The Brest-Litovsk Conference and Treaty

Leon Trotsky in 1918. started
well at Brest-Litovsk, finished
badly

In the early days following the Bolsheviks seizure of power, their consistent policy of withdrawal from the war rebounded on them rapidly. The ideological stance of the party was that a global proletarian revolution would inspired by their example, and that would soon lead to the laying down of arms by the other main combatant countries. There was indeed much war weariness in each of those countries – Germany, France and Britain – but their leaders had a firmer grip on events than Kerensky’s Provisional Government, and the resources to counter any unrest. In particular the military leadership of Germany (now virtually a dictatorship, as the Kaiser shrunk to bit part player) had no intention of missing out on the new opportunity to exploit the collapse of Russia. This was the non-ideological reality that posed great danger.

Lenin was quick to recognise Russia’s vulnerability to further German invasion. Half of his Bolshevik ruling central committee, led by Bukharin, argued for a revolutionary war by peasants and workers to any German invasion, both to save the revolution and to inspire the global proletariat. Lenin pressed his view that a predominantly peasant army would not be capable of waging war against the might of Germany to protect the revolution. Negotiating peace with Germany was imperative. It would buy time for the Bolshevik party to consolidate its position and to build up its own army, thereby protecting the revolution at home, even if delaying revolution elsewhere. In debate, Lenin’s view prevailed, as usual. However, Bukharin’s group remained strongly opposed and Trotsky – after years in exile working for global revolution – was only grudgingly onside with Lenin’s position. So, Russia’s negotiations with the Central Powers (aka Germany) started from very weak positions – militarily and politically.

The first delegation set out from Petrograd on 16^th November 1917. Brest-Litovsk was a historic but miserable city, largely obliterated by three years of warfare, situated in (today’s) Belarus, close to the (today) Eastern Polish border. For such a complex and delicate mission, the composition of the delegation was unprecedented:  three senior Bolsheviks led by Yoffe, an ally of Trotsky, and an assortment of representative, purely symbolic, revolutionaries – soldiers, sailors, workers, women and peasants. Indeed the peasant was added almost as an afterthought, when Yoffe’s car (en route to Warsaw station) picked up a peasant sheltering from the snow in a roadside hut. Having briefly established the man’s revolutionary credentials, Yoffe added him to the delegation!

On arrival at Brest-Litovsk they found a large group ranged opposite them. Although completely dominated by the Germans, it included political and military representatives also of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, all eager to press the Russians for their own purposes. Despite their protests none of the newly declared independent states of the Baltic, Ukraine or Finland were represented. Poland’s status and wishes were completely ignored.

The first task was to agree an armistice, pending a formal treaty. This was wanted by all those present at the conference, for their own reasons, but Lenin’s ‘Decree on Peace’ had been overoptimistic in expecting the other Allied nations to send delegates, or be interested in an armistice. That was a non-starter. Although spontaneous local ceasefires were occurring along the Russian front, there were no instances recorded anywhere else, and on 3^rd December the Russian delegation reluctantly signed an armistice that was confined to the Russian front and for one month only (Lenin had wanted six months). Two days later, the remaining Rumanian forces at the extreme east of the front were obliged to follow suit. At this point Lenin decided to dispense with Yoffe (and the superfluous revolutionary delegates) and send Trotsky to take over. He urged Trotsky to use his formidable rhetoric and cunning in stalling the peace talks. Trotsky had great success initially with his filibustering, running rings around his opposite number, the German Foreign Secretary and distinguished diplomat Baron von Kuhlmann. By the new year the German Military Command in Berlin (i.e. Ludendorff) was losing patience, and took advantage of the arrival of a Ukraine national delegation at the conference to rack up the pressure on Trotsky. 

Richard von Kuhlmann.
German Foreign Secretary
Tortoise to Trotsky's hare.

