End of 1916 position 1: The German Peace Proposal

Bethmann-Hollweg addresses to Reichstag 5th December 1916

Ever since the dramatic five weeks of diplomatic frenzy between the Sarajevo assassination and the outbreak of war, both sides had made efforts to undermine or split their opponents by employing diplomatic feelers. They also both sought to gain favour from the most powerful of the neutral nations, the USA - led by the determinedly neutral and moralistic Woodrow Wilson.  Although he felt no sympathy for the German cause, he was not a supporter of the imperialist philosophy of the nations ranged against the Central Powers. The majority of Americans were more sympathetic to the Allied cause, and German prestige had not recovered from the scandal of the Lusitania sinking in May 1915. Washington, New York and Chicago were hotbeds of intrigue and factions advancing the cause of different nations.  The delivery of the German peace proposals on 12th December marked a dramatic escalation of these diplomatic and covert games of cat and mouse.

On that day, identical notes were delivered to the USA Embassies in Berlin, Vienna, Sofia and Constantinople. The note stated that in view of Germany's invincibility on the battlefield, and her possession of Belgium, NE France, and large parts of Russia and Roumania, she was prepared to negotiate peace on the basis of the pre-war borders (although no specific terms for peace were offered). There was no expectation that the Allies would, or could, accept this proposal as a basis for peace. Rather, the move was a cynical ploy to take the moral high ground over the Allies, easing the way to declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare - the only way Germany could now envisage outright victory. Writing after his speech to the Reichstag on 5th December Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was clear: "Should our enemies refuse to enter peace negotiations - and we have to assume this will be the case - the odium of continuing the war will fall on them. War weariness will then grow and generate new support for the elements that are pushing for peace..... The rejection of our peace offer, the knowledge that the continuation of the struggle is inevitable thanks alone to our enemies, would be an effective means of spurring our people to utmost exertion and sacrifice for a victorious end to the war."(germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org).  

The document was thus carefully crafted with regard to its home audience - the war weary German people who were prepared to believe that the Allies were responsible for the war - but it had no chance of duping the Allies, and little chance of impressing the neutrals. However, the note did give the American President a problem. Wilson had ambitions to be a leading statesman and peacemaker on the world stage. Driven by his wish to keep the USA out of the war, he had been considering putting out peace feelers of his own. Now, with the unsubtle German ploy practically inviting him to be the peace broker, an openly positive response to the notes delivered to his embassies round Europe would risk the wrath of the Allies.

Woodrow Wilson

There had already been angry rebuttals from Russia and France. So Wilson followed up the German proposal with a finessed proposal of his own – inviting both sides to publish their own terms for peace, and pleading his good faith in the matter. Diplomatic eggshells were strewn everywhere. Briand, the French Premier, and Nikolai Pokrovsky, the new Russian Minister for Foreign affairs made the angry denunciations in their respective parliaments on the 15^th. Wilson’s note reached all parties on the 18^th. The Allies agreed to convene for a more measured response and Britain assumed the role of co-ordinator. Lloyd George, only one week in office, faced a tricky task to keep his government and the allies united, and to avoid offending Wilson. At the time a British peer, Viscount Lansdowne, was drumming up support for peace proposals of his own, arguing that the war risked destroying humanity and that the slaughter must be stopped. Balfour, the new Foreign Secretary, was indisposed and his Deputy, the under Secretary of State Lord Cecil, assumed a key role in the process. He was strongly opposed to peace proposals. Lloyd George realised that were Britain to reject the proposals outright, they risked playing into German hands. 

Sir Cecil Spring Rice
Consummate Diplomat and one
of Britain's unsung war heros

Following days of feverish activity in London and Washington, in which the Ambassador to the USA, Sir Cecil Spring Rice (probably best known for penning the poem I vow to thee my country, set to the music of Holst’s Jupiter) played a brilliant diplomatic hand, Lloyd George formulated his response. On December 19^th he delivered a consummate speech to the House of Commons, before convening the conference of Allies in London over Christmas. Their work was interrupted for nearly two days by the crisis in Greece (see Part 2 of this blog) and they continued throughout the 25^th and 26^th to reach an agreed position. On 30^th December the French Government communicated to the USA Ambassador in Paris a formal answer, signed by Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Montenegro, Portugal and Roumania. 

The statement included: “A suggestion without any conditions for initiating negotiations is not an offer of peace. The so called proposal, devoid of substance and precision, circulated abroad by the Imperial Government appears less an offer of peace than a maneuver (sic) of war. It is based upon a systematic disregard of the nature of the struggle of the past, present and future”.

The cynical proposal was thrown out. The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare and the entry of the USA into the war – two of 1917’s more dramatic developments – were one step closer.