batteries and hospitals and transport, while by every choked route peasants and townsmen fled for refuge from the Austrian cavalry. Units lost discipline, orders miscarried, roads were blocked for hours, and all the while down from the north came the menace of Below, swooping southward to cut off all retreat. There had been nothing like it before in the campaign, not even in the Russian debacle of 1915, for then there had been great open spaces to move in.” The 3^rd army (most of it) just won the race to its river crossings. By 31^st October they had crossed to support the temporary line of the 2^nd army, strung out northwards on the right bank of the Tagliamento. D’Aosta’s rear-guard troops and masses of equipment were cut off and captured.

The first news of the Caporetto breakthrough had reached the Allies on 26^th October, and the British and French governments at once agreed to send five Divisions each to support the defence of Italy’s front. The British force would be led by Plumer, their best general, but it would take time to get there.

Cadorna realised that the Tagliamento line could not be held, and that a more extensive withdrawal would be necessary. The best defensive positions were to be found behind the River Adige, nearly one hundred miles back, but such a move would concede Venice and with it control of the north Adriatic Sea. Instead, the right bank of the River Piave, 30-50 miles back, was selected. Here the upper reaches were vulnerable, and it would be necessary to pull back the 4^th Army of de Robilant to the line of the river, so it would form a link between the remnants of the 2^nd army on its right, and the 1st army, currently facing the Austrians on the Asiago plateau, on its left (see Map, and post 3/11/2016).

Through early November the plan was executed with determination and skill. On 7^th November final positions on the Tagliamento were relinquished, and by 10^th a new line had been achieved. This retrenchment, allied to the actions of a new Government, led by Vittorio Orlando, restored some pride and a new sense of national unity. This was timely, as serious attempts were being made by the Austrians to break the new line. In this critical phase many gallant defensive actions were fought, upstream from the important town of Montello and the high ground of Monte Grappa between the Piave and Brenta rivers (see Map). De Robilant led his troops brilliantly, even though many of them were raw reserves or new recruits. Attempts further south by Borosevic to break through to Venice were repulsed.

Vittorio Orlando
The new PM helped turn around
Italy's prospects in late 1917.

Cadorna was finally sacked, being replaced by Diaz, and in early December a significant conference took place in Rapallo, northern Italy. The senior leaders there - Lloyd George and the new French and Italian Prime Ministers (Painlevé and Orlando) - took firm steps towards creation of the Allied Council at Versailles and a unified military command (Ferdinand Foch, who would be the first supreme commander, was also present).

In December, the British and French Divisions took their place alongside the Italian 4^th Army in the Montello sector. Von Below and his senior officers were recalled to the Western Front for planning purposes, and the immediate danger had passed.

So, from the disaster – desertion and humiliation – at Caporetto arose a new national unity in response, and a magnificent defence of the new line under its new Command. Italy’s losses were officially estimated at 800,000 ‘effectives’ (10,000 dead; 30,000 wounded; 265,00 prisoners; 350,000 missing and deserters, and 150,000 sick). She had all but collapsed, which might haver brought a premature overall defeat for the Allies. A close run thing.

The Czech Legion 1

Europe 1919 - the new order

One of the reasons that WW1 has always absorbed me is the influence of its outcomes on the map of the world that we live in today (let alone their direct causation of WW2). The dismantling of four of the six great empires involved – German; Austro-Hungarian; Ottoman and Russian – created numerous new states. The list is a long one – countries of the Middle East, Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia and Turkey included – but of all of them Czechoslovakia provides some of the most fascinating stories.

Rewind to 1914, before the Sarajevo assassination. The Habsburg Empire, constituted as the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary since 1867, had been crumbling for years, at a pace almost as fast as its historic rival, the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the need to strike against the multiple disaffected ethnic groups and grumbling nationalist movements was one of the main drivers for Austria’s determination to declare war against Serbia. Austria’s own representative (and toothless) parliament, the Reichsrat (Imperial Council) had been disrupted for several years by the tactics of the various nationalist groups. Foremost among them were the Bohemian (Czech) nationalists. During the July crisis of 1914 the Reichsrat was suspended and would not reconvene for over three years. The Czech nationalists pursued their cause through different routes, and they would be indebted to two men in particular: Thomas Masaryk - later Founding President of Czechoslovakia - and Edvard Benes - later first Foreign Minister and successor as President to Masaryk. But, on suspension of the Reichsrat statehood for Czechoslovakia (and their own roles) were but distant dreams.

Masaryk - extraordinary man,
incredible life

Thomas Masaryk (Tomàš Garrigue Masaryk 1850-1937) was a truly remarkable man. Born in Bohemia, he studied at Vienna University, gaining a PhD in 1879 on the epidemiology of suicide (surely an enlightened topic for the time). He pursued a dual career, academic and political, and used both to great advantage. He became a Professor of Philosophy at Charles University, Prague, aged only 32. He served two terms as a member of the Reichsrat before its suspension, the second as leader of the Realist Party, which he had founded some years earlier.