Ukrainian independence had been declared in November (see Post 21/12/2017) but Kharkov and eastern Ukraine were being occupied by Russian forces (sound familiar?). Germany and Austria-Hungary, needing Ukraine badly as a vassal state rich in food and industrial resources, were happy to respond positively to requests for support from the Ukrainians. They threatened Trotsky with the annexation of Ukraine as a protectorate unless a peace treaty was signed rapidly. Trotsky called for an adjournment and hurried back to Petrograd to report to Lenin.* A crucial meeting of the Bolshevik central Committee was held on 11^th January 1918, where the three factions fought for their positions. The largest, Bulkarin’s, continued to argue for a revolutionary war against Germany to inspire world revolution. Trotsky, speaking for the second group, supported international revolution, but knew that a peasant army had little chance of resisting the German forces. He coined a slogan “No war, no peace” and suggested Russia should simply walk away from the conference. The smallest group supported Lenin’s demands for immediate signing of peace terms. He argued that delay would worsen the situation, and within a short time the Germans would sweep away the Bolsheviks and their revolution. Faced with defeat in the vote, Lenin was forced to side with Trotsky to avoid (what he saw as) Bukharin’s suicidal proposals.

Trotsky returned to Brest-Litovsk armed with the “No war, no peace” slogan, and instructions to play for more time. Remarkably, he spun things out for three more weeks before Ludendorff sent an ultimatum - either to sign the treaty on offer, or face resumption of the war next day. Trotsky’s bluff was called, but he astounded the conference by announcing that Russia was leaving the war, and would not sign the treaty. With that he left Brest-Litovsk and returned to Petrograd**.

Once the delegates had recovered from the shock, Ludendorff ordered Kuhlmann to announce that Germany and Austria-Hungary would resume hostilities on 18^th February, two days hence. This duly happened, and within five days the invaders had captured up to 150 miles of territory along great sections of the Eastern Front, meeting virtually no resistance.

Now a febrile and panicky session of the Central Committee in Petrograd raged for hours, with resignations threatened from all sides.  At midnight on 21^st February an offer of peace was sent by telegram to Brest-Litovsk. Some last minute appeals to the Allies for support became irrelevant when the German peace terms arrived on 23^rd. They exacted harshly punitive terms (that would rebound on them at Versailles in 1919), demanding all occupied territory, including that gained in the past few days. In effect, Germany was annexing all of  Ukraine, Poland and most of the Baltic states.

Lenin forced through the humiliating vote of acceptance at the Central Committee, winning only with the support of Trotsky. Later on that day the vote was ratified in a stormy meeting of the Soviet executive, by 116 votes to 85. Lenin left the meeting with shouts of ‘Traitor’ and ‘Judas’ ringing in his ears.

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty was finally signed on March 3^rd (the main terms are summarised below). Russian’s humiliation was complete. Within days, fearful of German proximity, Lenin moved the government to Moscow. Within a few months the nightmare of civil war would envelop what remained of Russia.

All the Central Powers gained material advantage from the treaty, but less than they had hoped. For Germany the main advantage was military, handing Ludendorff more resources and flexibility for the planning of his masterstroke on the western Front.

Brest-Litovsk Terms

Kuhlmann finished on top in his duel with Trotsky:

*Bolshevik Russia ceded the Baltic States to Germany (they were to become German vassal states under German rule).

*Russia recognized the independence of Ukraine (to become a vassal state of Germany)

*Russia ceded its province of Kars Oblast in the southern Caucasus to Turkey.

*Reparations (financial) from Russia to Germany would follow later in 1918

Poland was not mentioned in the treaty, as Germans refused to recognize the existence of any Polish representatives.

Russia lost 27% of its arable land; 26% of the railway system; 33% of the manufacturing industries, and 75% of coalfields

* the unfolding of this crisis is described graphically in Figes’ marvellous book The People’s Tragedy pp543-548

** The method in Trotsky’s apparent madness was that he still held out hopes that an attack by Germany on a ‘peaceful’ and defenceless Russia would provoke sufficient outrage in Berlin to trigger an uprising.

