"Kaiserschlacht" 4: The March Retreat

Ferdinand Foch.
Good man in a crisis

The scale of the German attack on 21^st March had been unprecedented. A look at the map shows that the area captured in two weeks was many times greater than the entire Allied gains of the five months Somme campaign in 1916 (shaded area). Seemingly a major German victory? In terms of ground gained, perhaps. But in other ways the gains were inadequate. Firstly, Ludendorff’s objectives for day one had not been met (he was as guilty as Haig of overoptimistic planning). Secondly, a look at the map and the triangular shape of the final gains, shows much greater success in the southern half of the sector. However, it was in the north that Ludendorff needed greater progress to roll up the British army in Flanders; and it was in the north where Byng’s 3^rd Army defences were much stronger than Gough’s 5^th Army. As Operation Michael progressed it was natural that the Germans would want to exploit the breakthrough at the Crozat Canal (see previous post 21/3/2018), but here they would have to travel further west to block the French routes fro reinforcement to the British – and greater distances meant longer lines of communication. Von Hutier’s demands for men and supplies began to outweigh those of von Below and von Marwitz.

The 22^nd April began badly for Gough’s army in the south, and deterioration continued for several days. Tergnier was captured by mid morning at the southern limit of Gough’s section, and by early afternoon all of his men were on their rear most defensive lines, from east of Peronne down to Tergnier (see map).  

Byng’s army was holding firm in the north, but by the evening this distortion of the line was leading to dangerous gaps between divisions. The Germans were exploiting these, and desperate efforts at plugging them with reserves (including some French companies arriving be bus) were barely adequate. The northernmost Corps of Gough’s army, below the Flesquieres salient, led by General Ivor Maxse, pulled back to the Somme at Peronne to support those on his right. This of course, created a gap between the 5^th and 3^rd Armies, and Byng was obliged to withdraw behind the Canal du Nord to align. He also lost some ground in front of Arras including Bullecourt, but thereafter held firm.
All through the night into the 23^rd the 5^th army pulled back, under severe pressure. Gough was soon faced with withdrawal across the Somme to avoid complete destruction. He began this on the morning, and all bridges and crossings were blown as soon as the men could be got across. Buchan refers to Saturday 23^rd as “possibly the most difficult day in the annals of the British Army”. Fierce rearguard actions continued all day between Tergnier and Peronne, and north of the latter the Germans, by then end of the day, had reached the furthest points of the Allied gains in November 1916. On this day, significant efforts were made by RAF aircraft harrying German advances and supporting British withdrawals.

In a separate action on this momentous day Ludendorff agreed to launch ‘Mars’ – a subsidiary operation to ‘Michael’, attacking the British line north of Arras. However, Byng was alert to the danger, and had withdrawn his men out of range of the German field artillery. The Germans were frustrated and decided to wait until they could bring up heavy artillery.

Taking stock after three hard days of rearguard actions, Petain agreed to Haig’s request to take over Gough’s section south of Peronne. British units still remaining there now came under the French command of General Fayolle (French Sixth Army). The days of 25^th and 26^th became a managed retreat, with fierce fighting, heavy casualties and heroics. In particular, the artillery, cavalry and RAF earned great credit for the support of the hard pressed and exhausted infantry. On the old Somme battleground of Combles and Lesboeufs (see post 30/8/2016) the valiant actions of the South African Brigade (recalling ironically its amazing actions at nearby Delville Wood two years earlier) resulted in its destruction, but enabled Byng’s right flank to retreat and consolidate a line.

Ivor Maxse. Stout
resistance. Made his
reputation in tactical
training for the final
victory.

By now the right and centre of Byng’s army and the left of Gough’s were virtually back to the Somme front line of 1/7/1916, whereas Maxse’s Corps was still clinging on near the Somme south of Peronne. All were in weak and makeshift defences. Continued pressure pushed the lines back beyond the Ancre, and to the south between the Somme and the Oise, making Maxse’s position untenable. The Germans reached the important town of Noyon. French reinforcements began to arrive in numbers, but the Germans punched a gap in the line at Nesle, enabling rapid further progress and a check on the French move towards Roye (see map).

The crisis was at hand. Haig had requested the CIGS (Sir Henry Wilson) presence on site, and Lloyd George also sent Lord Milner, Secretary of the War Cabinet. On 26^th they met with Petain, Foch and Clemenceau at Compiegnes. They agreed that the emergency called for unified action, directed by a military supremo. The 66 years old Marshall Ferdinand Foch was in the right place at the right time, and late on that day became the Supreme Allied Forces Commander. He inherited a parlous position. The route to Amiens was almost open, and the British and French armies in danger of separation. Greatly to their credit, Gough and his staff (removed from the front line action) organised a good defensive line to the east of Amiens. This would hold and keep the two sides connected. After 26^th the line north of Albert stabilized, thanks to the arrival of reinforcements including a new generation of smaller, more mobile tanks. There were also some signs that the German juggernaut was running out of steam, through exhaustion and extended communications. To the south, the Germans continued to make gains, pushing south and west of Nesle, and heading towards Montdidier to block French movements. Von Hutier’s most strenuous efforts took him within range of Montdidier, but he was dangerously extended.

March 28^th proved another tumultuous day. The Germans made their final concerted effort to break through to Amiens. Although Ludendorff’s original plan had been stymied, he still hoped that by taking the more southerly route, particularly capturing Amiens and Montdidier, he could isolate the British army. To the north he re-launched Operation Mars against Arras and Vimy Ridge with heavy artillery in support. Magnificent defence and counter-offensive by 3^rd army ensured that this gambit failed completely to break through. Also, this day spelt then end for Gough’s brave, shattered army. They were take completely out of the line, to be replaced by Rawlinson’s 4^th army. Rawlinson was ordered to hold a seven miles section of the new front, south of the Somme (compare this with 5^th Army’s 42 miles section on 21^st March).

The French now felt the force of von Hutier’s thrusts to break through between Roye and Montreuil. After a two day lull, he made his final small gains on 4^th April. By 6^th April, Operation Michael was at an end. Amiens was safe, and the line held there at Villers Bretonneux. The Noyons/Montdidier/Montreuil line was held by the French. The Germans, in this sector, were punched out.

Nevertheless, the map showed extraordinary German gains, and there was consternation in London. Gough was scapegoated. It was an undoubted defeat, but out of this disaster came two indicators of a shift in fortunes. Firstly, Foch in his new role as Generalissimo was able to achieve rapid transfer of colonial forces to reinforce Montdidier, holding off von Hutier; second was the repulse of von Below’s forces at Arras and Vimy Ridge. Ludendorff’s memoirs record that action as the point he realised the spirit of his army was cracking.

Thus, it was a defeat that showed the way to victory. The  British suffered 300,000 casualties (German losses were similar). The 5^th Army had barely a chance – its ‘rout’ was epic nonetheless, and helped the armies either side of it to foil the German plans. Byng’s 3^rd army had blunted the sharpest weapons the Germans could throw at them. Ludendorff still had other places to look for his next attempt at the killer breakthrough, but time was not on his side.