Britain's first few weeks

As the last of the great powers to declare war on August 4th, Great Britain was the least prepared to contribute to a continental war across Europe. Much of government and public opinion felt that Britain should have only a naval role in the conflict. Britain's professional army, used to fighting in remote empire outposts was tiny in comparison to the vast forces lining up on mainland Europe. By contrast, the Fleet had been unchallenged in its superiority on the high seas for more than a century, since Trafalgar.

At sea, in the early weeks and months of the war, the Fleet’s main activity was to seek out and engage or blockade German raiders and cruisers, in order to allow Empire forces to seize all German colonies around the world, especially in Africa and the Far east; and also to protect continuing Empire merchant trade. The Germans, particularly Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, did a lot of damage before they were suppressed. The successful pursuit of this strategy brought, in due course, important escorted reinforcements to the Western Front from India (5 Divisions), Canada (2), and Australia and New Zealand (2).

On 28^th  August in home waters the action at Heligoland Bight took place – it was the first Naval battle of the war. An action planned for some weeks took British submarines and cruisers right into the proximity of the German Home Fleet.

Six German capital ships were sunk or badly damaged, and this influenced German strategy for the rest of the war. There were no British losses. Back home, news of this action reinforced British public opinion on the invincibility of the Fleet.

The next Fleet action was land 3000 marines at Ostend to support the Belgians and to hinder German moves towards the Channel. The Royal Naval Air Force took responsibility for protecting South and east England from attack, notably by Zeppelins. As  Churchill said “the air was the first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The armoured car was the child of the air, the tank its grandchild”

On land, the main theatres of war would prove to be the western and eastern fronts.

From the German viewpoint, in the EAST, the Polish Russia salient had Warsaw at its centre; a front from East Prussia to Konigsberg in the North; plus Galicia and the Carpathians in the South. In the WEST, from the English Channel to Switzerland a continuous front was taking place. The Schlieffen Plan had been adapted by the Second Moltke as an essential strategy for rapid German victory over France to enable maximum forces to be concentrated for a longer battle with Russia in the east.

With regard to Franco-Russian dispositions, in 1906 France and Russia had agreed on a joint mobilization strategy, to be enacted in response to any aggression from Germany (nearly triggered by Agadir in 1911). This included substantial loans from the French to Russia and support in the rapid development of Russia’s railway links, and in increased efficiency in co-ordinating the huge Russian forces over vast areas.

Both sides’ plans added up to the mobilization of 12 million men