Allied Strategic Developments early 1918

The Supreme Allied War Council
meeting atVersailles in 1918

A new year saw the Allies needing to up their game to deal with the concentration of German forces on the Western Front. Previous years' meetings had focused on co-ordination of the Allies own breakthrough, whereas it was now clear that the Allied response in the west would have to be a defensive one. Haig's overoptimistic reports could no longer hide the serious losses and lack of strategic progress in Flanders. Furthermore, throughout 1917 the picture that had slowly and eventually emerged from Russia was a deeply disturbing one. Although wishful thinking had persisted for some months after the February revolution that Russia could remain as a significant partner in the Allied cause, by the end of the year all hopes were gone. The Bolsheviks were being lined up for a punitive armistice (thinly disguised as a Treaty) at Brest-Litovsk, and the Russian army was inactive and in ruins. Another Allied conference to agree on dates and priorities for the 1918 season was clearly not going to be appropriate. Previous posts (see 13/11/2017 and 21/12/2017) described the agreement to establish a Supreme Allied War Council to be based in Versailles, and it was scheduled to hold its first executive meeting on 30th January 1918. The focus would be the Western Front, and the unpalatable news that it might be as late as autumn before significant American forces could bolster the Allied defences there. 

In early January, Lloyd-George took advantage of a speaking engagement with the Trades Unions to re-frame Britain’s objectives for the war. Gone were any references to destruction of the German, Austro-Hungarian or Turkish empires. The objectives were much the same, but stated more positively – restoration of occupied territory in France, Belgium, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France; independence for Poland and for any aspiring nations within Austia-Hungary; and further east Britain wanted to see separate states for Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Arabia. Constantinople would remain the capital of Turkey, but the waters surrounding and the Dardanelle straits should become international. Reparations for war damage would be required, and an international ‘war prevention’ organisation created. Of course, the German government would take little notice of it, but they did pay heed to a similar document issued by the US President Wilson just a few days later. Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’, published on 8^th January were:

·       Open covenants of peace and no secret diplomacy in future

·       Absolute freedom of navigation in peace and war outside territorial waters

·       Removal as far as possible of all economic barriers

·       Adequate guarantees for the reduction of national armaments

·       An absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims, the interests of those peoples concerned having equal weight

·       All Russian territory to be evacuated, and Russia given full opportunity for self-development, the Powers aiding

·       Complete restoration of Belgium, in full and free sovereignty

·       All French territory freed and the wrong done by Prussian in 1871 in the matter of Alsace Lorraine righted

·       Re-adjustment of Italian frontiers on lines of nationality

·       Peoples of Austria-Hungary accorded an opportunity of autonomous development

·       Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro evacuated, Serbia being given access to the sea, and relations of Balkan states settled on lines of allegiance and nationality

·       Non-Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman empire assured of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles to be permanently free to all ships

·       An independent Polish state

·       A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

Wishful thinking? Certainly Wilson’s greatest hope was the fourteenth point – the creation of a League of Nations, to promote democracy, weaken imperial power and preserve peace. Idealistic, as we well know by now, but it received a positive, if disingenuous response from the Chancellors of Germany and Austria-Hungary. They were facing difficult domestic conditions, particularly in Austria, where Vienna was largely incapacitated by unrest and strikes. Both Cernin, for Austria-Hungary, and Hertling, for Germany, gave gushing responses in public statements about the principles, whilst rejecting points concerning territory and nationalist aspirations.

Lloyd-George was also determined to push his own military agenda, rather than listen to Haig, or the increasingly isolated CIGS Sir William Robertson. He chose the Supreme Allied Council meeting in Versailles in late January to do this. Largely due to Lloyd-George’s disruptions, this committee produced (in military aspects) a camel rather than a thoroughbred horse. Predictably, the agenda was dominated by the defensive plan for the Western Front. There was agreement about the need for a unified command, and the majority, including the generals, wants a supremo, generalissimo to take control. Lloyd-George was against this, despite (or perhaps because of) support for it by both Haig and Robertson. He argued successfully for a compromise that in the end suited nobody. A military executive, with Marshall Foch at its head would be allocated a force of thirty Divisions made up from the Allied armies, and have discretion over its deployment as the German plans revealed themselves. This was never likely to be a success, but Lloyd George was not finished. He insisted that the British advance through Mesopotamia and Palestine should not be compromised by shifting resources to France (this at a time when Ludendorff was moving forces from Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey to maximise his strength on the Western Front). Finally he used the meeting to pursue his own domestic agenda. He informed Robinson bluntly of his decision that the senior representative of the British Military on the Council should not be the CIGS, but a separate position. He offered Robertson the choice of either, but not both. Robertson, who believed the opposite, decided to resign - as Lloyd-George must have hoped he would. This neatly ended several differences Lloyd-George had with his CIGS. The most important was an impasse over whether all available British reserves should be transferred to France, as Haig was demanding (more of this in a future episode).  It was hard on Robertson – the first man to rise from the rank of private to the very pinnacle of the British Army. He had laboured unceasingly for the cause for over two years since Kitchener’s fall from favour, and now paid the same price – probably for being too supportive of Douglas Haig and for Lloyd-George’s understandable unwillingness to risk another Passchendaele.

