Conclusions and Appendices

Iconic view of WW1 trench warfare 

Over the past five years this blog has tracked the centenaries of the events of WW1. On numerous occasions, revisiting the terrible actions and suffering, the question has loomed large – ‘Surely this could have been prevented, or stopped?’ and it remains difficult to believe that such a continuing loss would be tolerated by public opinion today, whether in Europe or anywhere else.

In 2014 a televised discussion between historians Max Hastings and Niall Ferguson was featured in the blog post of 14^th November that year. The debate was whether WW1 could have been prevented and, in particular, whether Britain should have stayed out of it. At the time I came down firmly on the side of Hastings’ argument that a worse war would have followed within a few years. Now, re-reading Ferguson’s cogent arguments in his book The Pity of War I am more persuaded that WW1 as we know it would not have happened if Britain had stayed out. War would not have been prevented, but a shorter conflict confined to Europe would most likely have given victory to Germany and hegemony over Europe (see Post 18/11/2018). What followed may have been more like the Napoleonic wars than world war, and the attritional battles that cost so many lives may not have happened. With Germany ruling Europe maybe a resurgent nationalism in France would have thrown up a French Hitler? Who knows? And similar reasoning could be applied to Britain’s entry into WW2. Exploring endless ‘what ifs’ is interesting, but ultimately what happened is what did happen.

Germany signed Article 231 to accept responsibility for starting the conflagration, but they never believed it, and all the other players must take some share of the blame, even if for misjudgements rather than jingoism. Yes, the Kaiser may have been a sociopath who wanted a fleet and empire bigger than his grandmother Victoria’s. But by 1914, he knew he had lost the naval arms race. He had the best army in the world, but it would have to fight on two fronts and eventually would, inevitably, be heavily outnumbered. He had backed away from war before 1914, and tried to do so again with Austria when he countered his earlier ‘blank cheque’ undertaking. But by then it was too late to stop Austria’s attack on Serbia. Perhaps Wilhelm was most guilty of listening too much, and uncritically, to his military leaders.

“and the heavens were rolling like a wheel on a track, and our sky was unfolding and it would never look back” (Jackson Browne)

In the final crazy days of July 1914 a chain of events did unfold rapidly, but were they all unstoppable? All parties could have done things differently, but these are more what ifs.

And what about the vilified treaty of Versailles and the next twenty years of world history? Recent posts have argued that although mistakes were made and some terrible events followed, a great many good things happened. Three oppressive empires were dismantled and the world moved haltingly towards republics monarchies and democracy, largely holding off the forces of revolution. The League of Nations eventually failed, but without it would the post WW2 UN have been as robust as it has been for almost 75 years? It may not feel like it, but there is less war in the world today than at any time in history (Homo Deus. Yuval Harari. Harper 2016).

Thank you for reading the blog.

Appendices

Appendix 1 – the Armistice Terms November 11^th 1918

Signed last page of the Armistice agreement

There were 34 Clauses, with these main points:

 A. Western Front

Termination of hostilities on the Western Front, on land and in the air, within six hours of signature.

Immediate evacuation of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine within 15 days. Sick and wounded may be left for Allies to care for.

Immediate repatriation of all inhabitants of those four territories in German hands.

Surrender of matériel: 5,000 artillery pieces, 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfers, 1,700 aircraft (including all night bombers), 5,000 railway locomotives, 150,000 railway carriages and 5,000 road trucks.

Evacuation of territory on the west side of the Rhine plus 30 km (19 mi) radius bridgeheads of the east side of the Rhine at the cities of Mainz, Koblenz, and Cologne within 31 days.

Vacated territory to be occupied by Allied troops, maintained at Germany's expense.

No removal or destruction of civilian goods or inhabitants in evacuated territories and all military matériel and premises to be left intact.

All minefields on land and sea to be identified.

All means of communication (roads, railways, canals, bridges, telegraphs, telephones) to be left intact, as well as everything needed for agriculture and industry.

B. Eastern and African Fronts

Immediate withdrawal of all German troops in Romania and in what were the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire back to German territory as it was on 1 August 1914, although tacit support was given to the pro-German West Russian Volunteer Army under the guise of combating the Bolsheviks. The Allies to have access to these countries.

