Battle of Jutland 8 - The Aftermath.

King George V addresses sailors of the BGF from the deck of
the crippled battleship Warspite after the battle.

We have seen how the German return to home 24hours ahead of the British enabled them to steal a march with their version of events, which quite clearly trumpeted a striking German victory against the British Grand Fleet. This news reached the British government and population before the Admiralty's own official version of events and led to surprise, incomprehension and anger. From the beginning the knives were out for Jellicoe, setting the scene for later bitter disputes. In the short term however a gradual appreciation of the facts beyond the simple totals of ships and men lost brought a reappraisal. In mid June, an American newspaper summarised this with a neat analogy: "The German Fleet has assaulted its jailor, but it is still in jail."  

Jellicoe and the Admiralty fumed at the way the German interpretations warped the public perception of their actions. In June, Jellicoe wrote to his wife:

Of course I am not satisfied, as given clear weather the battle would have been final and there would have been no German Fleet left, whatever happened to us. But that can't be helped. It is ludicrous for the Germans to claim a victory. Victory always rests with the force that occupies the scene of the action, and we did this for the greater part of the next day, until it was quite clear that they had all gone home or as many as were left to go. If they had been so confident of victory they would have tried to go on fighting instead of legging it for home.

The German High Command knew it. In his confidential report on the Battle to the Kaiser in July 1916, Scheer admitted:

Should future operations take a favourable course, we should be able to inflict serious damage upon the enemy. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that even the most successful outcome of a further battle will not force England to make peace.... A victorious end to the war within a reasonable time can only be achieved through the defeat of the British economic life - that is, by using the U-boats against British trade.... It is my duty to advise Your Majesty that in British waters, where American interests are strong, it will be impossible to avoid incidents, however conscientious our commanding officers may be.... "

The passage of time, through the rest of the war and the early post-war years consolidated the view that Scheer, in a fog of uncertainty had ridden his luck and made decisions that allowed his fleet to escape, rather than being the tactical genius portrayed in the German and wider press.  His U-boat and aerial reconnaissance plans had made zero contribution to the battle, and in good visibility his fleet might have been annihilated by the BGF.

The summary naval verdict was best summarised sixty years later by Marder:

 (From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow [1978]) with his judgement that:

"since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, the battle belongs to the series of inconclusive battles or partial victories which are the rule in naval warfare."

Admiral David Beatty - unaccountably
promoted C-in-C after his performance
at Jutland

In Britain however, matters became inflamed post-war with arguments for and against the reputations of Beatty and Jellicoe. Notwithstanding his error strewn performance at Jutland, Beatty was promoted to Commander in Chief of the BGF in late 1916, as Jellicoe stood down on health grounds. In this role Beatty received the surrender of the German Fleet at the war end in 1918, and rapidly became a national hero. After the war a report of the battle was prepared by the Admiralty under First Sea Lord Wemyss, by Sir Julian Corbett and Vice Admiral John Harper. Before the report was published, Beatty was himself appointed First Sea Lord, and immediately requested amendments to the report. (Now) Viscount Jellicoe, posted overseas as Governor General of New Zealand, was forced to defend his position from the other side of the world. When the authors refused to comply with Beatty’s demands, he ordered the report to be destroyed and instead had  an alternative report prepared, which proved highly critical of Jellicoe. Considerable argument broke out as a result, with significant numbers of servicemen disputing the published version, including Admiral Reginald Bacon – a brilliant, if opinionated officer -  who wrote his own book about the battle, criticising both the version sponsored by Beatty and Beatty's own part in the battle. It contains this withering view of Beatty:

Admiral Beatty…failed when an experienced admiral would have succeeded, and his battle cruisers paid dearly for the omission, and the nation missed what should have been an annihilating victory”

However, Beatty remained the dashing Nelsonian hero of the popular press (and hence the man in the street) for many years. Have we got the perspective right now? It seems to me that Beatty was a reckless and vainglorious commander, intolerant of others and quick to apportion blame. Jellicoe’s more measured approach ensured continuing British control of the oceans, making a major contribution to eventual victory – am I wrong? 

Never again would such battle fleets assemble on the high seas. The arrival of air power, better submarines, missiles and above all better communications meant that an event such as Jutland could never be repeated.

Regarding the remainder of WW1, the Jutland outcome had a major impact on German conduct of the war. The British distant blockade of trade bound for Germany continued, and increasing levels of famine began to affect front line soldiers as well as the home population. The dreadful ‘turnip winter’ of 1917-18 brought the civilian population to its knees.

SMS Seydlitz - crippled at Jutland.
Such damage influenced the Germans against
trying a repeat operation.

Scheer’s report was backed by the military, but resisted by the politicians led by Bethmann-Hollweg, the chancellor, until early 1917, when unrestricted U boat warfare was finally resumed, rapidly bringing the USA into the war.

Finally, the morale of the men of the GHSF was destroyed by the outcome of Jutland – cooped up in home ports and the Baltic Sea with no prospect of real action. In late 1918 those men mutinied against orders for a final suicide sortie into the North Sea.

Here was the real outcome of the Battle of Jutland, and Jellicoe’s prudent tactics.