Sir Henry Wilson, the new CIGS
A better fit with Lloyd-George,
he had better political skills than
the soldier's soldier, Robertson.

Sir Henry Wilson, the new CIGS, was much more to Lloyd-George’s taste. At the same time as appointing Wilson as CIGS, Lloyd-George moved Lord Milner within the cabinet, creating the post of Secretary of State for War. He now had two new (and strongly supportive) senior advisers.

Shortly after the dysfunctional Versailles summit, President Wilson made a further contribution, outlining four principles as preconditions for peace. Each dealt with the importance of allowing self determination and peoples’ sovereignty rather than service under the yoke of oppression. More worthy principles. This time the German Chancellor Hertling seemed less interested – probably because Germany had just secured its access to the resources of Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and the Baltic states. More important still, a secret session of the Reichstag held in January had been promised by Ludendorff that Germany was poised for certain and outright victory on the Western Front.  

The Royal Navy in 1918

Nelsonian hero Roger Keyes.
Served with distinction in the Boxer
Rebellion in 1899 and two World Wars

In the early days of 1918 the war position was, in several ways, very different from one year earlier, but in others depressingly familiar. On 2^nd January  the new Air ministry was established in London, and on 4^th January a hospital ship was torpedoed in the English Channel. A fog of revolution and instability covered the Eastern Front, and a winter calm on the Western Front concealed massive German preparations for a coming storm. The British Government was trying to keep the Arabs onside to help its Palestine and Syria campaign, following the shock of the Balfour Declaration in November*, and the British army continued to make steady progress in the middle east. But what was happening at sea?

The post on 3/9/2017 (UUW Part 2) described how by late 1917 Britain had overcome the existential threat posed by UUW, and that of 21/12/2017 (End of 1917 Position: Part 2) covered the change of personnel at the top of the Admiralty. It was tough on Jellicoe, but probably stemmed from the different perceptions of the British Navy and Army held by politicians and public alike. Since Trafalgar in 1805 Britain collectively had rested secure in the primacy and invincibility of the Royal Navy (RN). Even with the late 19^th century build up of Japanese, American and (particularly) German fleets, there remained in 1914 a conviction that the RN could not be challenged. Instead, WW1 had brought initial embarrassments; the unspectacular (though highly effective) blockade of Germany; the indeterminate outcomes of Jutland, and the terrible 1917 merchant losses of UUW. The Army, on the other hand, had been traditionally small, and now its new legions were seen to be fighting heroically against a mighty military machine – albeit with terrible losses.

1918 would at last bring a Nelsonian style operation to warm British hearts ahead of final victory.

The first two actions of 1918 occurred 2000 miles apart. On 14^th January German destroyers (for the third time) bombarded the east coast town of Yarmouth. But in the eastern Mediterranean on 20^th January a symbolic success took place. Go back to the first days of the war in 1914 (see Post 17/2/2015) and the escape of the German battle cruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau across the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. This embarrassingly incompetent episode was the first to reveal how weakened the RN had become after 100+ years of complacency, bureaucracy and nepotism. Now more than three years later, after a war spent in the Black Sea under the Turkish flag (but German command), the two ships re-appeared in the Mediterranean Aegean sea. Early in the morning the British destroyer HMS Lizard spotted them heading for moored British ships in the island harbour of Imbros (today Gokcheada) west of Gallipoli. A brief action ensued, in which two moored British monitors were sunk before the German ships turned away. The Breslau promptly ran into a mine and was sunk. The damaged Goeben was listing, and ran for cover in the Dardanelles, where she ran aground in the narrows. In this case British revenge was certainly a dish enjoyed cold.