Renunciation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and of the Treaty of Bucharest with Romania.

Evacuation of German forces in Africa.

C. At sea

Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and surrender intact of all German submarines within 14 days.

Listed German surface vessels to be interned within 7 days and the rest disarmed.

Free access to German waters for Allied ships and for those of the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden.

The naval blockade of Germany to continue.

Immediate evacuation of all Black Sea ports and handover of all captured Russian vessels.

D. General

Immediate release of all Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, without reciprocity.

Pending a financial settlement, surrender of assets looted from Belgium, Romania and Russia.

Appendix 2 – The Articles of the Treaty of Versailles

Articles 1 - 30 and Annex   The Covenant of the League of Nations. No German membership. If one nation declares war, all members to stop it.

Articles 31 - 117 and Annexes  Territorial rights and new borders relating to Belgium, Luxembourg, Rhineland, Saar, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Heligoland, Free city of Danzig, Schleswig and Russia.

Articles 118 - 158 and Annexes  German Rights and Interests Outside Germany –Chain, Africa and Pacific islands

Articles 159 - 213  Military, Naval and Air Clauses

Articles 214 - 226  Prisoners of War. Graves and repatriation costs

Articles 227 - 230  Penalties. Arraignment of Kaiser Wilhelm and other war criminals

Articles 231 - 247 and Annexes  231 = Guilt Clause. Reparations to be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission. Pay by 1921 20billion Goldmarks.

Articles 248 - 312 Financial and economic clauses

Articles 313 – 320  Aerial Navigation

Articles 321 - 386  Ports, Waterways and Railways

Articles 387 - 399  Labour

Articles 400 - 440 and Annex  Procedures, guarantees and miscellaneous

Appendix 3 – The Post War treaties

Treaty of Versailles    28^th June 1919

Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye    10^th September 1919.

Confirmed the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian empire; Czechoslovakia and southern Slav states that would become Yugoslavia.

Romania expanded to include Transylvania and Bessarabia.

Poland was granted land occupied by Austria and Germany.

Treaty of Neuilly    27^th November 1919

Confirmed Bulgaria’s loss of territory to the newly formed Yugoslavia, to Romania and to Greece. It left Bulgaria without direct access to the Aegean Sea.

Treaty of Trianon      4^th June 1920

Signed with Hungary. Removed two-thirds of the land it controlled as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Three million ethnic Hungarians now found themselves living outside their country, most of them in Romania.

Treaty of Sevres      10^th August 1920

Signed with Turkey to confirm end of Ottoman empire. Its terms led to Turkey’s war of independence in its war with Greece.  Britain received a mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia, and France one for Lebanon and Syria.

Treaty of Lausanne       24^th July 1923

An extensive Treaty in which Ataturk held the upper hand and Allies were no longer making the rules. Reversed much of the Treaty of Sevres to recognise a sovereign, independent Turkey in return for Turkey’s permanent renunciation of all other former Ottoman territories. It contained a convention for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations found on the wrong side of new borders.

Treaty of Locarno     5-16^th October 1925

Extraordinary treaty that contained seven agreements aimed at improving post war reconciliation between France and Germany, and reducing tension in the new borders on Germany’s east. Initially hailed as a success, with three of its authors receiving Nobel Peace Prizes, in the long term it probably did more to facilitate Hitler’s moves in the 1930s that the Treaty of Versailles.

The Treaty of Versailles 5: The Fall Out

Following Germany's signature, the Treaty of Versailles had been endorsed by signatories from all thirty two nations except one. The exception was not Italy, who had been mollified pending further discussions, but China, whose delegates had returned home in disgust. In turn nearly all of those signatories’ governments, with widely varying enthusiasm, ratified the agreements. Germany’s assent perhaps only confirmed their realisation that they could have done nothing to stop the threatened invasion and occupation of Germany had they refused. There was much unfinished business, and not just with Italy. Further negotiations and treaties would be required for Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia (See Appendix), but the main players were keen to leave the stage.

Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau left for home that evening, and by the next day Wilson was crossing the Atlantic. His was to be one of the few ‘governments’ that would not ratify. With supreme irony, the creator of the League of Nations was unable to persuade his own Senate to agree to its charter, Republican opposition to it being marshalled by Henry Cabot Lodge. An exhausted Wilson arrived home to this crisis, and within weeks had left on a punishing national tour to raise support for his beloved League. Not quite half way through the tour he collapsed with a severe stroke. Hospitalised for weeks, he remained unable to govern meaningfully until the end of his term of office.  The USA never signed the League Charter and never joined the League. They signed a separate peace Treaty of Berlin with the Germans later in 1919.

Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau found their authority lessened rather than enhanced by the Treaty.

Embittered - Marshall Foch 1919  

A raging Foch, with his forces in eastern France made his famous statement on hearing news of the signing “this is not peace, but an armistice for twenty years”. This proved uncannily accurate, but Foch died a few years before he could say ‘I told you so’. Lloyd George’s economic adviser Keynes resigned in disgust, and by the end of 1919 had published his scathing (and influential) book The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Predictably, it was widely welcomed in Germany. The 20 billion goldmark figure in the Treaty was an interim and composite figure that summarised any number of complexities and staging. Of the eventual agreed figure of £6.6bn only around half was ever paid. France’s greatest economic compensation came from their occupation of the Saar and Ruhr coalfields.

The German overseas colonies were distributed, mainly between Britain and France – who also established their mandates in the Middle East, contributing to the conditions for the problems that have continued for over 100years.

The tragic destruction of Smyrna (Izmir) 1923 

 Perhaps the most tragic outcome came from Lloyd George’s unstinting support for the Venizelos Greek expansionism plans. A bitter four years was followed, culminating in the massacres and destruction of Smyrna (Izmir) in 1923, and the emergence of modern Turkey. Britain’s loss of prestige in the treaty that followed (see Appendix) would be a further blow to Lloyd George’s waning popularity.

The Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles produced a suitably dramatic and controversial closure to the First World War. Many mistake and misjudgements were made, but much was achieved. Considering the complexities and the scale of the issues, is it really fair to hold the Treaty responsible for an even worse Second World War and, by implication, all that has followed 1945? Marshall Foch thought so, but we don’t have to.

Final word to Margaret Macmillan:

The Peacemakers of 1919 made mistakes of course. By their offhand treatment of the non European world, they stirred up resentment for which the West is still paying today. They took pains over the borders in Europe, even if they did not draw them to everyone’s satisfaction, but in Africa they carried on the old practice of handing out territory to suit the imperial powers. In the Middle East, they threw together peoples, in Iraq most notably, who have still not managed to cohere into a civil society. If they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse. They tried, even cynical old Clemenceau, to build a better order. They could not foresee the future, and they certainly could not control it. That was up to their successors.

(p493 Paris 1919)

The Treaty of Versailles 4: Germany Signs

Orpen's famous painting of the signing ceremony in
the Hall of Mirrors, Versaillles

Germany, of course, was not a participant in the Paris Peace Conference. Like the Austrian and Ottoman governments the delegates had to await their summons to Paris to receive the terms of the treaty. Six months elapsed between the Armistice and their arrival in Paris. During that time, despite the turbulence and threat of revolution, a German socialist republic government had functioned with the grudging support of the army, and a cautious optimism had appeared. After all, their leaders told them, they had not been defeated in the field; not been invaded, and the authoritative President Wilson was calling for a ‘just peace’. Further encouragement came in March, when neutral Netherlands refused to extradite Kaiser Wilhelm to face war criminal charges.

Having been faced down over the Kaiser, the European leaders were more determined to make the Germans pay in terms of penalties, reparations and lost territory. Lloyd George (and to some extent British public opinion) was softening a little, but in France the opposite was the case. Italy was unyielding in demanding full reparations and the lure of extensive territories that induced them to sign the Treaty of London in 1915 (see Post 7/7/2015). Wilson’s attempts to mediate using his principles and points led to arguments and a general rise in tension. Punishment, payment and reparation all had to be resolved and agreed.

