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| The course of the Vistula from the Carpathians to the Baltic, at Gdansk |
After their humiliation at Tannenberg, what a glittering prize the taking of Cracow and an advance into German Silesia must have seemed to the Russians. Despite their victories at Lemberg against the sub-standard Austro-Hungarian armies, they had been comprehensively outfought and out thought by the Germans in the north. Not only would such a move now occupy German land and the road to Berlin, it would cut the direct route between Berlin and Vienna. They were egged on by the French, desperate for any actions that would detract from the German effort on the Western Front. Ironically, the threat to Cracow at this point compelled Germany to
make its main advance on Warsaw itself. With similar logic to Prince Nicholas,
Hindenberg saw it also as an ideal winter HQ, but it was his necessity to draw
Russian pressure way from Cracow that precipitated the assault. For a while the wings of the opposing armies were wheeling gigantically clockwise, with the Russians looking to move west and north to threaten Silesia, and the Germans, from their strong positions in the north, looking to move south and west to pressurise and envelop Warsaw - and then through the centre would come some titanic and see-saw battles for the control of Poland. Hindenberg's initial moves towards Warsaw were held off at great cost, and then reversed by the Russians
The course of Poland's great river the Vistula dictated much of the action. From its source in the Carpathians, it winds north eastwards before turning back
north west to run towards Warsaw . The key city of
Ivangorod (today Deblin) fifty miles upstream was the only other crossing point
of note. At Warsaw was the main crossing of the river for central Poland. Most
of the city lay on the west bank, but its main railway station, the nodal point
of the Polish lines was in the suburb of Praga across the river. The other
opportunity to cross the Vistula lay in the narrowed section at Josefov. With a
railway base at Ostroviets a few miles to the west the Germans had a good
launch pad for an attempt.
Sensing the attack through the centre that could ruin his own plans, the Crown Prince pulled all his
forces behind the Vistula and the San (in the south), hence Ivanov’s
significant withdrawal from near to Cracow. He still hoped to counter attack if
the German attempt at Josefov failed.
Hindenberg’s two leading general for the
campaign were Drieffel in the south and Mackensen in the north. On 10th October, Hindenberg’s centre was at Lodz; Dankl was on the left bank of the
Vistula near Sandomierz, and even the Austrian right wing had reach as far as
Tarnow well to the east of Cracow. On 14th the German left was at Plock, on
the Vistula north west of Warsaw; its centre was at Lowicz nearing Warsaw; and
its right between Radom and Ostrevietz. On 15th the battle was joined all along
the line of the Vistula. The fighting was hard, and the progress was slow. The
9th Army under Mackensen drove for two full days to penetrate the
Warsaw defences, and their cavalry appeared in Pruskov, a western suburb 8
miles from the centre. Stubborn resistance came from the Siberian corps,
recently arrived at the front. Rennekampf, who had been reinforced, was able to
strike at the right of Mackensen’s lines from the north in the area of the
river Bzura, and compel it to a defensive orientation east to west, rather than
north south. The battle was now resolved into two separate actions – those of
Mackensen to the north; and Dankl plus the Austrians to the south of the river
Pilitza (a tributary of the Vistula between Warsaw and Ivangorod). Russian
numerical superiority told and they began to drive the Germans into heavy
country on the western side of the Vistula. Through great areas of forest there
were countless small encounters and desperate hand to hand fighting. By the
beginning of November the German front was clearly broken into two sections
either side of the Pilitza. The southern army was retreating towards
Czestochova and Cracow, and the northern group westwards to the line of the
river Warta. They were in serious trouble, and the only continuing success had,
ironically been the Austrians, who in the very south and south east of the
front had moved across the San and re-taken both Jaroslav and Przemysl (though
not for long).
The pendulum was now swinging back, with
Russians pushing hard in every direction, towards the Masurian lakes in the
north west, and back towards Cracow in the south. By 12th November, the Russians had
taken Miechov on the German border, not 20 miles north of Cracow. Dmitrieff’s
advance had continued slowly for another three weeks, and by the end of the
first week of December he was in the suburbs of Cracow at Wielitza, and his
main force was on the line of the river Raba. But on 12th December Dmitrieff heard that the Austrians had taken the key
pass of Dukla through the Carpathians, well to the east. He was again compelled
to fall back from Cracow. Further news confirmed that Austria was retaking the
other main Carpathian passes, and so a major effort was required to address
this, so that by 25th December all Galician
approaches to the Carpathian passes were back in Russian control. However, the
advance on Cracow had been stalled; and the Germans, driven by Mackensen and Ludendorff, saw the
opportunity for yet another counter-attack in the centre, back towards Warsaw.
For all their success, the Russian
position was now a precarious one. Hindenberg had pursued a drastic scorched earth
policy during his retreat, and transport and communications were difficult. Any strong German
counter attack might prove decisive, and the Russians were now attempting to hold a front nearly one
thousand miles long with just 2 million men. There were dozens of points
weakness along the front.
(Buchan) In late Autumn in Poland there come heavy mists which
cover the landscape like a garment. From sunrise to sunset they never break,
and the traveller’s vision is limited to a hundred yards of sodden plain……
In such weather the bolt was launched against Russia’s
right centre
Mackensen started his new counter-attack from inside
German territory. Again they had been saved by their railways, so that they were
able to move rapidly 200,000 men to support the advance. He advanced east and south-east. The German eastern army rapidly
advanced from Thorn in north Poland towards Lodz. Everything came together
there in a huge and complex battle with massive Russian numbers superiority. By
the evening of 16th November, the Germans had broken right through the Russian centre, with a
further critical advance on the 19th across the Piontek causeway between Lodz and Lowicz. They were
almost encircling 150,000 Russians in Lodz, and entering the city.
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| German troops entering Lodz November 1914 |
Buchan: "The situation in the east now corresponded exactly
with the position in the west. The Russians entrenched themselves on a front
against which the enemy’s assault broke in vain. As in Flanders, the severest
fighting was in the north, and along the line of a little river. The Bzura and
the Rawka were indeed the equivalent of the Yser…."
What is known as the second battle for
Warsaw raged for three weeks until Christmas Eve. On this occasion it was less
for the relief of Cracow, than the strategic gain of Warsaw itself. Hindenberg
wanted it as a Christmas present for the Kaiser, but the defence could not be
broken. By Christmas Eve the German attack fizzled out, just as 6 weeks earlier
against Ypres in the west. The winter stalemate had finally arrived.
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