Battle of Jutland 7 - end of the battle

The Jade Estuary, south of Wilhelmshaven.
The GHSF equivalent of Scapa Flow

 Within two hours of sunrise Scheer’s fleet had passed Horn Reef and were in the mined passage back to port. They reached home - the natural harbour of the Jade Estuary at Wilhelmshaven - in early afternoon June 1st and celebrated victory with champagne.

Jellicoe's fleet was more dispersed and had much the longer journeys back to Rosyth and Scapa Flow. Only in this sweeping phase of rounding up straggling smaller ships did Jellicoe, to his shock (and no doubt anger), receive a signal from Beatty informing him of the explosions and sinking of Indefatigible, Queen Mary and Invincible (he was aware of the last of these). On their path home the two damaged British Dreadnoughts Marlborough and Warspite were both attacked by torpedoes, but got home safely. Three of Arbuthnot’s armoured cruisers were lost, Warrior on the journey home. On Friday June 2^nd at midday, Beatty reached Rosyth and shortly afterwards Jellicoe entered Scapa Flow.

The Battle of Jutland was over, and essentially its climax had been the brief reality of engagement between the vanguards of the two greatest fleets ever assembled. The battle that had been anticipated, plotted and prepared for several years was happening right there, and yet within minutes Scheer had managed to elude his much more powerful opponent. The following confused and frenetic activity through the evening and night of 31^st May may have been a strategic anti-climax, but not to those who lived through (or died in) the horrors of the close combat that occurred. On both sides seamanship had generally been of a very high order, whereas for both, communication in all it's forms had been dreadful.

So, was Scheer right in celebrating victory with champagne - a victory that the Kaiser trumpeted world wide the following day? The world wide response to the Kaiser's claims before the Admiralty had released its own statement shocked the British public, confidently expecting a Trafalgar style outcome. It was only with the passage of days and weeks that it became apparent the Britain's control of the North Sea and the oceans had not been influenced by the battle, and the Germans had themselves suffered considerable damage without making a significant advance.

The final tally of losses was:

In men (approx): Britain 6,000 and Germany 2,500. Unlike land warfare the injured totals were only 10-20% of deaths; 700 and 500 respectively.

In ships: Britain 14 - Battle cruisers Indefatigible and Queen Mary and destroyers Nester, Nomad and Shark in Beatty's action v Hipper 14.30-18.00; Battle cruiser Invincible and armoured cruisers Defence and Warrior in the Battle Fleet action 18.15-18.45; and armoured cruiser Black Prince and destroyers Tipperary, Sparrowhawk, Fortune, Ardent and Turbulent  in the night actions and return to port.

              Germany 11 - 2 destroyers in Beatty v Hipper; Battlecruiser Lutzow and light cruiser Wiesbaden in the Battle Fleet action; and pre-Dreadnought Pommern,  3 light cruisers and 3 destroyers in the night actions and return to home ports.

So, in terms of ships and men lost, unquestionably a German victory - althouhh had Beatty not lost 3 battle cruisers to the same technical flaw, the ships lost columns would have been comparable. There were other, probably more important, parameters to consider.

Beatty's Flagship HMS Lion.
Badly damaged at Dogger Bank in 1915
and again at Jutland in 1916

Firstly the damage sustained. Beatty's battle cruisers had suffered badly but of Jellicoe's 28 Dreadnoughts only two - Warspite and Malaya, both in Evan Thomas' QE Squadron sustained serious damage. Of Jellicoe's fleet Marlborough and Colossus were damaged, but none was hit significantly during the main battleship confrontation. German damage was much more severe. Only Moltke of Hipper's five battle cruisers escaped without being crippled, and three of Scheer's 15 Dreadnought battleships were badly damaged.
Secondly, and most tellingly in terms of the war not the battle, was ability to continue. Scheer knew he had escaped with his life and that of his fleet, and that he would not be able to attempt a similar move for several weeks, whereas Jellicoe's Grand Fleet was unharmed and ready to make steam within 24 hours of arriving back at Scapa Flow.

Nevertheless, less than 6 weeks after Jutland Scheer did make another, more modest, sortie. This time it was a plan to bombard Sunderland in the hope of luring the BGF out into a U-boat trap. Via intelligence, the British were aware of this, and sent out some of their own submarine defences plus an intercepting force of Tyrwhitt’s battle cruisers from Harwich. Although there were cruiser losses from torpedo attacks on both sides, misjudgements (again) by both Admirals meant that the battle fleets did not encounter each other, and by the end of the afternoon both forces were steaming back to their bases.

Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt.
On standby for Jutland, he was
a fine sailor who excelled in 1914,
1915 and 1918. 

The early lessons from the battle were there to be seen and acted on:
1. The weakness of armour and design made the British battle cruisers more vulnerable to long distance plunging shellfire.

2. The British turret ammunition hoists were vulnerable to flash explosion down to the magazine with direct hits on the gun turret. Safety features for this known risk had been removed to improved the rapidity of re-loading. (The Germans had learned their lesson after a similar event with Seydlitz at the Dogger Bank action a year earlier, and were better protected.)

3. Shells. British heavy armour penetrating shells were inferior to the Germans’ weight for weight. However, the much greater protection afforded to the newer British battleships would have protected them if the main fleets had engaged fully.

However, the major controversy of Jutland related to tactics, degenerating post-war into a campaign of support for Beatty's 'bravery" and excessive criticism of Jellicoe's conservative approach. Jellicoe's detailed control over his entire fleet, combined with his risk averse approach led to long and continued criticism after the event. His main concern had been the torpedo threat of destroyers and U-boats, and he had given the Admiralty ample warning that his priority would be to protect his Dreadnoughts from torpedo ambush (fully endorsed by the Admiralty). Nevertheless, Churchill cites three clear opportunities to engage Scheer “without increasing risk” of torpedo attack, and other establishment and senior figures rounded on Jellicoe for depriving them of their 'second trafalgar'. There followed a clamour to allow greater initiative to be allowed to flotilla commanders.

More on the aftermath in the next post