The full conference comprised delegates from 32 countries and met only eight times, always to ratify decisions taken by the Supreme Council. Not surprisingly this caused some unhappiness, particularly when that Council was soon reduced from ten to four members (See Post 18/6/2019). In contrast, the Council of four met over 150 times, before Orlando’s walk out reduced it to the Council of Three. All of this took place in an intense period from March to early May, when the competing demands summarised in the previous post had to be slotted in alongside consideration of main clauses of the settlement with Germany.

By the end of March, the Supreme Council had ditched, first, the Japanese, and then the Foreign Ministers. They may have hoped that excluding the aggressive and obstinate Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino would lower the temperature, and lead to some compromises in the Italian demands. But

Vittorio Orlando.
Urbane Italian PM.

Orlando remained under the grip of Sonnino (and even more strident Italian public opinion). Italy viewed the Treaty of London as a sacred promise against their commitment, and subsequent losses, in the war. Wilson had made it clear early on that he regarded it as of little standing alongside his principle of self determination. Lloyd George and Clemenceau were annoyed and embarrassed by their predecessors’ loose undertakings that promised Italy much of Austria, especially its Adriatic coast; large areas of Albania; a slice of Turkey (sic), numbers of Greek Islands including the Dodecanese; part of North Africa and even part of Jerusalem. As the weeks passed the relationship between Wilson and Clemenceau also deteriorated, and they were frequently at odds. The former was furious that Wilson, in his view, prioritised the League of Nations over dealing with Germany. He had also upset his own military leader Marshall Foch by excluding him from the French delegation to the Conference. Foch was fulminating on the sidelines, calling for measures to enforce the Armistice terms (in his opinion Germany was not complying) and for an occupation of the Rhineland.

The two big questions to be addressed were border changes and the agreement of financial penalties, damages and reparations. To facilitate these, Germany would first have to accept the blame for the pre-war machinations that led to war (this would appear as the infamous Article 31 of the treaty – the guilt clause). She would also have to accept massive reductions in military and industrial strength, in the interests of future peace. Clemenceau argued hardest for major border changes in the west, between France and Germany. The return of Alsace and Lorraine was a given, but France also wanted Germany to stay to the east of the Rhine, and so all the industrial areas of the Rhineland and Saar basin were included. There was a strong case for all the German coal production there to be allocated to France (and Belgium) as replacement for the mines in the war zone destroyed by the Germans during their retreat. To Germany’s east, a new Poland required concession of land in Prussia and Silesia. To provide for Wilson’s promise of sea access would mean leaving East Prussia as a coastal enclave within Poland. Again, France was most strongly in favour of harsh measures. Clemenceau backed Polish negotiator Dmowski’s submission for a ‘greater’ Poland (see Post 22/6/2019). He wanted a strong Poland at Germany’s eastern border to compensate for the loss of his erstwhile ally Russia. As with Germany’s west there were important industrial and agricultural considerations, and everywhere there was the thorny issue of ethnic and national minorities, exposed by shifting borders.

Assessing how much Germany should pay – and who should receive how much payment – was an even greater nightmare. Germany was bankrupt; her people were close to starvation, and much of her industrial capacity was about to be removed. There was a limit to what could be paid, regardless of how much should be. On the other hand, the allies were also bankrupt, or close to it with war debts, and if Germany did not pay, how could they ask their own taxpayers to do so? Britain had spent by far the most of the European allies, but France had lost the most, and had the enormous task of rebuilding a large chunk of the country (as did Belgium on a smaller scale). The inevitable compromise requirements would satisfy no-one.

Nevertheless, there was good progress through April, as spring arrived in Paris, lifting peoples’ spirits. Despite Orlando’s growing unhappiness with lack of progress on Italy’s demands, the other three felt sufficiently confident to invite the Germans to attend the conference and receive the terms in early May. Orlando really dug in his heels on the need for a decision in favour of Italy’s claim to Dalmatia (much of today’s Croatian coastline, including the ports of Trieste and Fiume). Occupation of the old Austro-Hungarian port of Fiume had become the emotional focus of Italian nationalism, inciting large public demonstrations across Italy.  On 24^th April, Orlando walked out of the Supreme Council discussion and returned, with Sonnino, to Rome. He would return thirteen days later, but the resulting press coverage was an embarrassment to the remaining three leaders at a most sensitive time.

Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau.
Led the first German delegation, but
not the second. Remind you of anyone?

Orlando had not re-appeared by the time of the next drama – the first appearance of the German delegation. On Sunday 4^th May, a meeting of the full Conference had rubber stamped the Big three’s terms for Germany. The summons for Germany was thereby confirmed for 7^th May, which just happened to be the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the Lusitania – one of the most egregious acts of the war. The Germans were to be allowed two weeks to comment and respond to the terms. The German delegation was led by Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, an old school diplomat now Foreign Minister in Ebert’s Socialist led coalition government (See Post 7/11/2018). He sat with his colleagues at the central table of the conference room while Clemenceau stiffly read out the main terms. Awkwardness and delays in translation meant that it was a little while before the shock and distress of the Germans became apparent.

Bockhorff-Rantzau stumbled through a prepared response before he and his colleagues withdrew in disarray. As the news filtered out, reactions in Germany were predictably of disbelief and outrage. Wilson in particular was vilified, and went from Germany’s great hope to despicable traitor overnight. There was political and civil unrest, but Ebert kept his nerve, and within two weeks produced a comprehensive set of objections and counter-proposals. The onus was now on the allies to respond. The first two weeks of June were filled with animated, often bitter, discussions within the allied governments. Wilson was conciliatory towards Germany, and was perhaps more alarmed by the hostile reception his League of Nations Charter was receiving in Washington. Clemenceau and his government  remained hawkish, the bitterness being over how hawkish. Lloyd George came under pressure to conciliate. Senior advisers including the economist John Maynard Keynes argued that a stable and peaceful Germany posed less danger than a starving revolutionary one. In the end only minor concessions were made, the main one being to grant plebiscites in some areas with large German minorities as in Silesia. In that period Orlando’s government in Rome fell because of public anger and disenchantment.

Scuppered at Scapa. A grisly
end to WW1 at sea

The Germans were given one week from 16^th June to agree to the revised terms, or to face invasion. More uproar followed in Germany. Ebert’s coalition fell apart. On June 21^st the German Fleet anchored in Scapa Flow, where it had been since surrendering to the British Fleet on 11^th November, scuttled itself rather than pass into the ownership of the British. Over 400,000 tons of shipping went to the depths of the Scottish sea. On 22^nd June, Ebert cobbled together another coalition that wearily agreed to the terms with the exception of the guilt clause. The Paris response was a flat repetition of its previous ultimatum.

And so it was, on the morning of 28^th June - exactly five years on from Sarajevo -  that people crowded into the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles Palace for the denouement. To the new German Foreign Ministers Johannes Bell and Hermann Mueller fell the doubtful honour of signing acceptance to one of history’s most famous documents. The full list of articles is included as an appendix, but the main clauses pertaining to Germany were:

• Acceptance of blame for causation of the war (Article 231)
• ·      Reparations for the losses and damage done of 20 Billion Gold marks, an interim figure (worth approx. £2 billion at the time) that would be worked on further by a commission (ultimately rose to £6.6billions)
• ·      Loss of territory in Germany and overseas:

                        - Alsace and Lorraine

                        - Saar Coalfields to France for 15 years

                        - Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium

                        - West Prussia and Posen to Poland

                        - east Silesia to Poland

                        - Memel (northern area of East Prussia) to Latvia

                        - all overseas colonies (mainly shared between Britain and France who thereby        temporarily increased their empires)

• ·      Demilitarised area 50 miles wide in the Rhineland bordering France
• ·      Allowed no submarines or air force, and a fleet with only a maximum of six capital ships.
• ·      The army to be restricted to 100,000 men.
• ·      Membership of the League of Nations not allowed
• ·      Any union (anschluss) with Austria forbidden

Bell and Mueller signed, and it was done. "Es ist volbracht".