Gallipoli 10. The End

Beach Cemetery, ANZAC Cove

At this late stage, the British still felt that they would have to make another offensive against the peninsula, at a minimum to keep Greece and Romania onside. A Calais conference of Allies in July had determined there would be no further major Anglo-French initiative on the Western Front in 1915, but again Joffre was determined to challenge this, and he persuaded the French Government, and subsequently Kitchener, to support his new plan for the largest offensive yet across Artois and Champagne (the British contribution being at Loos, as we have seen). Churchill describes how he protested strongly at this volte face by Kitchener, but the decision was supported. The implications were all too apparent for those tenaciously holding ground on the various beachheads of Gallipoli. They would be left to hold what they had, with minimal supplies and reinforcements, while British resources would be prioritised for France. 

At the same time France, for internal political reasons, decided that a substantial new force of four Divisions under Sarrail - an enemy of Joffre - should be sent to the Eastern Mediterranean either to support Gallipoli from the Asiatic shore, or to land at Salonika. Naturally, Joffre was unhappy about this, but was pressured to agree to the transfer of forces from the West when the outcomes of his own offensive had become clear (‘when’ being a moot point).

It is one more example of policy confusion and inconsistency with respect to Gallipoli, but it seems to have happened independently of the decision on 15th October to relieve Sir Ian Hamilton of his post as Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. As the Government considered the merits of switching forces to Salonika, Hamilton was asked his views on the feasibility of evacuating Gallipoli. His abrupt response - that it would be “politically and strategically wrong, and practically impossible” – earned his recall to London. His replacement, General Sir Charles Monro, was a senior figure, active in France, where he was popular and had led 2^nd Division and 1 Corps with distinction. He was firmly in the ‘decisiveness on the Western Front’ camp. He arrived at the Dardanelles on 28^th October, and within 48 hours had reached a decision that complete evacuation of the peninsula was necessary. His report was shortly received with alarm in London, where it drew the classic Churchillian rebuke “He came, he saw, he capitulated”. Buchan’s view was that no better man could have taken on a near impossible position.

Kitchener, in his political position, (rather than the military role in which he excelled) was now being pushed and pulled from all sides and was feeling the strain. He was troubled by the implications of Monro’s recommendation, which may explain his rapid leap to support yet a different plan presented to him by the intrepid Commodore Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff to Admiral de Robeck in the Dardanelles (Keyes was a dasher, and would reappear heroically in1918). Keyes’ plan (supported by the Deputy Admiral of the Fleet, de Wemyss, but not by de Robeck) was for an audacious forcing of the Straits by the Royal Navy, utilising improved minesweeping abilities, to access the Sea of Marmora and isolate the Turkish army. Kitchener was keen, but telegraphed Birdwood, the senior officer remaining on Gallipoli, that he was coming out there to see for himself evacuation options.

The die had been cast for the ending of Gallipoli, but there were still three months of misery and hardship to be endured. In the words of Churchill “disease and despondency” surrounded those left on the ground. Nevertheless, until the definitive plans for evacuation began, the arguments continued regarding pressing on in Gallipoli versus transferring resources to Salonika to support Serbia. Kitchener left for his visit to Gallipoli on 4^th November, still sympathetic to the ambitious Keyes plan but with the uncertainty of the War Committee (now excluding Churchill) behind him. When he arrived, he found the troops on the ground to be resilient, and capable of fighting on, but his discussions dissuaded him from the Keyes plan. Instead, he and Admiral de Robeck concocted a plan for a new naval landing at Ayas (today Iskenderun at the coastal border of Turkey and Syria). The aim would be to cover an evacuation of Gallipoli, but also forestall any consequent Turko-German response towards Egypt (He was aware that Mackensen’s marauding force, currently in Serbia, was  popularly known in Germany as the ‘Army of Egypt’). However, his new plan was not well received in London – by the Admiralty or the War Committee. These decisions proved the final straw for Churchill, who resigned from the Government. They also weakened further Kitchener’s own authority. He returned to London on 30^th November and offered his resignation but it was not accepted.
On 7^th December, the Government decided to evacuate Suvla Bay and the ANZAC beachheads, but to hold Cape Helles for strategic purposes. The winter storms of the Aegean had started and it would be a race against time to get the men away before being precluded from doing so. Late November rains turned trenches into rivers, and when the temperature plummeted men on duty – weeks earlier choking on dust and heat – began to die of exposure and frostbite. Publication of Gallipoli casualties on December 11^th revealed over 100,000 men dead, wounded or missing in the past seven months, but an equivalent number had been evacuated because of disease – predominantly dysentery and paratyphoid.

On 8^th December, Monro issued detailed orders to Birdwood for covert withdrawals from Suvla Bay and ANZAC, as the prelude to evacuation. Over the next two weeks men, supplies and artillery were withdrawn stealthily, at night, whilst keeping up the appearance of day time actions against the Turkish defences. So successful was this approach that by 18-19^thDecember it was possible to evacuate the remaining battalions without loss, leaving behind only booby trapped trenches, spiked equipment and unneeded stores, the last of these providing a giant beach bonfire, set alight as the last boats pulled away. The weather had been kind for two nights, but within hours it broke, unleashing a great storm on deserted Suvla and ANZAC bays.

W Beach Cape Helles 7/1/16, shortly before evacuation.
How did the Turks not realise?

By now it had been decided after all that Cape Helles could not be held against the German heavy artillery now arriving in the Dardanelles area. A similar, but more risky, covert withdrawal would take place from the various Cape Helles beachheads. The Turks either were taken in again, or were themselves exhausted and unable to capitalize on their opportunities. On the nights of 7-8^th January 1916, all forces were evacuated, under somewhat more challenging weather conditions, with only one man wounded.

And so ended the year long Gallipoli saga, or ‘Dardanelles Campaign’. Even in that terminology is the ambivalence regarding naval or land based operation. It should always have been combined. The final irony among many was that in this moment of strategic defeat and humiliation came the Allies most brilliant victory of the entire campaign. Asquith called the successful evacuations an achievement ”without parallel in military or naval history”. Superb planning and implementation under command of Monro, Birdwood, Byng, Davies and de Robeck undoubtedly made it happen. Birdwood in particular should be singled out. He had led the ANZACs from the outset with the same courage and determination shown by his men, and he was there with them at the death of the campaign.

This final chapter was, however, no compensation for Britain’s worst experience of the war to date.