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| Robert Nivelle in 1916 - during his meteoric rise |
We have seen how Joffre was replaced as Commander in Chief of the
Allied armies on the Western Front in late 1916 (see Post 4/1/17). Disillusionment and war
weariness amongst the general public in France and to a lesser extent in
Britain increased the tension and manouevring within the Governments. As the
new British Prime Minister, Lloyd George was eager for change. He held Joffre
and Haig largely responsible for the futile offensives of 1915 and 1916 with
their unacceptably high casualties. A divided and fractious French parliament
made for a nervous unstable government. The prime minister Briand was in a
precarious position and desperate for a change of fortune. Both were impressed
by the newly appointed Commander in Chief – Robert Nivelle, and his confident
plans for a devastating breakthrough. He proposed a sharp thrust through the
most vulnerable point of the German salient, using his artillery techniques refined
at Verdun; after that he would break out behind the German lines on both sides
with cavalry and tanks. This was a move away from Joffre and Haig’s attempts to
break through on broad fronts. Nivelle did not impress everyone. More senior generals were well connected and expressed their scepticism about Nivelle to politicians.
Robert Nivelle. By the time Nivelle was promoted to the top job in
the French Army, he was a national hero on account of his successes at Verdun
(see Post Verdun 7. 15/12/2016). Born in Tulle in 1856 to a French Officer and
an English mother, he had attained the rank of colonel in the artillery by the
outbreak of war. His courage and élan in the battles of the Marne and the Aisne was
noted, and in early 1915 he was given command of a division. His star was in
the ascendancy, and by December he was leading III Corps of Pétain’s 2nd
Army at Verdun. Ironically it was Joffre who promoted the likeminded soldier to
replace the cautious Pétain as commander of
the 2nd Amy in April 1916, when he promoted Pétain sideways to lead the central army group. Nivelle’s rise had indeed been meteoric. His
tactical advances, with rapid movements behind creeping barrages added
convincing victories at Verdun in late 1916, making him a surprise choice to
replace Joffre in December. He was supported by two key figures. Militarily,
his right hand man was General Mangin (see Post Verdun 6 6/4/2016), known to
the poilus as ‘The Butcher’. Mangin’s ruthless sacrifice of men for ground in
July 1916 had led to calls for his removal, but Nivelle backed his man
resolutely. Politically, a more shadowy figure was Nivelle’s chief of staff - the aristocratic Marcel Eric Audemard d’Alençon. Already seriously ill in 1916 (he would die in
September 1917), he was in a hurry to play a part in a final victory over the
hated invaders, and intrigued behind the scenes – in army and in government –
to promote Nivelle’s views to the detriment of opponents.
Nivelle’s (barely) two years of high rank rendered him a novice strategically,
but his energy, eloquence and confidence were highly convincing – at least
initially. Within months this confidence would be seen as vainglory and
bluster, but for now, he held sway*. He had the support of such senior military
figures as Maginot, and even Joffre. Warnings
from more senior generals that he was bound to fail (particularly from Pétain, Castelnau and Franchet d’Esperey, who had been
passed over in his favour) were politely rebuffed.
Early on Nivelle met Lloyd George and impressed the latter with his sure plans and fluent English. Lloyd George invited him to London
to present to the War Cabinet, thereby starting a cynical and none-too subtle
process to undermine Haig’s authority. Nivelle eagerly adopted the suggestion
that Haig should be his subordinate – he already thought this way, and his plan
required the British to launch a supporting action at Arras. For his part, Haig
was favourably impressed by Nivelle at their first meeting. He thought him a
plain speaking soldier with success and energy behind him, and was willing to
make plans for a complementary action supporting Nivelle’s main thrust. But, as he found himself being undermined in
London, and recipient of peremptory communications from French GQG, their
relationship unraveled faster than even Nivelle’s own fate.
In Calais on 27th February the
leaders of Britain and France** met to discuss the details of Nivelle’s plans.
Included in this was ‘unity of command’, and under pressure from the French,
Lloyd George did propose that Haig should subordinate himself as an army group
commander under Nivelle’s orders. Later that night Haig and Robertson
confronted Lloyd George, indicating that they would resign and face
court-martial rather than comply. The cornered politician backed down.
The Hindenburg Line. Shortly afterwards, Haig’s struggle to retain his authority received
a boost from an unexpected quarter – the German withdrawal to the ‘Siegfried’
line. Since November 1916, aerial reconnaissance had identified major activity
several miles behind the front lines of the Somme battle. This turned out to be
groundworks for a new defensive line (being dug out by Russian prisoners of
war in the biggest construction project of the entire war). The effect of this new line, which ran roughly north-south for seventy
miles from Arras to Soissons, was to straighten the large Noyon salient,
bulging into France towards Amiens. The whole new line of the Western Front became known as the Hindenburg
line, after its creator, but sections were named for Teutonic mythical figures. The Siegfried line, the strongest section ran from Cambrai to St Quentin. The next section to the north, from Cambrai to Lille, was to be the Wotan line. Hindenburg and Ludendorff saw several advantages of this move,
particularly at a time when their attention was glued on the events in Russia
and the U-boat war at sea. Most importantly, their shortened line could be
defended by fifty less divisions of troops, enabling them to create a large
strategic reserve that could be used for reinforcement and damaging
counter-attacks against attempted advances. Secondly, the new line enabled them to select even
better defensive vantage points than they had held to now (in the centre of the
Noyon salient, the dogged persistence of the British at the Somme had finally
pushed them out of some of their best positions). Thirdly, their own
communication lines would be shortened, whereas for the Allies, they would
be extended into territory where German scorched earth tactics would make life
as difficult as possible for them. Hindenburg was confident that this line
could hold off any assaults, at least until Britain was brought to her knees by
the U-boats.
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| Removing the Noyon salient released 50 Divisions of German troops |
All of this had implications for Nivelle’s
own plan, but now his hubris and weaknesses began to show. Initially he refused
to acknowledge the news of German withdrawal. When this became reality, he
refused to modify his own plans. Although Haig profited to some extent by
gaining permission to move one of his armies to the north to his preferred
campaign ground in Flanders, Nivelle would not budge from the main assault. His
choice for the key point of his attack would prove disastrous, and would become,
as we shall see, infamous – le Chemin des Dames, above the river Aisne.
*Nivelle’s mantra re his tactics at Verdun was “the experience is
conclusive, our method has proved itself”. This ‘Verdun method’ was dubbed ‘Nivelling’ by the press.
**Briand, Lyautey
(War minister) and Nivelle for France, and Lloyd George, Robertson (CIGS) and
Haig for Britain
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