When war broke out, Masaryk concluded rapidly that his nationalist sedition would have better chances from exile. In December 1914 he narrowly avoided arrest, and escaped with his eldest daughter from his home in Prague, leaving his long-suffering wife (an American national) to look after the rest of the family. He made his way to Rome, then Geneva, then London via Paris. In London he made a base, but travelled extensively, particularly to North America, building up political support and networks, often under cover of academic lecture tours. He gained a professorship at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London. On his visits to the USA he galvanised the support of large numbers of Czech and Slovak immigrants (reckoned to number as many as 1.5millions) concentrated in Chicago and the Eastern seaboard cities. He won the support of an influential Chicago industrialist, Charles Crane, employer of large numbers of Czechs. Crane would, in time, open the door to Washington for Masaryk.

When WW1 opened in 1914, large numbers of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks were living on the Russian side of Austria-Hungary’s northern border. As Masaryk began his tour in exile, those Czech and Slovak representatives petitioned the Russian Duma to support their cause for an independent state. An offer of voluntary Czech units to fight alongside the Russian army evidenced their sincerity. Their offer was rapidly accepted by the Stavka (military HQ) and a small unit known as the Ceska Druzina (‘Czech companions’ - compare with the ‘Pals’ battalions in England in 1914) was formed and assigned to the 3^rd Russian Army. Masaryk, when he learned of this, saw immediately the political potential to gain support from the Allies for his cause. He urged the Druzina leaders to expand as much as possible, particularly by gaining permission to recruit from the many Czechs among the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war. Initially, the Russian authorities gave permission, but shortly afterwards withdrew it, for ill defined political reasons. The Druzina numbers thus stayed at around 2,500 through 1915-1916, although they established a good reputation for courage and discipline (the latter began to falter badly in the wider Russian army in the latter stages of 1916). They were restructured as the 1^st Czech Rifle Regiment during this time.

Edvard Benes, second only
to Masaryk in Czechoslovakia
creation

All the while, Masaryk was promoting the cause through networks of overt political activities and by covert diplomacy and espionage. Benes created an anti-Austrian resistance movement in Bohemia, the Maffia (sic), before going into exile himself in 1915. He was a constant presence in Paris from 1916-18, where he was secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council – the Czech Government in waiting. Unhappily for him and Masaryk, there was a rival pro-Russian, Tsarist, anti-independence group in Petrograd- the Czech and Slovak National Council, led by Josef Durich, vying for influence within the Druzina.

The February 1917 Revolution in Petrograd changed the situation dramatically. The instability throughout Russia and the Eastern Front had a mixed impact on Masaryk’s cause. On the positive side the new Provisional Government (see Post 23/2/2017) abolished Durich’s Council. Milyukov, one of the PG’s ministers, called for an independent Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the disintegration of the Eastern Front threatened a German crushing of his fledgling national army. He had already moved to Paris to support Benes and to persuade the French of the desirability of his forces fighting alongside the French Army on the Western Front. He needed to back a winning horse, and at that moment the Western Allies were looking stronger. On learning of events in Petrograd, Masaryk resolved to go there as soon as possible to influence actions. His first attempt to travel was foiled when his transport steamer was torpedoed and sunk en route to

Milan Stefanyk.
Slovaks comprised
around 10% of the
Czech Legion

France. He was forced to kick his heels in London for a couple of months, leaving behind Benes and his Slovak counterpart Milan Stefanyk. In May 1917 he left London with a forged British passport in the name of Thomas George Marsden, taking a boat to the remote north of Sweden where he entered Russian Finland via the border town of Haparanda.

Masaryk had spent much time in pre-war Russia and had many well placed contacts there. He found himself in a chaotic and confused environment, but was able to make progress with the Provisional Government on the subject of recruiting prisoners of war for the Druzina. Shortly came the time for the Kerensky offensive of July 1917 (see Post 27/8/2017) – the last throw of the dice for the beaten Russian army. In the overall disaster, the Druzina had its finest moment in the Battle of Zborov, near Lemberg. A force of around 5,000 Czechs overran the trenches and positions of the much greater strength Austro-Hungarian forces (including, ironically, two Bohemian regiments). Set against the other adverse outcomes, this victory strengthened Masaryk’s negotiating position with a now desperate Kerensky, who authorised further recruitment of Czech and Slovak PoWs. He also agreed that Brusilov (now his Chief of Staff) could define the military relationship with Masaryk. Remarkably, “Brusilov agreed to Masaryk’s plans to transform the Druzina into an independent CzechoSlovak corps that would remain militarily under Russian control, but politically under the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. He agreed to their departure to France, and to Masaryk’s demand that his men maintain neutrality inside Russia”*. Masaryk followed up this breath-taking stroke with a hectic tour of the battlefronts and PoW camps to maximise recruitment to what was now named the ‘Czech Legion’.

Equally breath-taking were the plans for transfer of the Legion from the Eastern to the Western Front. By means of the Trans-Siberian Railway, they were to be transported to Vladivostok; thence by sea to Vancouver; across Canada, and then across the Atlantic to France. Needless to say this ambitious plan encountered a number of logistical and political challenges, but these will have to wait until next year. Suffice to say the Czech Legion found itself drawn into the last stages of WW1 in the East; the murders of the Tsar and his family, and the Russian Civil War.

*Dreams of a Great Small Nation. Kevin McNamara p132