The breakthrough at Gorlice-Tarnow

KW2 meets Mackensen at German GHQ 1915

They didn't teach us any of this - either at school or in documentaries (and according to a Russian friend they certainly learned nothing of it there as schoolchildren or beyond) - and yet the mighty German assault on the west of the Galician front was the most conclusive and significant of military actions during 1915. Ironically it was ordered by Falkenhayn - great champion of 'decisive action in the West' school of German thought - who agreed this only as part of his need to support Austria, and his ongoing disagreement with Hindenburg and Ludendorff about east/west strategy. The latter wanted another great pincer movement, south and north, to isolate and crush the faltering Russians, whereas Falkenhayn favoured a central assault on a wider front (nearly 40 miles) than the Allies had attempted in Champagne and Artois. With even more irony, the breakthrough was achieved by the new German 11th Army, which had been created by Falkenhayn, initially for another decisive attack in the west, but then destined for Serbia to cover the unstable Balkan situation that surrounded the Gallipoli campaign. Germany could not afford for Austria Hungary to be overwhelmed from the south and east if Turkey succumbed to the Allied efforts in Gallipoli. However, what began as a fairly modest plan to attack by Conrad's Austrian forces between Gorlice and Tarnow, (now both in southern Poland) became a massive hammer blow, intensified by the new 11th Army and led by the (now) legendary Colonel Ludwig Mackensen (subject of a later post).


From the outset the line of the Eastern Front had been dominated by the Polish Salient - Russian occupied Poland jutting west towards Germany. To both sides it represented an opportunity and a danger. It gave the Russians the chance to attack west into industrial Silesia or towards Berlin, north into East Prussia or south towards the Carpathians and the heart of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However the salient was also vulnerable to German and Austro-Hungarian attack, with a risk that the Russian armies in Poland could be trapped in the west. 
In the autumn of 1914 Russia had enjoyed great success against Austria-Hungary to the south of the salient in Galicia, particularly at Lemberg and Przemysl; but to the north of the salient, the Germans had spectacular victories, with Tannenberg the highlight. A German attack on Warsaw in the autumn of 1914 had briefly allowed the Austrians to restore their own situation, but by the spring of 1915 they were once again fighting in the Carpathians and faced a real danger that the Russians might break through into Hungary.

The Austrian Chief of Staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, devised a plan to retrieve the situation, but needed German troops to bolster his own forces. He called for four German divisions to be moved to the relatively quiet western end of the Carpathian Front, where the front line turned north. This German force would break through the Russian lines and advance east behind the Russian armies in the Carpathians, forcing them to retreat or risk surrender.

The Austrian plan basically was hijacked by the German High Command. Falkenhayn decided at this point to move his 11th army to that sector of the front line that ran north from Gorlice, at the edge of the Carpathians, to Tarnow. In a brilliant piece of subterfuge, the entire army was moved in secrecy from the Western Front. The gas attack that opened the second battle of Ypres was one of a series of diversions launched to hide this movement. Another was in the extreme north of the Eastern front with German fleet bombarding Russian positions from the Baltic. It worked brilliantly. Buchan comments "German organisation had put forth a supreme effort. The world had never seen a greater concentration of men more swiftly or more silently achieved." So while the Allies in the west were hoping for a decisive Russian breakthrough into Hungary to finish Austria, the reverse was about to happen.

Mackensen, who had distinguished himself in the battles of the Masurian Lakes and at Tannenberg, was put in command of the 11th Army, and also of the supporting Austrian forces, which were moved to the rear. By 28th April the Germans were in place. Apart from the Russian army, their main barriers were three rivers - the Donajetz, the Biala and the San - beyond which they would be able to pour through and take control of Galicia and the south of the Polish salient.

Between Tarnow and Gorlice, the target of Mackensen's hammer, the Russians were heavily outnumbered on men and equipment. The Germans had 170,000 men, with more than 700 field guns and nearly 300 heavy guns. In the area to be attacked, the Russians had only two divisions from Radko-Dmitriev’s Third Army (about 20,000 men). 

Gorlice braces itself for the German onslaught

 The German plan was for a simple frontal assault, supported by a heavy artillery bombardment. It was thus very different from the more ambitious plans for envelopments and double envelopments that had previously dominated German thinking (Schlieffen and also Hindenburg's preferences). It was a type of attack that would probably have failed on the Western Front, despite its breadth and scope,  but the Russian lines between Gorlice and Tarnow were much weaker than the French or British lines in the west.

At 6 am on 2 May a four hour bombardment began. This was the heaviest yet seen on the Eastern Front, and destroyed the Russian defences. At 10 a.m. the first wave of 30,000 German and Austrian infantry attacked, and by the end of the day had captured the Russian first and second lines.

On 4 May a Russian counterattack failed, and the Germans broke out into open country. They made rapid progress to the east, threatening the entire Russian Carpathian Front. By the end of the first week of the offensive, the Germans had captured 140,000 prisoners and 100 guns, and the Russian Third Army had been destroyed. Most of its divisions were down to 1,000 men, less than 10% of their full strength. 

Russian trenches were primitive compared
to the Western Front, and unable to cope with
the German juggernaut

The Russians managed to dig in and hold the line of the San for a few days. However, on 10 May the Austrians advancing on the German right forced their way across the river San at Sanok, and began to advance towards the fortress of Przemysl. 

The German and Austrians continued to advance throughout the summer - watch for the next post. Compared to the attritional stalemate actions of the Western Front, and the numerous embarrassments of the Gallipoli failures, this was 1915's brilliant and decisive military campaign by the German war machine.