Zeebrugge 1918. The grounded Thetis lies beyond
Iphigenia and Intrepid in the canal mouth

The Nelsonian event that lifted the nation took place in April, but had been in planning since November. Its architect was the intrepid Sir Roger Keyes, who had taken command of the Dover Patrol in the 917 re-shuffle. Keyes had shown himself to be a dasher by his courageous actions to date and, in the words of Buchan “he interpreted generously the limits of what was possible for the British sailor”. The targets for action were the two occupied Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. Both provided safe haven for U-boats and proximity to the western approaches of the Atlantic, extending U-boat killing time (provided they could evade the Channel barriers). They also acted as ports for a number of destroyers, such as those that raided Yarmouth on 14^th January. Keyes’s audacious plan was to disable both ports by means of sinking ‘block ships’ in the harbour entrances. Success would push the U-boat havens 300 miles to the east, but was easier said than done. Both ports were heavily fortified and inaccessible to the attackers. Zeebrugge, the larger of the two, was protected by a crescent shaped breakwater, or ‘mole’, carrying a railway track and bristling with defences. The block ships would have to manoeuvre round the mole and position themselves across the canal outlet before scuttling. Immediately before their attempt to do so diversionary attacks would be launched. A bombardment of the mole by offshore destroyers would accompany a landing of marines to take out the buildings on the mole and destroy the railway viaduct linking the mole to land. Ostend was smaller and had no protecting breakwater. Here the task of two block ships was simply to charge in, ram and block the entrance before scuttling. 

After some predictable delays for inclement weather the attacking armada left Dover late evening on 22^nd April. Keyes led the flotilla in the destroyer HMS Warwick and there were two other destroyers; the cruiser HMS Vindictive with two ferry boats for the landing parties and attack on the mole, and an assortment of monitors and smaller boats to make smoke and cause confusion. The stars of the show were the five block ships - old cruisers, full of explosive and weighed down with concrete – three were for Zeebrugge and two for Ostend.

At midnight the diversionary attacks on the mole began, along with aerial attacks and bombardment, and as much smoke as could be generated. All went well for the three block ships initially, as they rounded the lighthouse at the top of the mole. Then, unluckily, the wind changed, the smoke cleared and they were seen. Although most of the mole’s guns had already been put out of action, heavy fire from the shore batteries damaged the first block ship Thetis and grounded her. The two others – Iphigenia and Intrepid – ploughed on, belching smoke with all guns firing, and managed to position themselves near perfectly across the canal entrance before scuttling. The crews escaped in small boats to be picked up by destroyers, and the landing party scrambled to re-embark via the ferries and make their exit. By 2am all were safely in English waters – complete success with negligible casualties.

HMS Vindictive lying along-
side the pier at Ostend May 1918

The Ostend attack was a different story. With no diversionary attack to protect them, the two block shops, Brilliant and Sirius, were wholly reliant on surprise and effective smoke cover. Unfortunately, the wind direction worked against them – they were visible but their target was obscured. In the chaos they found themselves almost beached well to the east of the harbour piers, and were forced to scuttle and abandon the mission. Still, the larger port of Zeebrugge had been completely closed off, and the operation was hailed as a major victory at home. The Germans immediately strengthened their position at Ostend, and posted a guard of nine destroyers. It seemed to make a further attempt almost impossible, and yet this is precisely what Keyes attempted some two weeks later on 9^th May. One of the two new block ships did not make it to the attack zone, but the other was the Vindictive - hero of the landing party actions at Zeebrugge -  now on her final voyage. Supported by destroyers, air cover and fog, she ran the gauntlet and did manage to ram one of the entrance piers. She sunk at an angle that caused major obstruction. Again, the skeleton crew escaped in motor launches and were picked up by destroyers.

These two victories (small strategically) helped restore the faith of the British public in the RN and raised morale amongst naval staff and civilians. Perhaps more significant was the effect on the German navy. U-boat strategy took another hit, and the morale of the German navy, already low, took another fall. Cooped up since Jutland, the German fleet was now subject to more restrictions, as destroyers from Dover and Harwich were free to cause more damage amongst the light craft and defences of the Heligoland Bight area. Mutiny was stirring in the German navy, and within months it would become reality.

* Balfour’s famous/infamous statement in November 1917 indicated British Government support for a post war establishment of a national home for Jewish people in Palestine – apparently contradicting assurances given to the Arab leader King Feisal in 1916. We all know what followed.