At the start of 1915, the fortified Western Front stretched 350
miles from the Swiss alps to the Channel. The German fleet was trapped in its
harbours, and the British could neither lure it out, nor go behind it to
alleviate behind the front. Thus, for the first time in recent military
history, there was no scope for a turning movement. Frontal assault was known
to be costly, and very likely to be fruitless – hence the stalemate. (Nevertheless,
full frontal attacks were pursued by the French and British throughout 1915,
1916 and 1917 at horrific cost). Until the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in march, described alter, there were only skirmishes and small tactical actions along the whole front.
From some British leaders’ viewpoint (Churchill and Lloyd George
especially), the Western front was at an impasse – attackers would fare worse
than defenders – and France was completely pre-occupied by the invasion of her
soil. Russia was under pressure, and communication was poor; the Fleet was now
in control of the high seas, and the likely theatre for realistic progress was
the near East/Eastern Mediterranean. They pressurized Asquith, promoting the
near East as a new theatre of war. Like the German ‘east or west’ debate, there
were those on the British side – Kitchener, Grey, French – plus the authority
of Joffre in France, who shared Falkenhayn’s military view that only decisive
victory on the Western front could break the deadlock.
Falkenhayn was still smarting from losing his personal argument with Hindenburg re East/west strategy, and resolved to create another reserve army that he could employ on the Western Front. He planned to take battalions from various quieter points of the front, add in some reserves and create the new 11th Army, to be placed under control of two of his rising stars, Colonels von Seeckt and Krafft.
Falkenhay's Plan (from Churchill: The Great War Vol II) |
Falkenhayn was still smarting from losing his personal argument with Hindenburg re East/west strategy, and resolved to create another reserve army that he could employ on the Western Front. He planned to take battalions from various quieter points of the front, add in some reserves and create the new 11th Army, to be placed under control of two of his rising stars, Colonels von Seeckt and Krafft.
Hans von Seeckt (1866-1936) A brilliant strategist, he later became influential in strategy for Hitler's Wehrmacht |
Over a period of two months he planned to build this army, and chose
the area of the front from Arras to the Somme for a full frontal attack to pierce
the Allied line. The right flank of the British line at La Bassee would come under
early pressure, and the aim was to push it back towards Boulogne and Calais, wrapping
up the British, French and Belgian forces to the north. The tenth French army
of Maud’huy would be pushed south and west, creating a wide gap through to the Pas
de Calais.
This plan did not materialise – the British struck first at Neuve Chapelle
in early March, and in fact his new 11th Army was also destined to move
to the Eastern Front, not serve in the West