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| SMS Markgraf. One of Behncke's elite Konig class Dreadnoughts - pride of Scheer's High Seas Fleet |
17.45 Meanwhile Hood’s force, comprising Invincible (his flagship), Indomitable and Inflexible (I3); light cruisers Chester and Canterbury, and 4 destroyers, had forged ahead south east of the BGF. The I3 battle cruisers were Fisher’s first generation of Dreadnoughts, and so despite their speed were no longer state of the art. Ironically they had been at Rosyth with Beatty, until the exchange with the QE squadron, one week previously, and were now about to meet up in spectacular fashion. At 17.45 the Chester, leading the group, encountered four German cruisers emerging from the mist, and came under concerted fire, suffering 17 hits in less than five minutes. She would surely have sunk but for the arrival of the I3, which chased away the cruisers, sinking one of them. The heroic actions of Chester gunner Jack Cornwell, 16, still firing as the only survivor at his gun turret, became famous after his posthumous VC award (the 3rd youngest to be so honoured).
18.15 At 18.15 Jellicoe made his move, deploying to port, rather than starboard. This was the more cautious option, placing his
fighting line 4000 yards further away, but consequently less vulnerable to
torpedo attack. (His decision was vindicated post war, including by the official German
history, but endlessly criticised at home.) Nevertheless, a smooth deployment ran to plan, and Scheer's advance company of the GHSF, Admiral Behncke's four elite Konig class Dreadnoughts soon appeared in view. At either end of Jellicoe's line tremendous congestion of the smaller flotillas occurred. This was particularly so at the south-western extreme, where Beatty was leading his force across their bows. In the ensuing chaos, Arbuthnot’s cruiser squadron of 4 was dispersed, and his impetuous
dash with Defence and Warrior to sink the Wiesbaden (which had been badly disabled by fire from the I3) took him straight at the GHSF, which
emerged from the mist at a distance of 8000 yards. Within minutes, Defence was blown up and sunk with all
hands. Warrior, similarly vulnerable
was saved, fortuitously, by running into Evan-Thomas and the QE Battle Squadron. Of these four Dreadnoughts, Warspite was hit in the stern, damaging her steering so that she
too was heading straight for the GHSF. This drew their fire, enabling Warrior to escape. Warspite managed to fix her steering and withdraw from the action,
but she was hit 29 times in those few minutes and was ordered by Evan-Thomas to
limp back to Rosyth.
18.15 The next drama occurred at the other (eastern) end of the British formation where Hood, after his intervention with Hipper’s cruisers, pushed west in search of Beatty. Very soon, he encountered Lion heading due east straight towards him, so he had to put about, and lead Beatty’s line back eastwards.
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| The desperate sight of Invincible, her two halves wedged on the sea bed in shallower North Sea water |
This disaster
meant that Beatty had now lost three of his nine battle cruisers, but at least his remaining six were in much better shape than four of Hipper’s five. Hipper was now
forced to leave his flagship Lutzow,
which was barely seaworthy, and via destroyer he visited in turn Derfflinger, Seydlitz and von der Tann, each of which was in a
worse state than Lutzow and unable to
take his flag. He was forced to stay on the destroyer until 22.00, when he was
eventually able to transfer his flag to his remaining battle cruiser Moltke.
18.15 Because of
their varying top speeds, the ships of Scheer’s fleet were by now somewhat
strung out, and Scheer himself was 13 miles behind Hipper’s vanguard, with as little information as Jellicoe. He was unaware of Hipper's
problems, and still ignorant of Jellicoe's proximity. He urged Behncke's Konigs to make maximum speed and secure victory over Beatty. As they did this, they emerged from a patch of mist and ran into withering fire from Jellicoe's leading ships. Scheer belatedly realised that they had ‘crossed his T’ - a classic naval move. He was in mortal danger. At 18.36 he ordered the well rehearsed (now famous) 180
degree turn. This was accomplished so smoothly and quickly that within
minutes he had vanished from the view of the BGF, even before Jellicoe's
deployment was fully complete. The engagement of the two major fleets had lasted
only from 18.15 to 18.36.
18.55 The most extraordinary
moment came 20 minutes later at 18.55. Scheer abruptly ordered another about
turn, and headed back due east towards the BGF battle line. Scheer’s post hoc explanations covered
counter-attack, valiant support for the trailing and badly damaged Wiesbaden, and escape to the east (the
further west he travelled, the more likely all his escape routes would be cut
off). It meant that once again, Hipper’s badly damaged battle cruisers were in
the vanguard of what became known as 'the death ride'. Direction and visibility
were now working against the Germans, and within minutes they were in an
unprecedented bombardment from the BGF. In addition to further punishment for
Hipper’s ships, Scheer’s leading Dreadnoughts also suffered, with five of them
receiving direct hits from 15” shells. Although the German gunnery had been
superior in the earlier stages, it was now much less effective. Only two
hits landed on the BGF battleships, both landing on the Colossus, which was undamaged.
19.00 A few minutes of this was enough for Scheer. He ordered his Dreadnoughts to make their third 180 degree turn of the evening, while leaving Hipper's battle cruisers on their ‘death ride’ plus throwing a destroyer torpedo attack at the BGF. This lasted only a few minutes during which Scheer’s main ships drew further away from the action; Hipper’s ships received further pounding, and Jellicoe made his decision to turn away to port and guard against the torpedo attack. At 19.17 Scheer permitted Hipper’s ships to break off the action and limp away to starboard. This critical 17 minutes brought Scheer’s salvation. It was worth the cost of crippling Hipper’s fleet and damaging a number of his own Dreadnoughts. His torpedoes did no damage – only two thirds of them reached the BGF and none of them inflicted damage – but provoked Jellicoe’s caution, opening the distance between the fleets. For Jellicoe, his move to port would haunt his reputation, even though as a defensive tactic it was 100% successful.
By 19.15 dusk was approaching; the main fleets were out of contact, and only Beatty was still firing, determined to fight to the finish with his badly damaged enemy Hipper. The main confrontation was over, but not the battle.
19.00 A few minutes of this was enough for Scheer. He ordered his Dreadnoughts to make their third 180 degree turn of the evening, while leaving Hipper's battle cruisers on their ‘death ride’ plus throwing a destroyer torpedo attack at the BGF. This lasted only a few minutes during which Scheer’s main ships drew further away from the action; Hipper’s ships received further pounding, and Jellicoe made his decision to turn away to port and guard against the torpedo attack. At 19.17 Scheer permitted Hipper’s ships to break off the action and limp away to starboard. This critical 17 minutes brought Scheer’s salvation. It was worth the cost of crippling Hipper’s fleet and damaging a number of his own Dreadnoughts. His torpedoes did no damage – only two thirds of them reached the BGF and none of them inflicted damage – but provoked Jellicoe’s caution, opening the distance between the fleets. For Jellicoe, his move to port would haunt his reputation, even though as a defensive tactic it was 100% successful.
By 19.15 dusk was approaching; the main fleets were out of contact, and only Beatty was still firing, determined to fight to the finish with his badly damaged enemy Hipper. The main confrontation was over, but not the battle.
