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| Operation Blucher-Yorck June 1918. Despite the gains, the Germans did not get as close to Paris as in September 1914 |
The large territorial gains made in the
early stages of Operation Michael and
Operation Georgette (see Posts 21/3/2018 and 8/5/2018) brought a mixed reaction in their home country. The Kaiser, his military
leaders and many politicians looked at the maps and became overconfident,
missing the significance of the later stalemates and attrition. Talk of a
negotiated peace trailed away to be replaced by more strident demands for
territory and reparations in outright victory that was surely coming. Richard
von Kuhlmann, now a high profile foreign minister following his success at the
Brest-Litovsk treaty (See Post 22/1/2018) was one of a minority who argued for holding
fast to the new gains, but to consolidate the position in the east, and strengthen
Germany’s hand for a negotiated peace. The German people were less convinced by
the extravagant claims of impending victory. Not only were they hungry and war
weary, they were sick of the huge casualty figures resulting from the
‘triumphs’. They were now being discomforted further by British RAF air raids,
penetrating as far into Germany as Cologne.
However, Ludendorff was not prepared to
make any concessions in his Kaiserchlacht. In the relative calm during May, he had managed to replace more than 70%
of the half million casualties from the
offensive so far. Frustrated near Amiens and in Flanders, he still aimed to
split the British and French armies as a prelude to victory.
Ludendorff now resolved to attack at the
southern limit of the great salient created by Operation Michael. His plan was to drive through and weaken further
Foch’s reserves by drawing them south from Flanders. He would then return to
the Somme region in the centre to apply the coup
de grace, separating the British and French. In that sense the Battle of
the Aisne* was a diversionary action. Some diversion, some action.
Ludendorff’s selection of the Aisne was for reasons similar to his choice of the Lys for Georgette. It was sufficiently far from the central thrust to
weaken Allied reserves there, and it threatened key Allied possessions. At the
Lys it was communications and the Channel ports. At the Aisne it would be the
main communication routes to Champagne (south of the Marne), and Paris itself. Operation Michael had created a large
salient, like a nose, from the Hindenburg line into the heart of France, and
his plan now was to create another salient – a large pimple on the nose –
towards the river Marne; and then another, further west towards Compiegne (see
map). In the final phase, he would consolidate these, and link with his
existing salient at Montdidier (See Post 4/3/2018) thereby isolating Amiens and
Paris. Having sucked all Allied reserves into these areas he would be enabled
to resume his advances further north.
The Army Group under Crown Prince Wilhelm
had forty Divisions between two armies to carry out this surprise move. The I
Army was commanded by the veteran von Below, and the VII Army was under von
Boene. The armies were to attack on a 30 miles front between Reims and the
river Ailette (a tributary of the Oise) to the west. Their first objective
would be the high plateau of the now infamous Chemin des Dames (See Post 13/5/2017).
Once again, the German concealed their
preparations well, and would find themselves advancing against a weak section
of the Front. This time it was the French that would bear the brunt of the
attacks, although on the right of their defensive line stood the ill-fated British
9th Army Corps. It had been formed specifically for the Gallipoli
campaign in 1915 before transferring to France at the end of that terrible
saga. It had been commanded by General Hamilton Gordon since 1916, and had
recently taken a severe mauling at the Battle of the Lys; being transferred
south to this quiet (sic) sector to recuperate. Marshall Foch still believed
the main German resumption would come against Arras or in Champagne, and had
opted to leave the Chemin des Dames lightly defended by five divisions of the 6th
French Army, under General Maistre (who had finally won it from the Germans in
the Battle of Malmaison in October 1917 (see Post 10/12/2017)).
The German assault began with the now familiar gas and heavy artillery barrage through the night of 26-27th May. Soon after dawn an irresistible attack of storm troopers and infantry broke through the weak defences on the plateau, and before long they were on the Aisne. On the right, the British had more initial success in holding the Germans but by afternoon they were forced back across the Aisne at Berry au Bac.
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| Men of the Worcestershire Regiment defending the Aisne south bank |
Ludendorff’s day 1 success was, for the
first time in Kaiserschlacht, beyond his objectives (see map). He was in a
position to advance rapidly to the Marne, and if his flanks could broaden the
sharp salient he was creating, he could sniff Paris. By the end of the next
day, his forces were on the high ground north of Soissons, and infiltrating to
the east of the town.
However, that same day saw the first
significant involvement of the American army. Its 1st Division,
acting with the French 1st Army, was part of a successful
counter-attack and capture of Cantigny, near Montdidier. This pressurised the
north-west of the German advance, and was an ominous sign, since 250,000
American troops were now arriving in France every month.
On 29th came the next German
surge towards the Marne. Soissons fell, and by the evening of 30th
von Boehne had control of a ten mile stretch of the Marne, around Chateau
Thierry. However, on his flanks he could not advance beyond Soissons, nor could von Below take Reims.
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| Paul Maistre - somewhat harshly sacked for caving in at Les Chemin des Dames |
Ludendorff was reaching the limits of his
advance. He needed desperately to broaden the base of his salient, the tip of
which was Chateau Thierry. The lure of Paris was too great for him to stop, but
it meant he must commit all of his forty Divisions and most of his reserve –
the very trap into which he had planned to force Foch. A series of actions, very
costly for the Germans, created an uneasy stalemate by 3rd June, and
a need for Ludendorff to switch the
focus of his attack. This came on 9th June, with a major attack to
the west, led by von Hutier in the Montdidier-Noyons sector. He was seeking to
reach Compiegne, from where he could attack Paris from a more northerly
direction. Desperate attack encountered desperate defence (shades of Verdun),
and von Hutier’s storm troopers had only limited success. Nevertheless, on 10th
June the French were falling back towards Paris, before a defensive arrangement
by General Mangin (now back in favour, see Post 13/5/2017) defined the furthest point
of the German effort.
From now, counter-attack tactics by Mangin
and increasing numbers of American reinforcements began to turn the tide on a battle
front before Paris that now stretched for
nearly 100 miles – recalling the great 1914 Marne battle.
Final German efforts to break through at Courcelles,
on 13th June, and Reims, on 19th June, were repulsed with
very heavy German losses. The German storm troop tactics had finally been blunted, then
exhausted. A lull followed for nearly one month, but when hostilities resumed the Allies would be the ones on the front foot.
* codenamed by
Ludendorff, as with other Kaisershlacht initiatives, as Operation Blucher-Yorck (after two Prussian generals of the
Napoleonic wars)
